Space Launch System Independent Evaluation
March
2013
Contact: caae@wt.net
NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS)
has encountered too many obstacles to be successfully completed. This
evaluation found the following neglected and unsolvable problems:
·
The SLS is based on the Apollo Saturn V expendable heavy launch
vehicle concept which is obsolete and has been found to be unaffordable. The
launch of two SLS vehicles for a crew and cargo mission is expected to exceed
a conservatively $4 billion
(FY2011) launch cost evaluation. A feasibility NASA Mars mission study
indicates that an austere human science and exploration mission ( http://trs-new.jpl.nasa.gov/dspace/bitstream/2014/41432/1/09-3135.pdf ) could
require 15 SLS launches for crew, cargo and habitat at a minimum cost of $30 to
$40 billion over a four year period for one manned Mars mission.
·
NASA has been disingenuous in their promotion of the safety of the
Orion MPCV. The Orion MPCV or any of the commercial crew modules are known
potential deathtraps.
·
The SLS’s Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) does not
have sufficient payload return to earth capability to meet the need for
commercial development of deep space resources. In order for the nation’s 21st
century deep space transportation system to be sustainable it must have
commercial support.
·
China will develop a space transportation system with commercial
applications which will be based on a reusable space shuttle launch concept.
NASA’s Space
Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program (SLS/MPCV) will fail
because…mission costs are too high, the Orion MPCV crew module has an
unsolvable water recovery issue, and there is no commercial or military
application.
The following SLS/MPCV “operation”
cost estimates were presented to the Congressional Budget Office to make the
executive branch aware of the prohibitive cost to operate expendable heavy lift
vehicles.
·
The SLS development program scenario based on 13
flights over a 21 year period would have extreme difficulty maintaining the
manufacturing labor force for such a low flight rate. However, it is the
introduction of the cargo vehicle which forewarns that it will require two
launches of these mammoth vehicles to accomplish one mission. The SLS is the
same heavy lift launcher concept used in the Constellation program which was
cancelled because: "The U.S. human spaceflight
program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory. It is perpetuating
the perilous practice of pursuing goals that do not match allocated
resources.” Such is the case today.
·
The following extremely conservative $4.2b estimate of annual
operations cost for the SLS indicated it will cost more to manufacture the
expendable vehicles, plan the mission, and conduct flight operation than NASA
has budgeted for human exploration. NASA is assuming that future budgets will
be increased to cover mission operations. THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN!
SLS/MPCV Operational Launch Cost
Estimate
FY 2010
Manned Launch
$ mil
|
Flight/Launch Contract
Labor Cost (11,000 total workforce JSC,MSFC,KSC) |
1,375 |
|
SRB (2) 5 segment |
160 |
|
Civil Service |
250 |
|
1st stage tanks |
75 |
|
1st stage
engines (4 RS-25E) |
200 |
|
2nd stage (tank) |
10 |
|
2nd stage
engine ( 3 J2-X engines) |
70 |
|
GFE |
30 |
|
Logistic |
87 |
|
Misc. ( fuel,range,etc.) |
77 |
|
Orion MPCV |
450 |
|
Total
Manned Launch |
2,784 |
Cargo Launch
|
SLS manned cost less
flight/launch labor fixed cost and MPCV |
709 |
|
Lander (cargo) |
730 |
|
Total Cargo Launch |
1,439 |
Annual Operation
Cost ~ Two Flights/YR
|
Total |
4,223 |
Flight/Launch Labor Cost – space shuttle labor cost for
mission planning and flight preparation was reduced to an operational level of
16,500 employees in 2004.
Constellation work force was assumed to be 6,000 which were unrealistic
for support from three NASA centers. For the SLS/MPCV an optimistic mission
operation workforce of 11,000 was used. Salary cost to NASA would be $125k per
employee for an annual fixed cost of $1.375b plus benefits..
SRB (2) 5 segment – Thiokol had a manufacturing workforce of
1400 for shuttle and an engineering/staff support of 490. Using the lower $125k
for the Thiokol workforce makes the annual labor cost for four 5 segment
SBR’s to be $60m each. It will be extremely difficult to manufacture only
four 5 segment SRB’s per year for less than $80m each.
Civil Service – Civil service oversight and support for
shuttle was at 2000 employees in 2004. This number was use for this evaluation even
though CS would have considerable more oversight responsibility for five
different SLS configurations, SLS, MPCV, crew habitat module, and landers) with
five different primary propulsion systems. Fixed annual cost is estimated to be
$250m.
1st stage tanks - The shuttle external tank production
operations used 703 employees. However another 1300 employees charged to the
tank production for engineering support, facilities, and quality control. If
this number of production support employees could be reduce to 300 and material
cost limited to $10m the tank cost could be reduced to $75m. Not an impossible
goal.
1st stage engines (5 RS-25E) – The cost for the
shuttle SSME engine (RS-25D) in 1989 was reported to be $38m. Considering
inflation the cost and the reduction in non-reusable engine cost, the RS-25E
was assumed to cost $40 per engine.
2nd stage (tank) – A tank cost of $10m assumes the
2nd stage tank can be built by the same labor force as the 1st
stage tank. Cost includes materials and transportation to KSC.
2nd stage engines - (3, J2-X engines) – Reported
to cost $24m each.
GFE – $87m was based on shuttle cost for government furnished
equipment such as crawler transport.
Logistic - $77m was based on like shuttle charges for base
maintenance as related to operations.
Misc. - $42m for range support, crew/capsule recovery, fuel, etc.
Orion MPCV - The Apollo CSM had a unit price of $77m in 1972, in
2010 $ that is $429m. Each
ATV cost about $304 m according
to ESA and the Japanese HTV spacecraft production cost is reported
to $220m. A conservative unit cost for the MPCV is $450m.
Lander – Constellation
program had a per unit lander cost of $730m.
“It’s
the Launch Cost…Stupid”… paraphrasing Bill Clinton’s
presidential economy election theme. It
takes five SLS vehicles configurations to support NASA’s unaffordable
launch program.
The Orion MPCV Crew Module is a Death Trap
NASA Management has chosen not to
disclose that crew modules have unsolvable safety issues that are inherent to
all crew modules. There is historical evidence that validates crew modules have
been no safer than the space shuttle. In fact it is by chance that the crew
module safety record is not much worst. Every flight of the Orion
Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) or any of the commercial crew modules will be
a “test flight.” NASA management has chosen to disregard the
perilous “entry” phase of flight where Soyuz cosmonauts were killed
when their crew module failed during reentry and the recent near fatal reentry
mishaps…all related to manufacturing errors.
Orion Crew Module Crash Site
The
Orion MPCV would be an acceptable risk if there was not a safer option for crew
safety. The crew escape modules which can be installed on automatic space
shuttles will be that option.
The following NASA release and
emails confirm:
·
NASA administrator Charles Bolden issued a NASA release stating
the Orion MPCV is designed to be ten times safer during ascent and entry than its
predecessor, the space shuttle. NASA release 11-164(It is impossible to achieve
this design goal and there is no
analysis supporting this claim!)
·
The NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance and the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel were notified that that the safety record of crew modules
does not support this safety claim and requested their position on the safety
of the Orion MPCV (email, dated June 15, 2011).
·
The Chief of the NASA Office of Safety and
Mission Assurance in the email (dated June 16, 2011) seemed unaware of NASA
release 11-164. However he did confirm that the Orion did not meet their safety
requirements at the preliminary design review (PDR) for the Constellation program
(Cx). (There is no feasible concept available to
make crew modules safer than the space shuttle during entry).
·
The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel elected
not to release their position of this safety challenge of Orion MPCV.
Disingenuous NASA Orion MPCV Safety Declaration:
Michael Braukus/J.D.
Harrington
Headquarters, Washington
202-358-1979/5241
michael.j.braukus@nasa.gov j.d.harrington@nasa.gov
May 24, 2011
RELEASE : 11-164
NASA Announces Key Decision For Next Deep Space Transportation System
WASHINGTON -- NASA has
reached an important milestone for the next U.S. transportation system that
will carry humans into deep space. NASA Administrator
Charles Bolden announced today that the system will be based on designs
originally planned for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle. Those plans now will
be used to develop a new spacecraft known as the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle
(MPCV).
"We are committed to human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit and look
forward to developing the next generation of systems to take us there,"
Bolden said. "The NASA Authorization Act lays out a clear path forward for
us by handing off transportation to the International Space Station to our
private sector partners, so we can focus on deep space exploration. As we
aggressively continue our work on a heavy lift launch vehicle, we are moving
forward with an existing contract to keep development of our new crew vehicle
on track."
Lockheed Martin Corp. will continue working to develop the MPCV. The spacecraft
will carry four astronauts for 21-day missions and be able to land in the
Pacific Ocean off the California coast. The spacecraft will have a pressurized
volume of 690 cubic feet, with 316 cubic feet of habitable space. It is designed to be 10 times safer during
ascent and entry than its predecessor, the space shuttle.
http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2011/may/HQ_11-164_MPCV_Decision.html
Email Warning to NASA Safety Office and ASAP:
From: Don
Nelson [mailto:danelson@wt.net]
Sent: Wednesday,
June 15, 2011 9:04 PM
To: Burch, Susan (HQ-TDOOO); Oconnor, Bryan (HQ-GAOOO)
Attn: Office of Safety and Mission Assurance:
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Subject:
Crew Module Safety Issue
Recently published statements
attributed to NASA state that the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Is: "designed
to be 10 times safer during ascent and entry than its
predecessor, the Space Shuttle." Is this statement the position of the
NASA's safety oversight authorities? If so, as a retired NASA engineer with
extensive experience in the operation of crew modules, I challenge the authenticity
of this statement.
While the crew escape tower on the
MPCV does provide significant improvement over a Space Shuttle without crew
escape pods, it does not negate the many factors that have made crew modules a
death trap during the re-entry phase of flight. As example, historically the
Russian Soyuz crew module's safety record is not significantly better than that
the Space Shuttle. While the Soyuz crew module has experienced a failure of the
escape tower it has been the re-entry phase of flight that has proven to be the
fatal environment for flight crews. Potential fatal crew module failures are:
• Every crew module
flight is a test flight! Manufacturing errors have occurred.
• Water landings are an
unacceptable dangerous risk to flight and recovery crews. Land landings have
the potential expose the crew to fatal high g loads upon impact.
• Crew modules have very
limited cross range capability which could require a reentry into unacceptable
weather conditions.
• Crew module's notorious
reentry errors result in an expanses landing zone that could prevent rapid
access to the crew in dire circumstances.
• Parachutes are known
to fail. This is another unacceptable single point failure.
There are too many potential failures
with fatal consequences for a crew module to be even
considered for 21st century
human space transportation. The Russian Soyuz crew module is still in service
only because their government cannot afford to develop a safer reusable lifting
body winged runway landing crewed spacecraft (http://en.wordpress.com/tag/kilper/).
While NASA spends billions developing the MPCV crew module which is nothing
more than a political derived government jobs program. Furthermore, the crewed
missions proposed for the MPCV can be conducted more efficiently with robotic
spacecraft. The silence of the NASA crew safety oversight authorities on the
safety of the MPCV is a deadly silence. Will you remain silent?
Don A. Nelson
Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer
Alvin TX
EMAIL REPLY FROM NASA SAFETY OFFICE:
__________________________________________
From: "Oconnor, Bryan (HQ-GAOOO)"
<bryan.oconnor@nasa.gov>
To:
"Don Nelson" <danelson@wt.net>; "Burch, Susan
(HQ-TDOOO)" <susan.burch@nasa.gov>
Cc: "Cooke, Douglas
(HQ-BAOOO)" <douglas.cooke-1 @nasa.gov>; "Wilcutt,
Terrence W. (JSC-NA111)" <terrence.w.wilcutt@nasa.gov>
Sent: Thursday,
June 16, 2011 6:40 AM
Subject: RE:
Crew Module Safety Issue
Don,
I don't know about these statements
(or misstatements). I cannot vouch for everything NASA people have said over
the past few years about risk, but there is nothing official out of NASA saying
Orion or MPCV must be ten time safer than shuttle for ascent or entry. The
level 1 requirements set for Cx included a
requirement that the PRA show total ascent risk to be 1/1000 in the mean, and
same for entry. Those numbers represent somewhere between half and 1/3 the risk
of shuttle for the same phases of flight.
At PDR, the Cx
design PRA estimate was better than the requirement for ascent and not there yet for entry, but
they had some design changes, including improvements in landing system failure
tolerance they were looking at to get the entry PRA to 1/1000.
We
don't have a set of level 1 requirements yet for the next NASA developed human
system, but we do plan to
use the Cx numbers above as part of our human rating
requirements set for commercial crew to ISS. I agree this will be a challenge for any capsule for all the reasons
you give if not more.
As for
my community's silence on this matter, I
normally don't comment on
unsubstantiated rumors floating around the internet, but be assured I
have a voice and an audience within NASA, and I will not hold my tongue if I
think we are doing something that puts our crews in an unacceptable risk
posture.
Best,
O'C
Comment:
The NASA safety office continues to remain silent on the unsupported Orion MPCV
safety claim.
Dismal
Flight History of Crew Modules:
Launch
Escape Tower Failure - May 2009 – The Soyuz escape tower suffered a central thrust chamber
malfunction. Manufacturing error suspected.
Entry
Module Failures
Strato Lab V – Crewman drowned during ocean retrival.
Strato-Lab V
Mercury Liberty Bell 7 – Lost
capsule but save crewman during ocean retrival.
Soyuz 1 – Cosmonaut killed on
landing.
Soyuz 11 – Three cosmonauts died
from asphyxiation caused by module leakage during entry.
Soyuz 23 – Had near disastrous
landing on icy lake.
Soyuz TM-5 – Problem with
deorbit engine…computer failure.
Soyuz TMA-1 - Ballistic entry
occurred…technical malfunction landed 300 mile off course.
Soyuz TM-10 – Ballistic entry
occurred…cable malfunction caused heat shield problem.
Soyuz TM-11 – Same problem as on
TM-10…. Manufacturing errors suspected.
The failure history of crew modules
repeats itself because it flight is a test flight subjected to manufacturing
errors. Recover of a crew in any sea state is always a gamble with their lives.
The only way to insure any improvement in astronaut safety is to provide crew
escape pods and that is only available on an automated space shuttle.
Soyuz 1 Crash Site
Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods
This is the only viable crew
escape/safe haven system and is available only on the CSS.
·
Commercial
Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods
·
The
orbiter mass property issue is resolved by removing the piloting functions to
provide weight margin for the pods (~ 3,700 pounds). Escape pod weigh is 700
pounds per pod. The pods provide protection for all phases of flight. At launch
pad and lower altitudes escapes, a ballute deploys to
slow the pod for parachute deploy. The pod’s life support system provides
on-orbit safe haven in the event the cabin pressure is breached. Target lifetime
for life support is 20 days to allow for on-orbit rescue. Pods are located
behind the nose cone heat shield wake to reduce excessive thermal loads in the
event of a Columbia type entry failure. The pod is also equipped with a heat
shield system. The pod must be a “smart pod” ... it must have
knowledge of the environment.
The crew escape pod is the key to reducing the shuttle operations cost and
providing safe access to space for the astronauts. To install the pods requires
weight be removed from the cabin area or the forward center of gravity limit
would be violated. The only function in the cabin area that is not required for
flight operation is the piloting function. All piloting functions can be
automated. Automated flight has been conducted for all phase of flight
operation. Removing the piloting subsystems (commander and pilot weight, seats,
forward flight deck displays and control systems, escape pole, forward windows,
etc. ) provides a weight margin of nearly 3,700 pounds that can be used to install
the escape pods. The only major roadblock is the steadfast objection of
NASA’s spaceflight management to carrying astronauts on automated space
vehicles. This is an inbred management policy that has festered in the human
space programs for far too long!
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Commercial Deep Space
Development:
Robotic and human exploration
missions are the path finders for mankind’s roles in deep space. However,
for mankind to have a sustainable future in deep space there must be a
commercial benefit to offset the development and operation costs. The
commercial satellite business is an example of this basic requirement for
sustainability as signified by the success of Arianespace. Recently
entrepreneurs Asteroid Resources and Deep Space Industries announce plans for
deep space commercial ventures. These ventures will remain dreams of grandeur
until our limited space development resources are redirected to the development
of an affordable commercial space transportation system with significant
payload return to earth capability. The SLS has none of these attributes.
The predicted average commercial medium to heavy launches for the
next ten years is 11 per year. The Commercial Space System (CSS) has the
potential to capture a majority of these launches by offering the unique
capability of satellite on-orbit checkout before release and returning faulty
satellites for repair. Once the space tug is operational satellites can be
serviced on-orbit or retrieve. The CSS can offer tourist flights to reduce cost
of cargo delivery.
Space Launch System/Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Versus
Commercial Space System
|
|
SLS/MPCV |
CSS |
|
Launch Cost |
$2.78b |
$1.1b |
|
Development Cost Estimate |
$38b |
$7.8b |
|
Operational Availability |
2017 |
2017 |
|
Crew Safety |
Poor |
Good |
|
Commercial Applications |
No |
Yes |
|
Payload Return Capability |
No |
Yes |
|
Maximum Launches/Year |
2 |
12 |
|
Military Applications |
No |
Yes |
|
Space Based Support |
Possible |
Yes |
|
Vehicle Upgrade Potential |
Limited |
Excellent |
|
Launch Fails Mission Fails |
Yes |
No |
It is mandatory that this
nation’s 21st century space transportation system reduce launch
operations costs. The two keys factors for reducing launch cost operations is
the removal of NASA (government operations) from the control of space flight
operations and introducing reusable vehicles for launch, near earth, and deep
space transportation. This space transportation plan is an evolutionary process
for establishing reusable launch and space based vehicles. In the near term existing expendable space transportation vehicles
would supplement space transportation requirements. This is the only viable
concept that can provide a feasible and realistic launch system in the
foreseeable future. Its development is a mandatory requirement to provide a
safe human transportation system. Key to this plan is the long range roadmap
that provides direction to NASA and the aerospace community. The development
schedule will accelerate or decrease as the needs for exploration requirements
dictate. Unlike
the SLS/MPCV, the CSS provides a stair step approach outlining the strategic
plan for four decades. To get somewhere…we’ve got to know where
we’re going.” The funding available may cause the schedule to vary,
but the direction is clear.
What
is the Commercial Space System (CSS)?
The CSS uses the remanufactured orbiter airframe,
external tank, and SRM boosters. The orbiter is updated with subsystem
components that are quickly replaceable modules to reduce vehicle turnaround
time. Computer software and hardware is upgraded and the vehicle is operation
without inflight piloting requirements. Crews will be flown only on missions
requiring their support for onboard payloads or to be transferred to space
based vehicles. On crewed missions the crew escape pods will be installed. The
entry thermal protection system will have on orbit repair capability and
advanced X-37 program improved tiles. Pad assembly of the space shuttle will
also reduce operations cost and turnaround time. Rapid turn-around is a unique
CSS feature and which supports the military requirement and provide the capability
of timely intercepts of asteroids/comets that may impact earth.
The deep space vehicles will initially be
unmanned space based tugs. They are a
key factor for reducing mission cost and increasing mission success. Tugs can
be supplied by the shuttle and expendable launch vehicles. Tugs can support
near earth, lunar, and deep space missions.
Russian
Space Based Tug
This proposed
Russian vehicle called the Parom is a space based
inter-orbit “tug”. Future space based tugs can conduct the
following missions at significantly reduce operation cost and reduced chance of
mission failure.
The space tugs are the first step to
establishing a “Star Trek Enterprise” space cruiser for deep space
exploration and commercial ventures. NASA’s future is in the development
of these space based vehicles to be operated by the commercial sector…not
in obsolete Apollo class heavy lift launch vehicles.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
The China
National Space Administration (CNSA) can be expected to introduce a reusable
space shuttle transportation system by 2020. The program is designed Project
921-3 and is convincing evidence that CNSA understands that at 21st
century space program must be based on reusable space vehicles with capability
to launch and return crew and cargo from spaced based facilities. With a space
shuttle and spaced based infrastructure China will become the dominate space
faring nation.
In
October 2006 the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) revealed
that China is developing a winged space shuttle for use in the 2020 time frame.[9]
Concept images indicate the planned space plane may be about 2/3 the size of
the U.S. and Russian space shuttles. But instead of a using a large fuel tank
that powered launch engines in the space plane, it uses a separate three-part
liquid fuel booster.
USAF X-37B
The third mission of the X-37B space shuttle was launch in 2012. The success of this “automated” space vehicle will force the Chinese to develop an automated space shuttle.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Don
A. Nelson is an aerospace consultant and writer. Mr. Nelson has consulted with
congressional and government offices on NASA issues since his retirement from
NASA in January 1999 after 36 years with the agency. He has made numerous media
appearances on national and foreign television. He participated in the Gemini,
Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Projects as a mission planner and operations
technologist. Mr. Nelson was a supporting team member for the first rendezvous
in space, first manned mission to the moon, first manned lunar landing, and the
first flight of the Space Shuttle. During his last 11 years at NASA, he served
as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation
projects. He was a member of the design team for the space shuttle. His NASA experiences give him a unique
knowledge of NASA’s problems and for seeking feasible and realistic
solutions. Mr. Nelson is a graduate of Southern Methodist School of
Engineering. He is a certified private pilot and holds a Phase VI Pilot
Proficiency Wings award from the Federal Aviation Administration.
Mr. Nelson is the author of:
“NASA
New Millennium Problems and Solutions”
by
Don A. Nelson
Written by a retired NASA engineer, this
easy-to-read book is insider's look at many of the space program's current
problems. Not only does it predict the most recent shuttle disaster, it
provides a detailed understanding of why our nation's exploration of its 'last
frontier' is headed for disaster. With aging shuttles, no definitive plans for
future of the vehicle, and poor management, Nelson's book is a wake-up call to
all Americans to take note and action...or lose the hope of conquering the
stars (Barnes & Noble review).
Now is the time to: ”Speak out…or forever suffer
the consequences of remaining silent!”