Commercial Space
Shuttle / Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles
The Heavy Lift Launch Solution NASA Refuses
to Evaluate
April 2010
NASA senior management has refused to evaluate a
heavy lift launch program consisting of the existing space shuttle and existing
heavy lift launch vehicles operated by United Launch Alliance (see Bolden $20 Bet).
This failure of due diligence is the result of management decisions being made
on conjecture rather than engineer analyses. Decades of failed NASA projects
are the direct results of senior management miscalculations and have been
allowed to continue by the failure of oversight responsibility by the president’s
Office of Science and Technology and the Office of the NASA Inspector General. Will
President Obama let NASA continue to drift into oblivion?
Existing Heavy Launch Solution
The following Commercial Space Shuttle (CSS) /
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) report presents a feasible and
realistic option that solves the following critical
·
Provides the most cost effective
launch system for transporting human and cargo to low earth orbit
(LEO) by privatizing the shuttle as previously approved by NASA.
·
Establishes the course of action for developing and
operating a cost effective space based LEO and deep space
transportation system for human and robotic missions and eliminates
the need to develop heavy lift launch vehicles (HLV).
·
Transfers the space shuttle system to the
private sector in an orderly manner and eliminates the International
Space Station (ISS) supply gap by providing continuous crew and cargo support.
·
Removes the need to terminate thousands of skilled
aerospace employees supporting space shuttle operations.
·
Abolishes the necessity to purchase foreign launch
services for ISS and eliminates the single source Russian Soyuz crew transfer
accessibility to the ISS.
·
Stimulates the
·
Removes NASA from the responsibility of conducting
routine human launch operations and allows the agency
to focus on technology development.
·
Establishes a space based
transportation system which has the goal of returning
extraterrestrial resources and establishing human safe haven facilities.
This report recommends that special emphasis must be
made on solutions for upgrading the earth observations satellite system and the
increasing threat of asteroids and comets impact
on Earth.
The report also issues a warning that the “The
Central People’s Government of The
People’s Republic of China” will develop a space shuttle
within the next ten years. If the
Don
A. Nelson
Nelson
Aerospace Consulting
Retired
NASA Aerospace Engineer
Contact: nasaproblems@yahoo.com
Letter to the President dated July 17, 2009
===============
NASA APPROVED
SHUTTLE PRIVATIZATION
In response to the 107th Congress’s request
to investigate privatizing the space shuttle program (SSP), NASA issued the following:
CONCEPT OF
PRIVATIZATION OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
//s/Ronald D. Dittemore 9/28/01
Ronald D. Dittemore September 28, 2001
Manager, Space
Shuttle Program
Summary
It is believed that utilization of the Space Shuttle for human
access to space will continue through at least 2015 and possibly beyond 2020.
The longevity and operational aspects of this program demand a different approach to operational management for the
future. A different
management strategy needs to be employed.
Privatization of the SSP has the potential to provide
significant benefits to the Government. However, timing is critical. The continuing erosion of NASA skills and experience
threatens the safety of the program. It is critical to take advantage of the
existing NASA SSP expertise before further erosion affects the ability to plan
and safely implement privatization. Today, the skill and knowledge legacy still
remain to formulate the appropriate merger of the NASA SSP and private
industry.
Privatization
of the space shuttle fleet eliminates the sole reliance on the questionable
Ares I /Orion launch system. Allowing the space shuttle infrastructure to be
dismantled and gather dust in museums will be a cost this nation its leadership
in space.
http://www.nasawatch.com/shuttle/09.28.01.privatization.plan.pdf
===============
Commercial Space
Shuttle (CSS)
Feasible and Realistic
Goals for the Commercial Space Shuttle
·
Reduce
the space shuttle launch cost to near the $300 million level (CSS II).
·
Support
an initial flight rate of seven flights per year and can expand the flight rate
to twelve flights per year.
·
Provide
market competitive launch services for civil and military endeavors.
·
Establish
a competitive commercial launch service.
·
Incorporate
a crew escape
pods system that provides escape avenues for all phases of flight.
·
Establish
the foundation for a space based (reusable) transportation system, developed by
NASA and commercially operated.
============
Commercial Space
Shuttle Business Plan
Preface
There is an old
axiom that governs all space endeavors… “If you can’t get it
into space…you can’t use it in space.” The ability of the
·
High
·
Failure
of the Ares I /Orion space shuttle replacement vehicle will cause immeasurable damage
to this Nation’s space endeavors! Even if the development problems can be
overcome, the operations cost will be prohibitive.
·
The
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) launch vehicles are
under funded and unproven. The COTS cargo and crew modules development and
operations cost remain more conjecture than reality.
·
NASA
plans to purchase launch services from the Russian government for space station
support and commercial
There is a Solution…Reduce our launch cost by
privatizing the Space Shuttle Fleet!!!
=================================
The Current Space
Shuttle Problems and Privatization Solutions
Too
Expensive to Operate:
The
current space shuttle’s operation consumes over 20 percent of
NASA’s budget. The NASA management structure is too fragmented (managed by
three NASA centers) to effectively and safely direct flight operations. There is no incentive to reduce
operations cost. A presidential executive order prohibits commercial
operations. This results in excessive operation cost.
Privatization
solution:
There have
been extensive undertakings to reduce the cost of expendable launch vehicles
which has resulted in significant reductions in their operations costs. There
has NEVER been any determined effort to reduce the cost of space shuttle
operations. Competitive launch cost can be achieved by:
·
Removing
all civil service support.
·
Consolidation
of operation at the launch site.
·
Automation
of ground and flight operations.
Reducing
space shuttle launch cost is not a technical challenge…it is a political
challenge. The following chart shows the breakdown where significant cost
reductions can be achieved by privatization of the space shuttle operations:
Space
Shuttle Extremely Difficult to Upgrade:
Since
1994 NASA has invested over $8 billion in upgrades for the shuttle launch
system. The
space shuttle ground and flight avionic systems were not designed to be
upgraded. The glass
cockpit upgrade is a dismal example of the upgrade problem. This project was
started in 1992 and was not completed until 2006. The cost soared to over $300
million for an upgrade that provided only a cosmetic effect and marginal flight
safety improvement.
Privatization
solution:
Automation
of the ground and flight control systems permits the introduction of modular
subsystems. A ground and flight control system based on a modular subsystem
design can be repaired or upgraded without interference to the central avionic
control computing system. Modular subsystems were first introduced on the
Boeing 777 civil airliner and are now standard designs on all modern aircraft.
It was the design baseline for the X-33 VentureStar
launch vehicle.
Reentry
Thermal Protective System is too Fragile:
Foam shedding from the external is not the problem that needs
fixing. The entry thermal tiles are too fragile and must be replaced. NASA has
failed to conduct extensive research on thermal reentry systems. However, the
Air Force X-37 space research vehicle program is addressing this critical
issue.
Privatization
solution:
Automation
will allow the introduction of vehicle ground and flight health monitoring
systems to monitor and identify breaches in the thermal protective system,
however the current tile system is unacceptable and must be replaced. On-orbit
repair must be improvement until the TSP is addressed.
No Adequate Crew Escape System:
The space shuttle must have and can have a crew escape system
for launch, on-orbit, and re-entry phases of flight.
Privatization
solution:
Automation of shuttle flight provides sufficient margins to
permit installation of crew escape pods. THERE
IS NO DOUBT THAT SURVIVABILITY WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE CHALLENGER AND
Crew escape pods cannot be
installed in crew capsules making them an unacceptable safety single point
failure!.
Commercial
Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods
SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT SAFETY and
Shuttle
reliability remains unrivaled
Robert L. "bob" Crippen | Special to the
Orlando Sentinel
January
23, 2009
The space industry is approaching a fateful six-day period that
has become an annual time of reflection and rededication, as it honors the
memory of the three great space tragedies in our history: Apollo 1 (Jan. 27,
1967), Challenger (Jan. 28, 1986) and Columbia (Feb. 1, 2003).
These
anniversaries serve as reminders that the price we sometimes pay for extending
our reach beyond our earthly grasp can be high. For that reason, it is
imperative that we base decisions about how to proceed with our nation's agenda
in space on the right arguments.
There is an ongoing discussion among the aerospace and political community
regarding the risks of flying the space shuttle beyond its current retirement
date of 2010. Those who oppose it often cite aging and safety concerns. Too
often, these arguments have been based on somewhat scary probability figures
that, by themselves, are wholly inadequate to determine how much longer the
shuttle should fly.
In weighing the options for our space program, the new administration will need
qualified, independent sources to help define the associated risk, and a common
language for discussing it. These kinds of discussions generally rely on one of
two methods for defining and accepting risk: demonstrated reliability or
predicted risk. Using predictive models, the generally accepted number based on
Probabilistic Risk Assessment of the shuttle is about a 1 in 77 chance for loss
of a vehicle on any single mission.
However, as former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin has pointed out, PRA
"depends very strongly on underlying assumptions, which are, in essence,
impossible to verify. So, in the end, we can estimate risk levels but cannot
know them accurately."
Furthermore, this approach does not factor in the multitude of safety
enhancements made since
Orbiters returning from space today are among the cleanest in program history.
From improvements to the thermal-protection system, to new wiring in the
orbiter fleet and an enhanced process for building external tanks, the program
never stops striving to improve performance and safety.
After 126
flights, the demonstrated reliability of the space shuttle is 98.4 percent.
Other than the Russian Soyuz (98.2 percent), the demonstrated reliability of
systems currently being considered for human spaceflight is zero, since those
systems have not yet flown.
Ultimately, there is no way to eliminate risk in spaceflight. At best we can
try to understand and manage it to an acceptable level. The risk of flying the
shuttle has been successfully managed in 98.4 percent of the missions. The
continuous efforts to improve the safety and reliability have resulted in a
robust system that is, in many ways, safer each time it flies.
The decision to continue flying the shuttle involves a number of important
considerations. As the new administration considers ways to meet the nation's
goals in space, it should base its policy decisions on objective assessment of
national needs, priorities and available
resources.
The space shuttle is the only
available resource and with all its faults it is far safer system then the NASA
HLV with Orion crew capsules!!! Don A. Nelson
The space
shuttle transportation system had completed a remarkable 67 consecutive
missions before having a catastrophic mission. With crew escape pods the
========================================
Procedure for Privatizing the Space
Shuttle Fleet
- The government enables space
shuttle privatization by the transfer to a US Government corporation and
then at a later date, a sale to the private sector (example: the United
States Enrichment Corporation (USEC).
- The government would provide
indemnification and tax exempt status during the period the fleet operated
as a US Government Corporation.
NASA’s decommissioning of the fleet places its value to the
government as “scrap value.”
- During the period of
operation as a US Government Corporation the private operator would use existing
NASA facilities.
- The private corporation will
upgrade the fleet and construct private launch facilities (Space
- NASA should be tasked to
conduct technology research projects that expand the capability of
the private space launch industry.
========================================
Commercial Space Shuttle
Development Phases
·
Operate
two Orbiters from current facilities during US Government Corporation phase.
·
Third
Orbiter is removed from flight operations and modified to reduce launch cost
and improve safety. The vehicle will be Commercial Space Shuttle II (CSS II).
·
Private
corporation will be permitted to sell bonds and stock to finance modifications and
startup cost.
·
Launch
market demands will determine when remaining two Orbiters will be scheduled for
upgrades.
·
Space Shuttle III will be placed in service when NASA and DARPA second generation
technologies become available.
Commercial Space Shuttle II (CSS
II)
Development Concept
CSS II is
a four year development and flight test program. It is based on existing
technology and proven ground and flight control systems. The goal is to
prove that reusable automated space vehicles are the correct approach for
developing the 21st century space transportation system. Technology
development programs for further improvement in safety and launch cost
reduction will be conducted for Commercial Space Shuttle III (CSS III).
· The operational savings are gained
from reductions in support personnel made possible by flight automation and
consolidating operations at KSC. This is a similar approach used to reduce the Ariane 5 and Evolved Expendable Launch vehicles launch
costs. Automated operation was also the program baseline for the
X-33/VentureStar project.
· The shuttle pilot training
facilities will be closed. All flight monitoring will be conducted from the
corporation flight control center(Space
· Automation provides nearly 3,700
pounds weight margin which permits installation of four escape pods.
· This launch vehicle concept is to
be tailored for a private operator. NASA will continue to have responsibility
for flight crew operations as related to payloads.
=================================
CSS
II / CEP Development Cost Estimate
Four Years Program
|
|
Cost ~ $ Mil |
|
Escape Pods |
500 |
|
Avionics |
1200 |
|
Ground Support |
800 |
|
|
|
|
Contingency/Fees(40%) |
1000 |
|
Got. Support(15%) |
375 |
|
|
===== |
|
TOTAL |
3875 |
Escape
pods cost of $500
million is for the development and delivery of 12 pods.
Avionics cost of $1.2 billion is for all
remaining Orbiters and includes integrated vehicle health management systems,
automated flight control, and replacing wiring with fiber optics. Avionics
design is to be based on modular subsystems to permit uncomplicated system
upgrades.
Ground
systems cost of
$800 million is for new pre-mission planning support, ground monitoring, and
integrated assembly/launch pad facilities. NO CSS II VEHICLE COMMAND
FUNCTIONS WILL BE REQUIRED FROM THE NASA-JSC OR NASA-KSC FACILITIES.
============================================================
Commercial Space Shuttle II Safety
and Performance Upgrade Priority List
Unlike the
Ares launch vehicles there are viable avenues for improving the performance and
safety of the CSS II. The following systems are high priority candidates for
the CSS III configuration:
· Thermal Protection System -
consideration must be given to TPS improvement. The X-37 flight test for
thermal protection must be reinstated.
· External Tank - investigate
lowering the cost of the tank.
o
Retractable
thermal ground blanket at launch pad.
o
Explore
using the tank for on orbit storage and deep space facilities.
· Solid Rocket Booster Motors
o
Test
large diameter hybrid motors.
o
Investigate
removing thrust vectoring.
o
Consider
additional manufacturer.
· Mechanical and Power
o
Replace
APU and hydraulics. Develop long life high density batteries.
· Non Toxic OMS/RCS
o
Sole
source for OMS/RCS hypergolic propellants unacceptable.
Removing flight operations from NASA permits the agency to
conduct technology !!!
It is feasible that the CSS III can compete for commercial
payloads and efficiently deliver enough payload mass to low earth orbit for
construction of large space based vehicles. This would preclude development of
a heavy lift launch vehicle.
========================================
Conclusions
·
Expanded space exploration and utilization has
been stymied in the
·
Allowing
a contractor to own (or lease) the orbiters and market launch services would
give the contractor vested interest for reducing operations costs.
·
The
United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is a successful example of
transferring government property to the private sector.
·
Privatization
of the space shuttle provides a path of minimum obstacles for the development
of a 21st century competitive space transportation system.
Commercial Space Shuttle and the
Moon
There is
only one valid reason for returning humans to the Moon…SURVIVAL. If mankind is to survive we must have safe
havens other than those on planet Earth. The Moon is the first logical step in
establishing those safe havens. As the knowledge of our universe has increased
so has the realization that planet Earth is vulnerable to threats from deep
space as well as those created on our home planet.
Anthropologists
have traced the extinction of the dinosaurs to asteroids impacting Earth and
even today this occurrence may be looming in our not too distant future as asteroid
Apophis is predicted to make an incredibly close pass
by our planet in 2029. Then the
asteroid will return in 2036 with another chance to impact the Earth. Is this
mankind’s timetable to establish permanent human presence on the Moon?
The
commercial Space Shuttle II is the first step in establishing a feasible and
realistic human REUSABLE space transportation system for colonization of the Moon.
Can we afford to continue on NASA’s Constellation or
HLV path?
The President and
Congress must take immediate action for space shuttle privatization!
================
“It’s the Launch
Cost…Stupid” paraphrasing Bill
Clinton’s presidential economy election theme. NASA must reduce its launch cost and the CSS is the only option!
Shuttle operational launch cost for space
station support are significantly less than those of Delta IV (heavy) and the
Ares I for space station crew and cargo support! The space shuttle
“current” operations cost is based on 4 shuttle launches per year
with two to ISS. The two missions to ISS meet the crew rotation and cargo
support requirements. Only the space shuttle can deliver all critical
replacement components for the station (solar arrays, mechanical arms, gyros,
radiators, etc.). Privatization allows the shuttle launches to be used for a
combination of commercial and government payloads. The shuttle launch cost
number does not include the significant reduction in civil service employees.
Delta IV Ares I crew
rotation launch cost with the Orion command service module are from the
Aerospace study of June 2009 with both vehicles based on a 14 flight life cycle
cost. Delta IV at $1.14b and Ares I at $1.36b per launch…Study Finds Human-rated Delta IV Cheaper .
Another independent approach using Apollo 17 data indicates
the cost to build the Orion would be $355 million (based on 2009 NASA inflation
cost factor). This cost may be low because ESA’s
Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) recently put in service for station cargo
support is reported to be over $300 million (Each ATV mission produces an individual
cost of about $532 million, while each spacecraft is worth about $304 million,
according to ESA).
The ground/flight support for two missions per year is
estimated to be $385 million per launch, based on two launches per year. This
assumes that NASA’s optimistic Ares I Orion workforce goal of 6000 can be
achieved. The ground/flight workforce cost for Apollo 17 was $573 million
(2009). The 2009 ground/flight support workforce for shuttle is 12,500,
therefore it is conceivable that the Ares Orion workforce cost could double
(Based on NASA data workforce average cost of $125,000 per employee).
Delta IV heavy launch cost are reported to be $300 million.
These independent numbers total $1.1 billion and indicate
that the Aerospace launch cost evaluations are a “ballpark” number.
Another unconfirmed NASA estimate put the launch cost of the Ares I Orion at
$1.8 billion for two launches a year.
The cargo launch cost numbers represent the cost of two
ATV’s. The NASA cost or the manifesting of these vehicles has not been
decided.
Apollo 7 launch costs show that the cost trend for
expendable launch vehicles will exceed that of the space shuttle especially
when the additional cargo costs are included.
CSS: Only shuttle provides cargo
delivery and return capability. The shuttle launch cost
assumes four flights per year. The privatized commercial space shuttle (CSS) assumes increased
flight rates from the commercial market. The advance commercial shuttle (CSS II)
will have significant cost and safety improvements from the upgrades made
available from a NASA proposed technology program.
NASA has never made a conscientious effort to control the cost of the
space shuttle operations. In fact, NASA space shuttle managers have rejected
and in some instances ridiculed engineers making cost saving suggestions for
shuttle operations.
Note: Apollo data ref. http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/Apollo_00a_Cover.htm
The Saturn V Mausoleum
The history lesson that expendable lunar vehicle were too expensive is
being ignored by NASA’s management. There were three Saturn V’s
available for flight when the Apollo Program was terminated because their
launch cost were consuming 30 percent of NASA annual budget for two missions a
year. With a four day lunar stay time and a cargo return of only 200 lbs., the
President, Congress and science community would not support any more Apollo
missions.
NASA’s HLV are predicted to have a seven day lunar stay time and a 400
lbs. cargo return capability.
http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/Apollo_18-16_Apollo_Program_Budget_Appropriations.htm
Cost Effective Space Based Lunar Transportation System Option
A space based lunar transportation system serviced by the space shuttle
and the Delta IV heavy launch vehicles is a feasible option for establishing a
manned lunar based. One shuttle launch (Crews plus cargo) and four Delta IV’s
can construct and support (crew plus 100Mt cargo) a lunar program at operations
costs significantly lower than the predicted $3.5 billion launch cost of the
Ares I Orion / Ares V launch system. Space based trans-lunar and lunar landing vehicles permits
the establishment of facilities for permanent manned lunar bases.
The above launch cost numbers represent “ballpark” values and
are not exact. For example the HLV is predicted to delivery only 80 Mt, however
the space shuttle and Delta IV are existing vehicles that can put 100 Mt
in LEO. The CSS vehicles have feasible and realistic upgrade options to further
reduce operation launch cost.
However even the more cost effective space based concept does not pass the
realistic test because of two key missing technologies…lunar surface electrical power
and the inability to store cryogenics for long periods. In addition it is
not realistic to expect that the crew and cargo annual logistic cost of at
least $2 billion would be supported unless the robotic missions discover lunar
resources which justify this expense or a lunar safe haven policy is adopted.
Conclusion:
Continuing with the development of NASA’s HLV program is not an
affordable venture in today’s dire economic environment especially with
an agency that has management and technology problems. The commercial space
shuttle and the Delta IV are existing launch systems that can support the far
superior space based LEO and lunar transportation system. However, key
technology issues must be solved before viable lunar bases can be achieved.
=========================
NASA is technology bankrupt.
For nearly three decades NASA has failed to institute a technology development
program. Without advancement in technology there will be no advancements in
aeronautics and space exploration. NASA’s policy of development
technology during the program development contributes to excessive cost and
program failures. Technology development must become NASA first priority.
Technology programs must be established in the following disciplines:
·
Cryogenic
Storage
·
Propulsion
Systems
·
Structural
Material
·
Electrical
Power Systems
·
Avionics
·
Manufacturing
Tooling Systems
·
Also see the author’s
book.
In the late 1980’s
NASA established technology teams in the above disciplines comprised of NASA
employees and members of the aerospace community to identify and prioritize
technologies need for future programs. No funding was ever provided for the
technology programs. Having
technology available can reduce program development cycles from the current
5-10 years to 2-4 years.
These technology working
groups must be reestablished and funded or NASA programs will continue to fail.
Cryogenic Storage: There will be no extended human lunar or deep space
missions until cryogenic fluids can be stored indefinitely.
Propulsion Systems:
The
existing space transportation system launch and orbital vehicle performance
capability is provided by chemical liquid oxygen/hydrogen (or RP-1 kerosene
fuel) engines and solid rocket or hybrid boosters. These propulsion systems
have reached their maximum performance potential. However significant cost
reductions for this class of engines can be achieved with the development of
reusable engines for launch vehicles and the development of propulsion systems
for space based vehicles. Improved sensors that provide information to decrease
maintenance and flight operations cost are key technology requirements for
these class engines and, therefore must be assigned the highest priority. In
addition space based propulsion systems would require the development of a long
duration propellant storage system.
NOTE:
The space shuttle main engine (SSME) is the only existing reusable engine. This
technology must not be lost.
The long range advance propulsion technology concepts have a
wide range of possibilities. Several propulsion systems for long range
consideration are:
Solar
Propulsion— Incorporating a reflective solar concentrator to heat liquid
hydrogen to a vapor which is expanded through a nozzle to generate thrust.
Sunlight
Sail—An extremely thin and large sheet of material is expanded in space
to capture the force of the sunlight like sailboats capture the wind for their
propulsion force.
Nuclear
Propulsion—Same principal as solar propulsion except nuclear energy is
used to heat the liquid hydrogen.
Anti-matter—Collides
a proton with a positive charge into an antiproton with a negative charge that
produces a tremendous force for propulsion.
Plasma
Rocket—hydrogen gas is heated to extreme temperatures and accelerated by
magnetic fields to provide thrust.
The
long range propulsion technologies will be extremely challenging to develop and
will require extensive laboratory research testing.
Structural materials—technologies
are needed to decrease the structural weight of space vehicles. Carbon nanotubes materials appear to have tremendous potential for
space structures. They are light weight and stronger than existing spacecraft
materials. The tubes also have the potential to
solve
the storage and leakage problems for cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen. The tubes
can only be produced under laboratory conditions. A top priority must be
assigned to the development and large scale production of this material.
Research
is required for materials to replace the shuttle thermal protective system.
Ceramic materials for engine components also have shown promise.
Electrical Power Systems—are
limited to the capability of batteries, solar arrays, and nuclear power
generators. Extensive research is required in all these areas.
Electro-mechanical actuators research is required to remove hypergolic
generator from flight systems.
Avionics—will
present an extremely difficult management problem for the development of a
space based autonomous vehicle. Foremost in these problems will be costs that
may exceed 50 percent of the vehicle total cost. The integrated health
monitoring and autonomous control system of
reusable
space vehicles also presents formidable technology challenges in the areas of
software and sensors.
Autonomous
navigation systems must be developed and verified. One of the more exciting
avionics technologies being investigated is in the field of nano-electronic
devices. Laboratory demonstrations of accelerometers, gyros, pressure sensors,
thermal actuators, and optical devices
are
resulting in encouraging indications that this technology can significantly
reduce space vehicle weight, improve safety by providing additional layers of
redundancy, and reduce operations costs.
Manufacturing Tooling Systems- Advanced materials for future space programs must
have machines that can process them. The transfer of manufacturing to foreign
countries with low labor cost has diminished this nation capability to made
manufacturating tools. There is an acute need for machines that process
existing and advance materials which allow
Science
Launch
costs can consume nearly half of a science program budget. Launch cost must
be significantly reduced or science programs will continue to struggle with
funding. Launch cost reduction must be NASA’s top priority. Reusable
space based vehicles will provide a standard capability from which science
payloads can be designed. Expendable deep space vehicle must also be
standardized to prevent science programs failures caused by transportation
system failures and budget overruns.
==========
Earth Observation Program
This is a
time for unprecedented urgency for earth science research, however there
continues to be cuts in this budget. This must be reversed. NASA technology
programs must identify opportunities to reduce earth science mission cost and
still expand gathering of scientific data. The National Research Council has warned that the Earth Observation
Program is at risk. The space observation capability has been diminished as the
earth observation satellite system deteriorates.
Near
Earth Object Program
The
Near Earth Object Program has a congressional mandate to catalogue all
asteroids and comets passing near Earth that have the potential of catastrophic
effects. NASA must do
more to protect Earth from asteroid and comets impacts. Cataloging 90% of near
earth asteroids by 2020 is an inadequate goal with dire consequences. Nearly one thousand
have been found, however the technology to deter these asteroids and comets
does not exist. The increased number of identified asteroids and comets passing
near Earth is a warning sign that must not be ignored. Earth must have an early warning
system and options must be developed for diverting or destroying
“keyhole” asteroids that will impact Earth.
Asteroids
passing in the near earth range should be studied as possible observation bases
for monitoring threats from deep space. International cooperation must be
established! President
Obama’s programs may solve the domestic and
international challenges of the nation but the greatest challenge may come from
a terrestrial and extraterrestrial disaster.
The Near Earth Object Program must have the highest NASA priority to start
planning for this threat to mankind’s very existence.
===========
The China National Space Administration (CNSA) can be
expected to introduce a reusable space shuttle transportation system by
2020. The program is designated
Project 921-3 and is convincing evidence that CNSA understands that a 21st
century space program must be based on
reusable space vehicles with the capability to launch and
return crew and cargo from space
based facilities.
With a space shuttle and a space based infrastructure
system,
Ref:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_921-3 http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.174/pub_detail.asp http://www.astronautix.com/articles/china.htm
In October 2006 the China Academy of Launch Vehicle
Technology (CALT) revealed that China is developing a winged space shuttle for
use in the 2020 time frame.[9] Concept images indicate the planned
space plane may be about 2/3 the size of the U.S. and Russian space shuttles.
But instead of a using a large fuel tank that powered launch engines in the
space plane, it uses a separate three-part liquid fuel booster.
|
|
|
|
|
The
Tian Jiao 1 (Pre-eminent in Space 1) manned spaceplane was proposed by the |
|
|
The V-2 vertical takeoff /
horizontal landing two-stage reusable space shuttle was proposed by Beijing
Department 11 of the Air Ministry in 1988. The first stage would use liquid
oxygen/kerosene engines, while the second would use liquid oxygen/hydrogen
engines. Both stages would be winged, and first flight would be no earlier
than 2015. |
Ref: http://www.astronautix.com/craftfam/chicraft.htm
Four Are
Charged in Espionage Cases Tied to China
By Evan Perez
Companies Featured in This Article:
Boeing
WASHINGTON -- The Justice Department
unveiled charges against a U.S. military analyst and a former Boeing Co.
engineer in separate cases that officials said underscore intense economic and
military espionage efforts by China in the U.S.
The unrelated cases, filed
in
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-charges-four-in-espionage-cases-tied-to-china
==============
NASA must have a space
transportation system which is reusable and space based and operated by the
private sector. The space shuttle and the Delta IV heavy offer the only
feasible option for a near term 21st century lunar transportation
system. This system provides lower operations cost and the mandatory
requirement of a minimum 10 Mt lunar cargo return. This concept can support the only valid reason for human on the
Moon…SAFE HAVEN! The following charts outlines a development
plan.
Space Based Tug- Space tugs must be a top priority for NASA’s
space transportation. They are a key factor for reducing mission cost and
increasing mission success. Tugs can be supplied by the shuttle and expendable
launch vehicles. ONLY THE SPACE SHUTTLE CAN RETRIEVE TUG PAYLOADS!
Tugs can support near earth, lunar, and deep space missions.
Lunar Program: The near term lunar
program should continue with the robotic exploration of the moon. The lunar exploration must be defined to not only
explore but also to identify the requirements for establishing the moon as a
safe haven for human survival. Lunar
safe haven is the only valid reason for establishing a human lunar base. The
schedule for that plan is outline in the above space transportation plan.
The following proposed
Lunar space transportation system (STS) provides the guidelines for the
technology development program.
Note: The lunar excursion
vehicle is space based in Moon orbit. The following technology programs must be
developed by NASA’s technology programs:
Mars
Program: Today’s technology
limitations prevent human exploration of Mars from being considered as a
feasible and realistic goal. However, the Mars STS would follow the same space
based development plan envisioned for the lunar STS. Until technology is
available significant knowledge has and can be achieved by robotic exploration.
=======================
International
Space Station Decision
There are many factors the President and Congress must consider
in deciding the future of the $120 billion International Space Station (ISS).
·
First
and foremost is the station worth the $2 billion annual cost for operations
support?
This decision must be made by consensus of all the
international partners. This nation has made a commitment that must be kept.
However, operation costs must be considered and a long duration manned tended
station instead of the current permanently manned operation may be a cost effective option
and still provide productive scientific investigations.
·
Will
the ISS be able to operate without the space shuttle from 2010 till 2020?
The ISS was designed for space shuttle support. Station
electrical power is already a critical resource. The solar arrays can only be
replaced by the space shuttle. With the existing problems of the station solar
arrays it is unrealistic to believe that existing electrical power level supply
will be available after 2010. Without the space shuttle only 132 pounds of
experiments can be returned on each Soyuz flight.
It is extremely doubtful that the ISS can
operate until 2015 without shuttle support.
NOTE:
The Commercial Space Shuttle offers the most feasible and realistic approach
for providing cost effective crew and cargo transportation to the ISS.
==============
Don A. Nelson is an
aerospace media consultant and writer. He has made numerous appearances on
national and foreign television. Mr. Nelson has consulted with congressional and
government offices on NASA issues since his retirement from NASA in January
1999 after 36 years with the Agency. He participated in the Gemini, Apollo,
Skylab, and Space Shuttle Projects as a mission planner and operations
technologist. Mr. Nelson was a supporting team member for the first rendezvous
in space, first manned mission to the moon, first manned lunar landing, and the
first flight of the Space Shuttle. During his last 11 years at NASA, he served
as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation
projects. He was a member of the design team for the space shuttle. His NASA experiences give him a unique
knowledge of NASA’s problems and for seeking feasible and realistic
solutions. Mr. Nelson is a graduate of Southern Methodist School of
Engineering. He is a certified private pilot and holds a Phase VI Pilot
Proficiency Wings award from the Federal Aviation Administration.
Mr. Nelson is the author of:
“NASA New Millennium Problems and
Solutions”
by Don A. Nelson
Written by
a retired NASA engineer, this easy-to-read book is insider's look at many of
the space program's current problems. Not only does it predict the most recent
shuttle disaster, it provides a detailed understanding of why our nation's
exploration of its 'last frontier' is headed for disaster. With aging shuttles,
no definitive plans for future of the vehicle, and poor management, Nelson's
book is a wake-up call to all Americans to take note and action...or lose the
hope of conquering the stars (Barnes & Noble review).
Now is the time to: ”Speak out…or
forever suffer the consequences of remaining silent!”
============
References and Supporting
Documentation
Space Shuttle Privatization
Privatization
must be reinstated with the following goals: Establish a government corporation
to operate the existing fleet for NASA. The space shuttle government
corporation will take one orbiter out of service and upgrade the vehicle for
unmanned operations, install crew escape modules, and build a new launch
facility. Funding for these upgrades would be provided by the corporation by
selling government bonds. When available the remaining orbiters will receive
these upgrades and the government corporation sold to the private sector. The
then private corporation will provide commercial, civil, and military launch
service with these upgrade orbiters. A technology program directed by
government agencies (NASA, DARPA and others) will be established to promote the
safe and efficient operations for private space systems operators.
There is no doubt that the space shuttle in
its current configuration is a costly and unsafe human transportation system.
However, even with two tragic failures, the
“reusable” space shuttle has proven to be a most reliable and
practical concept for space transportation and there are feasible and realistic
solutions for making the space shuttle safer and cost effective. As a
privatized transportation system, the space shuttle can reduce operations cost
by offering commercial launch services.
Over 40 percent of the shuttle cost is for operations
compared to 20 percent for the expendable Atlas II. In previously Shuttle
accountings another 10 percent was charged for government resources and program
management (R&PM). Privatization reduces the shuttle operations cost to
slight over 20 percent of the flight cost which frees up skilled employees to
work technology research programs.
Crew
safety can be significantly insured with the installation of crew escape pods
in the Orbiter.
Prior
to the space shuttle
Note: Privatization will allow continuation of space
shuttle service to space station and allows the $200 billion space shuttle
investment from becoming a museum exhibit. Privatization saves thousand of jobs
and will make the
SSME – The “ONLY” Reusable Rocket Engine
Boeing image
Should the only reusable rocket engine in the world be
abandoned? NASA’s announcement to not use the Space Shuttle Main Engines on
the Ares I and V is another indication that the
Current
Reusable Space Vehicles Transportation Plan
=================
July 17, 2009
The Honorable Barack Obama
President of the
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
NASA’s management has been
unable and/or unwilling to eliminate the detrimental policies employed in their
human space program as is again being revealed by their failing Ares I Orion
shuttle replacement program. Their
inept management of space station Freedom, Space Exploration Initiative, X-33 VentureStar,
and now the Ares I Orion shuttle replacement is a stern warning that the agency
is not ready to embark on leading the nation’s return to the Moon and
beyond.
There is the mistaken
belief that NASA’s human space initiatives and programs have been or are
being thoroughly analyzed and reviewed and therefore can be trusted. Instead
too often NASA’s management has relied on conjecture instead of verified
analyses to formulate and justify their human space endeavors. Without
impartial internal and external oversight, NASA’s programs will continue
to experience significant cost and/or schedule growth. It is requested
that a presidential directive be issued that establishes the mechanism
for internal and external oversight of NASA. Without authoritative
oversight there is no accountability.
The absence of
authoritative oversight has created the potential seven year space station
launch supply gap and the prospects of losing thousands of skilled aerospace
jobs (economic recovery ).
These dire consequences and the questionable reliance on foreign launch
services can be avoided if the space shuttle is not decommissioned. An
unsolicited comparison of a privatized space shuttle with automated flight
systems and crew escape pods concludes it is the far superior to any of the
proposed expendable launch systems. It should be no surprise that a Chinese
space shuttle launch system can be expected and will propel that
nation to forefront of space exploration. NASA’s refusal to evaluate the
automated privatized shuttle is a failure of due diligence that must be
corrected.
The Shuttle privatization solution
eliminates the station supply launch gap and the need for foreign launch
services, keeps the capability to replace critical space station systems,
returns cargo, lowers operation cost,
competes in the commercial launch market, and provides the foundation
for a 21st
century space based human transportation system.
Mr. President, your administration
has endorsed change, however the window of opportunity
for change to NASA’s human space projects is rapidly closing.
There must be presidential directives for NASA oversight and space shuttle
privatization or the 21st century’s human space transportation
will be labeled “Made in
Nelson Aerospace Consulting
Retired NASA Engineer
1407 Moller Rd
NASA’s Management Problems and Solutions
I think it's fair
to say that there's been a sense of drift to our space program over the last
several years” President Barack Obama
NASA’s ongoing inability to meet schedules, control costs, and
prevent cancellation of projects is caused by their unwillingness to resolve
the agencies internal problems. Internal problems that have been festering for
years and must be addressed before NASA can again significant contribute to
expanding mankind’s knowledge of the space frontier. This report
identifies the problems and recommends solutions to stop the “drift to
our space program” into oblivion.
Identifying the problems:
·
NASA has dysfunctional management. The “One
NASA” problem has never been solved and each NASA center continues to
operate like an independent “fiefdom”. Program costs soar because
there is no accountability for failure. The objective is get the program funded
with the belief that Congress will provide for cost overrun rather than cancel
the program.
·
Manned spaceflight operations cost are excessive and
consume too much of NASA’s resources. NASA has no incentive to reduce
manned launch operation costs.
·
Technology development programs have been neglected for
decades and NASA today is technologically bankrupt. The troubled “Apollo
on Steroids” Constellation Program’s development problems are the
results of trying to build a 21st century space transportation
system with 20th century technology.
Who
is really in charge at NASA?
The President makes three political appointments to NASA: the
Administrator, Assistance Administrator, and the Inspector General. Too often
these appointees are unwilling or unprepared to challenge the NASA civil
servant senior managers who have their own agendas. The conflict in the NASA
Inspector General Office leading to the resignation of the Inspector General
typifies the problem and the damage it has done to the agency.
Senior members of Congress with NASA oversight also contribute
to the problem when they use their position to promote agendas that dilute the
primary strategic plan for the Agency or continue to support programs that have
failed to meet their development goals and have exceeded budget limits. The
internal agency resistances to change the cultural impairment are major factors
why many qualified political candidates refuse to accept appointment to NASA.
NASA
Administrator
Must have the unique qualification of a
The Administrator must have
“independent” advisors who can challenge the
“entrenched” NASA civil service managers. The
general rule in today’s NASA is to tell the Administrator what you want
him to hear and not what he needs to know.
NASA Inspector General
The
NASA Inspector General Office has the NASA oversight responsibility; however
this office is plagued by internal
dissension and its technical evaluation capability is virtually nonexistent. The Inspector General must have outside independent
evaluator(s) on technical issues. The Inspector General must also identify to the
Administrator those project managers whose management decisions created program
problems. In general, accountability of senior management doesn’t exist
at today’s NASA.
The
President must appoint a NASA inspector generals whose background knowledge
relates to the agency…not just government career bureaucrats. To have
accountability, there must be responsible oversight.
NASA
Office of the Chief Engineer
This office must become the “eyes and ears” for
the Administrator. The NASA chief engineer must be the administrator’s
must trusted advisor and not necessarily a career civil service employee. The
Administrator must provide this office with the resources to serve as the
agency’s independent internal evaluator of proposed projects and monitor
of existing projects. Each NASA’s center chief engineer office must serve
as the coordinator agent for using the resources of their office in evaluating
that center’s projects and report directly to the Headquarter Chief Engineer.
They will have no allegiance to the center director. All evaluations will be
public record. The peer pressure of internal monitoring by the NASA Chief
Engineer will be the most effective mechanism the Administrator can have.
The Office of the Chief Engineer must be used as the training
ground for future executive program managers for Senior Executive Service
positions. Invaluable management experience can be obtained by appointing
promising candidates to the Chief Engineer Office and rotate them around the
various centers to gain insight into program management and each center’s
capability. NASA’s management creditability problems can be attributed to
the lack of extensive experience in project management. This process solves
that inexperience problem and addresses the “One NASA” issue by
creating a NASA senior management team with knowledge and a relationship
with other NASA centers.
NASA Advisory Council
The NASA
Administrator current appoints the members of this “advisory”
council. This appointment policy defeats the objective of providing independent
unbiased advice for the Administrator. Public input to the Council is not
permitted and that must be corrected. Council members have been removed for
issuing proclamations unfavorable to the Administrator position.
This policy has been detrimental to the oversight of the Agency.
The NASA
Advisory Council must be appointed by the executive branch and report to the President
and Congress and not be subservient to the NASA administrator. The Council must also serve as forum where NASA
employees and contractor can voice concern on NASA programs and policies
without fear of management reprisal.
NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel
This
panel effectiveness has been negated by the appointment of members with limited
technology knowledge.
For
Example:
Safety Experts Call for Shuttle Shutdown (Source:
Orlando Sentinel , 4/17/2009)
Saying NASA is at a critical crossroads, independent safety experts have called
for the agency to stay the course and shut down the shuttle program after nine
remaining missions. Keeping NASA’s shuttle fleet flying beyond 2010 would
endanger astronauts and sap money from efforts to return American astronauts to
the moon by 2020, the group said. “Continuing to fly the shuttle not only
would increase the risk to crews, but also could jeopardize the future U.S.
exploration program by squeezing available resources,” the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel said in its latest annual report, released Thursday. The
panel was created by Congress after the 1967 Apollo 1 launch pad fire killed
three astronauts.
These are the same “experts”
that said they “didn’t do tech analyses” when requested to
investigate the safety of Ares I. Their call for shuttle shutdown was based on
a non-existence safety evaluation of the two transportation system. A competent
evaluation would have shown that the Ares I Orion excessive launch vibrations
and water landing makes it the least safe system of any manned vehicles.
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oer/asap/documents/9_12_2007.pdf page 9.
It is
recommended that membership on the ASAP consist of aerospace engineers and they
not be appointed by the NASA administrator.
NASA Credibility Issue
GAO: NASA Still 'High Risk' for Waste (Source:
NASA remains a "high risk" investment of taxpayer dollars because it
cannot complete major projects on time or on budget, according to a watchdog report. The news is
hardly surprising. Federal auditors at the Government Accountability Office have
included NASA on their "high risk" list since it was first created in
1990. At the time, the GAO said NASA missions faced "persistent cost
growth and schedule slippage." Little seems to have changed. Since 2006, NASA has broken the
bank on 10 of 12 major projects.
The Apollo Program spent $165 billion (2005 dollars) through
the first lunar landing. NASA management has estimated in their 2006
Exploration System Architecture Study that the Constellation program through
the first lunar landing would cost only $124 billion. NASA management concluded
that the costs were estimated conservatively because they included $20 billion
for ISS servicing by the Ares I Orion (CEV). In other words the cost of
Constellation up to the first lunar landing would only be $102 billion! NASA
would develop a stand alone crew launch vehicle (which Apollo didn’t
require) and develop the largest cargo launcher ever built for a cost nearly
40% less the Apollo Program.
THIS
IS WHY NASA MUST HAVE EFFECTIVE INDEPENDENT PROGRAM OVERSIGHT.
========================
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
COTS…too many negatives! Neither, the Orbital
Science’s Taurus/Cygnus or SpaceX’s
Falcon 9/Dragon heavy lift launch system exists. The lofty and improbable goals
of these companies still cannot eliminate the need to secure foreign launch
services for ISS support. Neither vehicle solves the reusable issue required to
reduce launch costs to competitive levels.
NASA’s plan to spend $3.5 billion for twelve SpaceX vehicles will cost $130 million per flight and eight
Orbital Science vehicles will cost $237 million per flight. It will require
seven flights for the SpaceX Dragon and Orbital
Cygnus to deliver 15 Mt to ISS. Only two ATV flight are required but ESA plan
to support only one flight per year. The Japanese H-2A first launch is
scheduled later this year.
Crew transportation on COTS vehicle is an
unrealistic goal. Privatization of the space shuttle eliminates the need for
NASA to spend billions on launch systems that are inferior to the space
shuttle.
================
Shuttle Derived HLV Configurations:
Development cost of the HLV Sidemount is
report to be $11 billion and the HLV In-line to be $15 billion. Operation cost
for the lunar seven day mission is estimate to be a conservative $2 billion.
NASA Management Timeline of Failures:
1988- Space Shuttle
returns to flight status. Presidential Executive Order prohibits any commercial
payload flights. The Space Shuttle launch system has become a government
“jobs program” for 24,000 employees and is too large to manage as
was evidenced by the two shuttle disasters caused by safety oversights. NASA
senior managers also failed to make launch cost reduction a priority and used
the safety concern to discourage attempts to reduce shuttle operations cost.
Launch costs soared to a staggering $500 million per flight and impacted
funding for NASA programs.
1989—NASA’s
Advanced Launch System (also called the National Launch System) program to develop
expendable launcher capable of putting heavy NASA, military, and commercial
payloads into orbit was cancelled. Expendable heavy lift launch
vehicles were determined to be too costly to develop and operate.
NOTE: NASA management has again ignored that expendable heavy
lift launch vehicle are too costly.
1991- First Lunar
Outpost (FLO) was initiated to develop human lunar transportation system. A
Super Saturn launch vehicle was to be developed to carry 6 to 8 astronauts to
the moon. It was conceived by one of NASA management’s infamous 60 days
study. It was cancelled after development cost predictions soared to $50
billion and a lunar manned mission could cost $4 billion.
NOTE: The same NASA manager who directed the failed FLO, as
NASA Administrator directed the Constellation lunar program. Learn from your
mistakes?
1990-Advisory
Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (Augustine Committee) stated
that, “the overall technical base underpinning the
space program has been permitted to languish in terms of funding for several
decades.”
NOTE: NASA management continued to disregard the need for
technology development. NASA is
technologically bankrupt.
1993-Space
Station Freedom program was canceled after a 9 year development program and
spending $11 billion. Replaced with the International Space
Station program (ISS).
NOTE: Technology and available funding was not a factor in
the cancellation. This was a NASA management blunder caused by the “NASA
Fiefdom” managers.
1996—NASA
contracts with Lockheed Martin to build X-33 half scale flight demonstrator to
verify feasibility of the single stage to orbit VentureStar
as the shuttle replacement vehicle. Development cost and flight safety issues
were ignored and the program was cancelled in 1999.
NOTE: This $1.3 billion program failure emphases the
necessity to develop technology before committing to major development
projects.
1999—Shuttle safety problems keeps fleet grounded most of the
year. NASA management ignores request to evaluate automate flight systems and
provide crew escape pods.
2000—International
Space Station is $1 billion over budget and behind schedule. Commercial
interest in ISS is lacking. Congress placed budget limits on the station
development.
NOTE: Budget limit was exceeded and Congress took no
action.
2001 –
Congress requested NASA to Investigate Space shuttle privatization. NASA
reported: ”The longevity and operational aspects of this program (Space
Shuttle) demand a different approach to operational management for the future.
Privatization of the SSP has the potential to provide significant benefits to
the Government. However, timing is critical.” Ref.: http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=3828
NOTE: NASA and Congress missed this window of opportunity, however if
it’s too late to save space shuttle, it is in all probability too late to
save this nation’s human space program.
2002 - GAO report found NASA could not implement key
management controls for the $4.8 billion Space Launch Initiative (SLI) basic
requirements. In response to the GAO report, NASA indefinitely postponed the System Readiness Review for SLI.
Jan. 14,
2004 - President
Bush announces plans for Moon and Mars exploration and plan to decommission the
Space Shuttle by 2010 and have its replacement in service by 2014.
NOTE: NASA management sold this program on a “go as you
pay” budget with a four year gap of depending on the Russian government for
crew access to ISS.
2004 - Retired Navy Rear Adm.
Craig Steidle, head of NASA's new Office of
Exploration Systems,
identifies the Crew Exploration Vehicle as the Shuttle replacement. Suggests a
contractor fly off in 2008.
NOTE: Adm. Steidle had no space
vehicle background and no experience dealing the NASA “fiefdom”
culture. He resigns in 2005.
2005 – The NASA Inspector
General office’s failed to conduct a requested independent evaluation for
space shuttle crew safety (IGO report: “Crew
Escape System and Automated Flight Control System”, March 29, 2005).
2005 - Michael Griffin becomes
NASA Administrator. Halts Vision for Explorations activities and initiates
another infamous 60 day study to redefine approach for shuttle replacement and
manned lunar program. The space
shuttle replacement program loses 16 months of development time.
Note: "We have ways to construct
such vehicles using shuttle solid-rocket motors and external tanks and shuttle
main engines,"
July 2005
“The estimated
cost of these new vehicles (Ares) is from $10 billion to $15 billion through
2015. Operating costs for the single-stick series (Ares I) would run about $3
billion a year--approximately $1 billion less than the shuttle cost before
2006 GAO Report:“NASA has had difficulty bringing a number of projects to completion,
including several efforts to build a second generation of reusable human
spaceflight vehicle to replace the space shuttle. NASA has attempted several
expensive endeavors such as the National Aero-Space Plane, the X-33 and X-34,
and the Space Launch Initiative, among others. While these endeavors have
helped to advance scientific and technical knowledge, none have completed their
objective of fielding a new reusable space vehicle. We estimate that these unsuccessful development efforts have cost
approximately $4.8 billion since the 1980s.”
Ref: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06817r.pdf
2008 – NASA cleared to conclude a $700
million-plus deal with
Note: Russian space agency has
already announced the cost to transport astronauts to space station will
increase in 2012.
2009 –
Augustine Report: Human
exploration beyond low earth orbit is not viable under FY 2010 budget guideline
and to continue would require annual increase of approximately $3 billion.
2010
–GAO Report: ”NASA
has had difficulty meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives for many
of its projects. The need to effectively manage projects will gain even more
importance as NASA seeks to manage its wide-ranging portfolio
in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment. The GAO has designated
NASA's acquisition management as a high risk area since 1990.”
2010 – Constellation Program is cancelled, wasting $11.5 billion
and will cause still yet to be seen impact to the
NOTE: The Constellation Program
failed because of shoddy management. NASA programs will continue to fail until
NASA senior management has independent oversight and is made accountable
====================
March 5, 2010
NASA Headquarters
Office of the Administrator
Attn: Gen. Charles F. Bolden Jr.
Subject: $20 “Plan B” Bet
Charlie,
The Commercial Space Shuttle is the only option for the “Plan B” manned spacecraft heavy-lift launch vehicle compromise. It solves the launch gap problem, has the least development cost, is commercially operated, provides the highest level of safety with crew escape pods, has proven heavy lift capability, provides the only heavy payload return capability, and has the lowest mission operation cost.
History will record that NASA management ignored requests to
evaluate the commercial space shuttle as the lunar heavy lift vehicle before
proceeding with their disastrous Ares Orion launch system. The hand writing is
already on the wall that the Chinese space program will have a reusable space
transportation system and therefore must have a space shuttle. Will history
record that it was on your watch that this nation conceded human space
exploration to
Gave the attached supporting data to Mike Coats at JSC, bet you $20 that it will never reach your desk unless Mike sends it to you.
Don
Don A. Nelson
Nelson Aerospace Consulting
Retried NASA Aerospace Engineer
NASA REPLY:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Headquarters
April 1, 2010
Space Operations
Mr.
Don A. Nelson
Nelson
Aerospace Consulting
Dear Mr. Nelson:
Thank
you for your recent letter to our National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) Administrator, Charlie Bolden, proposing that NASA consider developing a
Commercial Space
Shuttle as the only Plan B option for a heavy-lift launch vehicle. After discussing
your proposal and enclosures with Mr. Bolden, I have a few observations and comments to share.
Although NASA does not have a Plan B, we are actively developing the technology, tools, and safety enhancements to make a future mission to Mars both realistic and achievable. Key to that effort will be a reliable heavy-lift propulsion system. Your letter suggests that lower operations costs can be achieved by turning the Space Shuttle over to a commercial entity. A sound business case, however, would be highly dependent on market demand beyond potential NASA requirements. Various studies and surveys, such as the annual commercial space transportation market forecast published by the Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space, indicate that there is not projected growth in the launch market. For the United States (U.S.) launch vehicle services, the market is primarily for U.S. Government payloads. Consequently, there may not be the market demand to profitably sustain a commercially-operated Space Shuttle. NASA's Fiscal Year 2011 budget request includes funding for a broad scope of Research and Development (R&D) activities aimed at developing next-generation space launch propulsion technologies. These activities aim to both reduce costs and shorten development timeframes for future heavy-lift systems. More specifically the R&D will target new approaches to first-stage launch propulsion, in-space advanced engine technology development and demonstrations, and foundational or basic propulsion research.
Hopefully
this brief explanation gives a little more insight into understanding NASA's
forward plan. Thank
you for your continued dedication to human spaceflight and crewed vehicle
safety enhancements. These are noteworthy contributions and your comments are
greatly appreciated.
Lynn Cline for
William
H. Gerstenmaier
Associate Director for Space Operations
Nelson reply
to Bolden:
Email dated
April 8. 2010
Charlie:
Ms.
Cline's reply to the Commercial Space Shuttle option typifies the disconnect between NASA's senior management decisions
based on conjecture and decisions made on unbiased engineering analyses.
In
her letter she states:
1) There may not
be the market demand to profitably sustain a commercially-operated Space
Shuttle.
The
2) The R&D will target new approaches to first-stage launch propulsion,
in-space advanced engine technology development and demonstrations, and
foundational or basic propulsion research.
Exhaustive
launch propulsion systems evaluations have proven again and again that no
significant improvements in the performance of first stage chemical engines
can be achieved. In other words, we’re stuck with what we got.
In-space advance engine development can
best be conducted if the engine can be tested in space and returned for
evaluation. Only the space shuttle has heavy cargo return capability.
3) NASA does not have a Plan B.
While
there may be no Plan B, NASA is investigating a heavy launch vehicle (HLV) space
transportation solution for the failed Ares Orion launch system. The HLV’s
will cost a minimum $11
billion to develop, has no commercial applications, has no cargo return
capability, and fails to solve the launch gap. The HLV like the Constellation
program requires two launches to lift 66 MT to LEO for a seven day manned lunar
mission.
The existing
space shuttle and EELV space transportation systems can delivery the same cargo
mass to LEO and avoid the launch gap and loss of thousands of shuttle jobs.
Using the space shuttle and EELV eliminates the HLV development risk and cost. A
commercial space shuttle further reduces operations cost. The commercial space
shuttle and EELV are the better candidates for establishing a human space
based transportation system for lunar, deep space, and Mars missions. A
space based transportation system is mandatory for human space exploration. To
continue on the Apollo expendable vehicle concept path invites failure and
disaster.
In
addition there is a safety issue associated in transporting astronauts to and
from LEO in space capsules that has not been addressed. The Soyuz capsule has
experience two fatal incidences. Warning signs of another catastrophic Soyuz
capsule failure are becoming increasingly alarming. The commercial space
shuttle not only significantly lowers the cost of mission operation, it can
provide crew escape pods. Has NASA forgotten that crew safety is their number
one priority?
I
strongly recommend that NASA have an unbiased external evaluation of the
commercial space shuttle and EELV space transportation system…due diligence is mandatory in this
nation’s critical stage of human space exploration.
Once again Charlie…this is happening on
your watch.
Don
Don
A. Nelson
Nelson
Aerospace Consulting see: www.nasaproblems.com
Retired
NASA Aerospace Engineer
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