NASA
Problems and Solutions
Should the NASA Administrator Resign?
Contact: nasaproblems@yahoo.com
January
2012
On more than one occasion NASA
Administrator Charles Bolden has stated that he is frustrated...and after
taking the NASA top position said, “I really don’t care what signal it sends. I did not want this
job.” (Ref http://www.spacenews.com/civil/bolden-talk-yields-insights-more-personal-than-political.html).
I met Charlie when he first came to NASA JSC as an
astronaut candidate. He is an A-number one nice guy and tries to please
everyone and a NASA administrator can’t be that guy. At a recent telecom
he again said that his goal was to have a human mission to Mars. I challenged
him that goal is impossible with the heavy lift Space Launch System (SLS) vehicles.
There are too many negative to proceed with the development of Apollo class heavy
lift launch vehicles. The “Austere Human Missions to Mars”
presented by NASA at the AIAA Space 2009 conference requires nearly 2000 T be
delivered to LEO to support a four member crew Mars mission. It would require 15 launches of the upgraded
SLS to support the four year Mars mission with a launch cost of a minimum
$30 billion plus the cost of
the payloads. If one launch vehicle or payload fails the entire mission could
be lost. With no cargo return capability on the Orion crew module there is no
commercial value for this Mars transportation system. Reusable launchers with
payload return capability and space based transportation vehicles with cargo
bays commercial applications are the only affordable and viable option for
human Mars missions.
The SLS is a political vehicle designed to try to save an
industry that supports NASA launch operations. The economic environment of the
21st century dictates that we abandon government operated launch
vehicles. Like the U.S. auto industry…we change or we shut down.
Charlie…by resigning you sent the message that we are
on the wrong path!
Don A. Nelson
Aerospace Consultant…Retired NASA Engineer
LLLLLLLLLL
China’s Space Shuttle
MPCV crew module deathtrap Space tugs to Space Cruisers
NASA Management Solutions NASA Technology
Issues Letter of Concern
LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL
July
14, 2011
NASA Headquarters
Office of the Administrator
Gen. Charles F. Bolden Jr.
Subject: Resignation
Charlie,
There is an old saying around NASA, “Tell the Administrator what you want
him to hear…not what he needs to know.” As a retired NASA engineer
I’m breaking this unwritten rule and telling you that it is in the best
interest of NASA and the President that you resign. You have ignored, or
failed to recognize vital issues which now have NASA on a course of certain
failure.
Under your administration you failed to replace the management <http://nasaproblems.com/#Impasse> of the ill-conceived Constellation Program.
These same managers have once again reintroduced an unaffordable and
unsafe Apollo era expendable crew module and heavy lift launch
vehicle…the Space Launch System (SLS) Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV).
This obsolete space transportation system with its limited 21 day mission
duration provides no foundation for the advancement of human deep space
transportation and exploration. The mission site time is limited to a few days
and without an MPCV airlock and robotic arm the crew EVA activity is an extreme
risk environment. NASA has not identified any SLS/MPCV mission that cannot be
performed with robotic spacecraft at a fraction of the cost. As you are aware
the SLS/MPCV mission duration fall 609 days short of being able to conduct a
humans Mars mission. As you should be aware, the manufacturing cost of the
expendable SLS/MPCV components and the mission/operation cost for two missions
per year could exceed $7 billion.
Your administration has misled the President and Congress about the
safety of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) <http://nasaproblems.com/#CrewModule> . Recent published statements attributed to NASA
reporting that this MPCV crew module will be ten times safer during launch and entry
than the space shuttle are in error. While the planned crew escape tower may
provide some improvement in crew safety during launch, there is no crew safety
improvement during the re-entry phase of flight. For crew modules it is the
re-entry phase of flight that is the most dangerous. Two Soyuz crews have
been lost during re-entry and two near fatal re-entries have recently occurred.
Unlike the Soyuz the MPCV is forced to make water landings
which places the crew and recovery team in even further jeopardy.
Engineers at Lockheed Martin recognized the safety problems with crew modules
and proposed a lifting body reusable crew vehicle. However NASA management
rejected their vehicle and directed that they develop an Apollo era crew
module…this is a death sentence for some future crew if the Orion MPCV is
ever flown. Under your administration, where is “crew safety is our
number one priority?”
The 2010 congressional NASA Authorization Act has a provision approving the use
of commercially developed vehicles. However, your administration ignored
numerous requests to evaluate a commercial space shuttle <http://nasaproblems.com/#CSS> . It does not take a rocket scientist to know that a
reusable commercial vehicle is more cost effective and safer than the
expendable launch vehicle that you have endorsed. The commercial space shuttle
would provide an orderly transfer of NASA contractors to the private sector,
create a competitive international cargo launcher in its unmanned flight
configuration, and eliminate the costly heavy lift launch vehicle by providing
launch support for space based reusable vehicles. It is the goal of every other
space faring nation to develop a space transportation system using reusable
vehicles. There is evidence that China will have a reusable space shuttle by
2020 <http://nasaproblems.com/#China> . It is the only avenue that can reduce mission cost
and provide safer human space transportation. By ignoring the numerous requests
to evaluate a commercial space shuttle <http://nasaproblems.com/#Bet> you failed to evaluate the space based usable
vehicles. Where is your justification for relegating the only reusable human
transportation system to museums? A FOIA request shows the NASA decommissioning
of the space shuttle has been based solely on conjecture. Continuing on
your course with obsolete Apollo era expendable vehicles is a course for certain
failure.
Charlie, I know of your deep feeling for NASA and human space flight. Also I
believe your commitment to the President is genuine. As you are aware the
Florida space coast will be a deciding factor in the 2012 presidential
elections. And as you are also aware the NASA technical oversight of the
SLS/MPCV by the Executive Branch offices of the NASA Inspector General and
Office of Science and Technology Policy has been non-existence and the
President will be held accountable for this failure. There is no doubt that the
SLS/MPCV will fail. To prolong the cancellation of this failed effort beyond
the timeframe of adopting the commercial space shuttle will be devastating to
the NASA community and will be a deciding factor in defeating the President in
the 2012 election. Therefore it is in the best interest of NASA and the
President that you acknowledge the SLS/MPCV is a failure and resign as NASA
Administrator.
Don
Don A. Nelson
Retired NASA Engineer
1407 Moller
Alvin TX 77511
Sent by email and NASA internal mail.
REPLY:
From: Bolden, Charles (HQ-AA000)
To: Don Nelson
Cc: gnelson@who.eop.gov
; Danielle_Borrin@ovp.eop.gov ; Bolden, Charles
(HQ-AA000)
Sent: Thursday, July 14,
2011 12:32 PM
Subject: Re: NASA
Administrator Resignation
Don,
As I hope you know, I have the utmost respect for your professional
capabilities and competence. While I have no intention of submitting my resignation
as you recommend, I can understand your frustration with the situation in which
we find ourselves and intend to continue to work all day, every day to bring
the nation an affordable and sustainable exploration program that works in
synergy with our science, aeronautics, and technology development efforts.
Respectfully,
Charlie B.
Charles F. Bolden Jr.
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
300 E St. SW
Washington, DC 20546-0001
(202) 358-1801
LLLLLLLL
Bolden
$20 Bet
March 5, 2010
NASA Headquarters
Office of the Administrator
Attn: Gen. Charles F. Bolden
Jr.
Subject: $20 “Plan
B” Bet
Charlie,
The
Commercial Space Shuttle is the only option for the “Plan B” manned
spacecraft heavy-lift launch vehicle compromise.
It solves the launch gap problem, has the least development cost, is
commercially operated, provides the highest level of safety with crew escape
pods, has proven heavy lift capability, provides the only heavy payload return
capability, and has the lowest mission operation cost.
History will record that NASA
management ignored requests to evaluate the commercial space shuttle as the
lunar heavy lift vehicle before proceeding with their disastrous Ares Orion
launch system. The hand writing is already on the wall that the Chinese
space program will have a reusable space transportation system
and therefore must have a space shuttle. Will history record that it was on
your watch that this nation conceded human space exploration to China?
Gave the attached supporting
data to Mike Coats at JSC, bet you $20 that it will never reach your desk
unless Mike sends it to you.
Don
Don A. Nelson
Nelson Aerospace Consulting
Retried NASA Aerospace
Engineer
NASA REPLY:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Headquarters
Washington,
DC 20546-0001
April 1, 2010
Space Operations Mission
Directorate
Mr.
Don A. Nelson
Nelson
Aerospace Consulting
1407
Moller Road Alvin,TX 77511
Dear
Mr. Nelson:
Thank
you for your recent letter to our National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) Administrator, Charlie Bolden, proposing that NASA consider developing a
Commercial Space
Shuttle as the only Plan B option for a heavy-lift launch vehicle. After discussing your proposal and enclosures
with Mr. Bolden, I have a few observations and comments to share.
Although
NASA does not have a Plan B, we are actively developing the technology, tools,
and safety enhancements
to make a future mission to Mars both realistic and achievable. Key to that
effort will be a reliable heavy-lift propulsion system. Your letter suggests
that lower operations costs can be achieved by turning the Space Shuttle over
to a commercial entity. A sound business case, however, would be highly dependent on market demand
beyond potential NASA
requirements. Various studies and surveys, such as the annual commercial space
transportation market forecast published by the Federal Aviation Administration
Office of Commercial Space, indicate that there is not projected growth in the
launch market. For the United States (U.S.) launch vehicle services, the market is primarily
for U.S. Government payloads.
Consequently, there may not be the market demand to profitably sustain a
commercially-operated Space Shuttle. NASA's Fiscal Year 2011 budget request
includes funding for
a broad scope of Research and Development (R&D) activities aimed at
developing next-generation
space launch propulsion technologies. These activities aim to both reduce costs
and shorten development timeframes for future heavy-lift systems. More
specifically the R&D
will target new approaches to first-stage launch propulsion, in-space advanced
engine technology development and demonstrations, and foundational or basic
propulsion research.
Hopefully
this brief explanation gives a little more insight into understanding NASA's
forward plan. Thank
you for your continued dedication to human spaceflight and crewed vehicle
safety enhancements. These are noteworthy contributions and your comments are
greatly appreciated.
Lynn Cline for
William
H. Gerstenmaier
Associate
Director for Space Operations
Nelson reply to Bolden:
Email dated April 8. 2010
Charlie:
Ms. Cline's reply to the Commercial Space Shuttle option
typifies the disconnect between NASA's senior
management decisions based on conjecture and decisions made on unbiased
engineering analyses.
In her letter she states:
1) “There
may not be the market demand to profitably sustain a commercially-operated
Space Shuttle.”
The United States had lost its profitable commercial space
launch market before the downturn in the satellite launch business. Our space
launch industry is dependent on government support for its survival. However,
while significant efforts were made to lower the operation cost of the
privatized expendable launch vehicles (EELV’s), none were made for
the reusable space shuttle even though a NASA JSC study report that: “Privatization of the SSP has the potential
to provide significant benefits to the Government. (Ref.: “Concept of Privatization of the Space
Shuttle”, Space Shuttle Program Office, Sept. 28, 2001).
2)
“The
R&D will target new approaches to
first-stage launch propulsion, in-space advanced engine technology development
and demonstrations, and foundational or basic propulsion research.”
Exhaustive launch propulsion systems evaluations have
proven again and again that no significant improvements in the performance of
first stage chemical engines can be achieved. In other words,
we’re stuck with what we got.
In-space advance engine development can best be conducted
if the engine can be tested in space and returned for evaluation. Only the
space shuttle has heavy cargo return capability.
3) “NASA does
not have a Plan B.”
While there may be no Plan B, NASA is investigating a
heavy launch vehicle (HLV) space transportation solution for the failed Ares
Orion launch system. The
HLV’s will cost a minimum
$11 billion to develop, has no commercial applications, has no cargo
return capability, and fails to solve the launch gap. The HLV like the
Constellation program requires two launches to lift 66 MT to LEO for a seven
day manned lunar mission.
The existing space shuttle and EELV space
transportation systems can deliver the same cargo mass to LEO and avoid the
launch gap and loss of thousands of shuttle jobs. Using the space shuttle and
EELV eliminates the HLV development risk and cost. A commercial space shuttle
further reduces operations cost. The commercial space shuttle and EELV are the
better candidates for establishing a human space based transportation
system for lunar, deep space, and Mars missions. A space based transportation
system is mandatory for human space exploration. To continue on the Apollo
expendable vehicle concept path invites failure and disaster.
In addition there is a safety issue associated in
transporting astronauts to and from LEO in space capsules that has not been
addressed. The Soyuz capsule has experience two fatal incidences. Warning signs
of another catastrophic Soyuz capsule failure are becoming increasingly
alarming. The commercial space shuttle not only significantly lowers the cost
of mission operation, it can provide crew escape pods. Has NASA forgotten that
crew safety is their number one priority?
I strongly recommend that NASA have an unbiased external
evaluation of the commercial space shuttle and EELV space transportation
system…due diligence is mandatory
in this nation’s critical stage of human space exploration.
Once
again Charlie…this is happening on your watch.
Don
Don A. Nelson
Nelson Aerospace Consulting
Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer
1407 Moller Road Alvin,
TX 77511
March 30,
2011
The Honorable Barack H. Obama
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Subject: Presidential
Directive Request for a Commercial Space Shuttle
Dear Mr.
President:
There now
are three failed attempts by NASA management to design a replacement vehicle
for the space shuttle: Admiral Craig Steidle’s
“fly off” concepts, the Ares I Orion, and the Space Launch System
and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle. All three failures were based on archaic
expendable vehicles concepts. Furthermore NASA management has misrepresented
the safety of an expendable crew module in which every launch is a “test”
flight and the reentry phase with no crew escape system has been a death trap
on too many flights.
These
obsolete and costly expendable vehicle concepts are the product of the NASA
management cultural impasse that has been perpetuated by the incompetent oversight
of the Executive Branch offices of the NASA Inspector General and Office of
Science and Technology Policy. NASA management’s belligerent refusal to
accept that their expendable rocket and crew concepts are unaffordable and
unsafe will continue until cancelled by an executive directive.
NASA
management has steadfastly refused to evaluate the commercial space shuttle. It
does not take a rocket scientist to know that a reusable commercial vehicle is
more cost effective and safer. Mr. President, the commercial space shuttle is
the only option for an affordable 21st century reusable and
“space based” transportation system. Only a presidential directive
can make this a reality.
Don A. Nelson
Nelson
Aerospace Consulting (retired NASA engineer)
NO REPLY TO THIS LETTER!
LLLLLLLLLLLL
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Office of
Inspector General
Washington, DC 20546-0001
Mr.
Don A. Nelson 1407Moller
Alvin, TX 77511
SUBJECT: Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) Request
I
am responding to your September 9, 2010, FOIA request for Inspector General documentation of any investigation that "confirm[s] the current plan
to develop a heavy lift
launch system and/or purchase commercial launch services will be safer and more cost effective than the spaceflight transportation
system using the existing space shuttle vehicles."
The OIG has no records responsive to
your request.
However, for information about Shuttle costs and retirement, you can access our
audit report, Review of NASA's Progress on Retiring the Space Shuttle Program (IG-10-012), at the NASA
OIG web site, http://oig.nasa.gov/.
You
have the right to appeal this initial determination to the Inspector General.
Under 14 CFR §
1206.605(b), the appeal must: (1) be in writing; (2) be addressed to the Inspector General, NASA
Headquarters, Washington, DC 20546; (3) be identified clearly on the envelope and in the letter as an "Appeal
under the Freedom of Information Act"; (4) include a copy of the request for the Agency record and a copy of the
contested initial determination; (5) to the extent possible, state
the reasons why you believes the contested initial determination should
be reversed; and (6) be sent to the Inspector General within 30 calendar days of the date of receipt of the
initial determination.
Jim Morrison
Assistant
Inspector General for Audits
OIG
FOIA Officer -- Audits
===========================================
NASA’s
Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose
Crew Vehicle Program (SLS/MPCV) will fail because…mission costs are too
high, the MPCV crew module has an unsolvable water recovery issue, and there is
no commercial application.
The
following SLS/MPCV “operation” cost estimates were presented to the
Congressional Budget Office after it failed to make the Congress aware of the
prohibitive cost to operate expendable heavy lift vehicles.
·
The NASA human exploration budget will be flat
lined at $2.8b for the foreseeable future. One report indicates a development
cost of $38b and another reports that the first development version launch of
the SLS could not take place until December 2017 and the 130mt production
versions (crew and cargo) are not expected to unveiled until August 2032. This
SLS development program scenario based on 13 flights over a 21 year period
would have extreme difficulty maintaining the manufacturing labor force for
such a low flight rate. However, it is the introduction of the cargo vehicle
which forecast that it will require two launches of these mammoth vehicles to
accomplish one mission. The SLS is the same heavy lift launcher concept used
in the Constellation program which was cancelled because: "The U.S. human spaceflight
program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory. It is perpetuating
the perilous practice of pursuing goals that do not match allocated
resources.” Such
is the case today.
·
NASA has failed to reduce the mission operation cost of the
SLS/MPCV. The following $4.2b estimate of annual operations cost for the SLS
indicated it will cost more to manufacture the expendable vehicles, plan the
mission, and conduct flight operation than NASA has budgeted for human
exploration. NASA is assuming that future budgets will be increased to cover
mission operations. THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN!
SLS/MPCV Operational
Launch Cost Estimate
FY
2010
Manned Launch $
mil
|
Flight/Launch Contract Labor Cost (11,000 total workforce
JSC,MSFC,KSC) |
1375 |
|
SRB (2) 5 segment |
160 |
|
Civil Service |
250 |
|
1st stage tanks |
75 |
|
1st stage engines (5 RS-25E) |
200 |
|
2nd stage (tank) |
10 |
|
2nd stage engine ( 3 J2-X engines) |
70 |
|
GFE |
30 |
|
Logistic |
87 |
|
Misc. ( fuel,range,etc.) |
77 |
|
Orion MPCV |
450 |
|
Total Manned Launch |
2,784 |
Cargo
Launch
|
SLS manned cost less flight/launch labor fixed cost and
MPCV |
709 |
|
Lander (cargo) |
730 |
|
Total Cargo Launch |
1,439 |
Annual
Operation Cost ~ Two Flights/YR
|
Total |
4,223 |
Flight/Launch Labor
Cost – space shuttle labor cost for mission planning and flight preparation
was reduced to an operational level of 16,500 employees in 2004. Constellation work force was assumed to
be 6,000 which were unrealistic for support from three NASA centers. For the
SLS/MPCV an optimistic mission operation contractor workforce of 11,000 was
used. Salary only (no benefits) cost to NASA would be $125k per employee
for an annual fixed cost of $1.375b plus benefits..
SRB (2) 5 segment
– Thiokol had a manufacturing workforce of 1400 for shuttle and an
engineering/staff support of 490. Using the lower $125k for the Thiokol
workforce makes the annual labor cost for four 5 segment SBR’s to be $60m
each. It will be extremely difficult to manufacture only four 5 segment
SRB’s per year for less than $80m each.
Civil Service –
Civil service oversight and support for shuttle was at 2000 employees in
2004. This number was use for this evaluation even though CS would have
considerable more oversight responsibility for three different vehicles (SLS,
MPCV, and lander) with five different primary propulsion systems. Fixed annual
cost is estimated to be $250m.
1st stage
tanks - The shuttle external tank production operations used 703 employees.
However another 1300 employees charged to the tank production for engineering
support, facilities, and quality control. If this number of production support
employees could be reduce to 300 and material cost limited to $10m the tank
cost could be reduced to $75m. Not an impossible goal.
1st stage
engines (5 RS-25E) – The cost for the shuttle SSME engine (RS-25D) in
1989 was reported to be $38m. Considering inflation the cost and the reduction
in non-reusable engine cost, the RS-25E was assumed to cost $40 per engine.
2nd stage
(tank) – A tank cost of $10m assumes the 2nd stage tank
can be built by the same labor force as the 1st stage tank. Cost
includes materials and transportation to KSC.
2nd stage
engines - (3, J2-X engines) – Reported to cost $24m each.
GFE – $87m
was based on shuttle cost for government furnished equipment such as crawler
transport.
Logistic - $77m
was based on like shuttle charges for base maintenance as related to
operations.
Misc. - $42m for
range support, crew/capsule recovery, fuel, etc.
Orion MPCV - The
Apollo CSM had a unit price of $77m in 1972, in 2010 $ that is $429m. Each
ATV cost about $304 m according
to ESA and the
Japanese HTV spacecraft
production cost is reported to $220m. A conservative unit cost for the MPCV is
$450m.
Lander – Constellation program had a per unit lander cost
of $730m.
--------------
·
The SLS/MPCV does not have a worthwhile mission objective. The
MPCV’s 21 day mission duration limitation is 609 days short of being a
Mars transportation vehicle. Missions to near earth asteroids are currently
being conducts by robotic spacecraft at a fraction of the SLS/MPCV mission
cost. The MPCV does not have a space shuttle type airlock making EVA extremely
dangerous.
·
There are no commercial or military applications for the SLS/MPCV
which could reduce annual operations cost.
· NASA’s
annual space technology budget of $1b is too small and too dispersed among too
many organizations to provide any significant improvement in space
transportation for the SLS/MPCV.
“It’s the Launch
Cost…Stupid”… paraphrasing Bill
Clinton’s presidential economy election theme. NASA must reduce its
launch cost and the commercial space shuttle is the only option! The SLS/MPCV
shuttle replacement plan is unaffordable, unsafe, and like the Constellation program
suffers from incompetent NASA management.
Crew Modules
are Death Traps
NASA
Management has chosen not to disclose that these crew modules have unsolvable
safety issues that are inherent to all crew modules with parachute water
landings and crew recovery. There is historical evidence that substantiates
crew modules have been no safer than the space shuttle. In fact it is by chance
that the crew module safety record is not much worst. NASA management has
chosen to disregard the perilous “entry” phase of flight where two
Soyuz flight crews were killed when their crew module failed during retry and
the recent near fatal mishaps…all related to manufacturing errors. Every flight of the Orion Multi-Purpose
Crew Vehicle (MPCV) or any of the commercial crew modules will be a “test
flight.”
Orion Crew Module
Crash Site
Remember
one of reasons the space shuttle was decommissioned was to improve crew safety and
that is not the case with crew modules! Ironically only the CSS would have crew
escape pods that would protect the crew during every phase of flight. This is another NASA management blunder
which again will have fatal consequences if implemented!
Recently published statements attributed to
NASA state that the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Is: “designed to be
10 times safer during ascent and entry than its predecessor, the Space
Shuttle.” As a retired NASA engineer with extensive experience in the operation
of crew modules, I challenged the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
about the authenticity of this statement.
Their reply (see below) was the Orion failed to meet the safety
requirements for entry during their Constellation Program evaluations and that
they have failed to establish a Level 1 set of requirement for the commercial
crew modules and Orion MPCV. It is my opinion that the Commercial crew modules
and Orion MPCV are potential deathtraps and NASA has misled Congress about the
safety of these vehicles.
While the crew escape tower on the MPCV may
provide significant improvement over a Space Shuttle without crew escape pods,
it does not negate the many factors that have made crew modules a death trap
during the re-entry phase of flight. As example, historically the Russian Soyuz
crew module’s safety record is not significantly better than that the
Space Shuttle. While the Soyuz crew module has experienced a failure of the
escape tower, it has been the re-entry phase of flight that has proven to be
the fatal environment for flight crews. Potential fatal crew module failures
are:
·
Every crew module flight is a test
flight! Manufacturing errors have occurred.
·
Crew modules have very limited cross range
capability which could require a reentry into unacceptable weather conditions.
·
Crew module’s notorious reentry
errors result in an expanses landing zone that could prevent rapid access to
the crew in dire circumstances.
·
Parachutes are known to fail. This is
another unacceptable single point failure.
There are too many potential failures with
fatal consequences for a crew module to be considered for 21st century human
space transportation. The Russian Soyuz crew module is still in service only
because their government cannot afford to develop a safer reusable lifting body
winged runway landing crewed spacecraft.
Email
reply: Excerpts from NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance:
“At PDR, the Cx (Orion) design
PRA estimate was better than the requirement for ascent and not there yet for
entry. We don’t have a set of level 1 requirements yet for the next NASA
developed human system, but we do plan to use the Cx
numbers above as part of our human rating requirements set for commercial crew
to ISS. I agree this will be a
challenge for any capsule for all the reasons you give if not more.”
============================================
Commercial Space Shuttle
There
has been an extensive undertaking to reduce the cost of expendable launch
vehicles which has resulted in significant reductions in their operations
costs. There has NEVER been any determined effort to reduce the cost of space
shuttle operations. Competitive CSS launch cost can be achieved by:
·
Use the existing Orbiter airframes and install modular quick
replaceable subsystems.
·
Removing onboard piloting functions.
·
Removing all civil service support.
·
Consolidation of launch and mission operations at the launch site.
·
Automation of ground and flight operations.
·
Shuttle assembly at launch pad.
Reducing
space shuttle launch cost is not a technical challenge…it is a political
challenge. The following chart shows the breakdown where significant cost
reductions can be achieved by privatization of the space shuttle operations:
Space Launch System/Multi-Purpose Crew
Vehicle
Versus
Commercial Space Shuttle
|
|
SLS/MPCV |
CSS |
|
Launch Cost 130 mt /crew
to LEO |
$2.78b |
$2.1b |
|
Development Cost Estimate |
$11.5b |
$2.4b |
|
Operational Availability |
6 Years |
4 years |
|
Crew Safety |
Poor |
Good |
|
Commercial Applications |
No |
Yes |
|
Payload Return Capability |
No |
Yes |
|
Maximum Launches/Year |
2 |
12 |
|
Military Applications |
No |
Yes |
|
Space Based Support |
No |
Yes |
|
Vehicle Upgrade Potential |
Limited |
Excellent |
|
Launch Fails Mission Fails |
Yes |
No |
What is the Commercial Space Shuttle
(CSS)?
The
CSS uses the orbiter airframe, external tank, and SRM boosters. The orbiter is
updated with subsystem components that are quickly replaceable modules to
reduce vehicle turnaround time. Computer software and hardware is upgraded and
the vehicle is operation without inflight piloting requirements. Crews will be
flown only on missions requiring their support for onboard payloads or to be
transferred to space based vehicles. On crewed missions the crew escape pods
will be installed. The entry thermal protection system will have on orbit
repair capability and advanced X-37 program improved tiles. Pad assembly of the
space shuttle will also reduce operations cost and turnaround time. Rapid
turn-around is an unique CSS feature that support a
military requirement and provide the capability launch timely intercepts of
asteroids/comets that may impact earth.
The CSS is a three phase program that transfers shuttle
operation to private sector, automates the fleet, and incorporates existing
technology to develop a space based transportation system. The CSS program:
Phase I: Eliminate dependency on the Russian
government for manned access to space by providing continued space shuttle
operations if funding are available. If not proceed to Phase II.
Phase II: Initiate a space shuttle upgrade program
that reduces operations cost and provides a crew pod escape system.
Phase III: Is a NASA conducted technology program
that addresses critical systems such as the entry thermal protection system and
on orbit propellant storage. This approach deletes the requirement for the
heavy lift launch vehicle (HLV) by developing a space based transportation
system.
CSS Development Phases
PHASE I
Shuttle fleet retro-fitting of orbiters will be
conducted jointly by NASA and the Corporation from NASA facilities during the
transition period. After transition the Corporation will be permitted to
continue to use NASA facilities until their Phase II commercial facilities are
ready for operations.
Phase II
The corporation will be permitted to sell bonds and
stock to finance modifications and startup cost.
The corporation will establish control and launch
facilities for the CSS operations. Launch market demand will determine when the
remaining orbiters will be scheduled for upgrades.
Phase III
The Commercial Space Shuttle will require advanced
systems development coordination by NASA for improvements in operations and
crew safety.
Space Based… Space Tug to Space Cruiser
The
first step to a “Star Trek Enterprise” space cruiser is the
unmanned space based tug. NASA’s future is in the development of these
space based vehicles to be operated by the commercial sector…not in
obsolete heavy lift launch vehicles.
The space transportation
system for the 21st century must be developed as an evolutionary process using
"space based" vehicles. The initial space based vehicles would be
small unmanned vehicle supporting robotic missions. The development schedule
for large crewed spaced based vehicles will accelerate or decrease as the
funding and needs for space exploration requirements dictate.
Space tugs must be a top priority for NASA’s space transportation. They are a key factor for reducing mission cost and increasing mission success. Tugs can be supplied by the shuttle and expendable launch vehicles. ONLY THE SPACE SHUTTLE CAN RETRIEVE TUG PAYLOADS! Tugs can support near earth, lunar, and deep space missions.
Russian Space Based Tug
This proposed Russian vehicle called the Parom is a space based inter-orbit “tug”. The Parom will rendezvous with launch vehicles, retrieve their
payload and transfer them to other in orbit vehicle or to higher orbits. Future
space based tugs can conduct the following missions at significantly reduce
operation cost and reduced chance of mission failure.
There is a long range space policy plan!
Unlike the SLS/MPCV, the CSS provides a stair step approach
outlining the strategic plan for four decades. To get
somewhere…we’ve got to know where we’re going.” The
funding available may cause the schedule to vary, but the direction is clear.
Commercial Launch Market for CSS
The predicted
average commercial medium to heavy launches for the next ten years is 11 per
year. The CSS has the potential to capture a majority of these launches by
offering the unique capability of satellite on-orbit checkout before release
and returning faulty satellites for repair. Once the space tug is operational
satellites can be serviced on-orbit or retrieve. The CSS can offer tourist
flights to reduce cost of cargo delivery.
Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods
This
is the only viable crew escape/safe haven system and is available only on the
CSS.
· Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape
Pods
·
==========================================
The China National Space Administration (CNSA) can be expected to
introduce a reusable space shuttle transportation system by 2020. The program
is designed Project 921-3 and is convincing evidence that CNSA understands that
at 21st century space program must be based on reusable space
vehicles with capability to launch and return crew and cargo from spaced based facilities.
With a space shuttle and spaced based infrastructure China will become the
dominate space faring nation.
In October 2006 the China Academy of Launch Vehicle
Technology (CALT) revealed that China is developing a winged space shuttle for
use in the 2020 time frame.[9] Concept images indicate the planned space
plane may be about 2/3 the size of the U.S. and Russian space shuttles. But
instead of a using a large fuel tank that powered launch engines in the space
plane, it uses a separate three-part liquid fuel booster.
Four Are Charged in Espionage Cases Tied to China
By Evan Perez
Companies Featured in This Article:
Boeing
WASHINGTON -- The Justice Department unveiled charges against a U.S.
military analyst and a former Boeing Co. engineer in separate cases that officials
said underscore intense economic and military espionage efforts by China in the
U.S.
The unrelated cases, filed in Los Angeles and Alexandria, Va., center on allegations that sensitive information about the Space Shuttle and Delta IV rocket programs, as well as U.S. military sales to Taiwan, were exposed to Chinese spies.
=============================
Solutions
to NASA Management Problems
“I think it's fair to say that there's been a sense of
drift to our space program over the last several years” President Barack
Obama
NASA’s ongoing inability to meet schedules,
control costs, and prevent cancellation of projects is caused by their
unwillingness to resolve the agencies internal problems. Internal problems that
have been festering for years and must be addressed before NASA can again
significant contribute to expanding mankind’s knowledge of the space
frontier. This report identifies the problems and recommends solutions to stop
the “drift to our space program” into oblivion.
Identifying the problems:
·
NASA has dysfunctional management. The
“One NASA” problem has never been solved and each NASA center
continues to operate like an independent “fiefdom”. Program costs
soar because there is no accountability for failure. The objective is get the
program funded with the belief that Congress will provide for cost overrun
rather than cancel the program.
·
Manned spaceflight operations cost are
excessive and consume too much of NASA’s resources. NASA has no incentive
to reduce manned launch operation costs.
·
Technology development programs have
been neglected for decades and NASA today is technologically bankrupt. The
troubled “Apollo on Steroids” Constellation Program’s
development problems are the results of trying to build a 21st
century space transportation system with 20th century technology.
Who is really
in charge at NASA?
The
President makes three political appointments to NASA: the Administrator, Assistance
Administrator, and the Inspector General. Too often these appointees are
unwilling or unprepared to challenge the NASA civil servant senior managers who
have their own agendas. The conflict in the NASA Inspector General Office
leading to the resignation of the Inspector General typifies the problem and
the damage it has done to the agency.
Senior
members of Congress with NASA oversight also contribute to the problem when
they use their position to promote agendas that dilute the primary strategic
plan for the Agency or continue to support programs that have failed to meet
their development goals and have exceeded budget limits. The internal agency
resistances to change the cultural impairment are major factors why many
qualified political candidates refuse to accept appointment to NASA.
NASA
Administrator
Must
have the unique qualification of a Washington politician, engineer, scientist,
and program manager with the ability to determine what passes the test of being
both feasible and realistic.
The Administrator must have “independent” advisors who
can challenge the “entrenched” NASA civil service managers. The general
rule in today’s NASA is to tell the Administrator what you want him to
hear and not what he needs to know.
NASA
Inspector General
The
NASA Inspector General Office has the NASA oversight responsibility; however
this office is plagued by internal dissension and its technical evaluation capability
is virtually nonexistent. The Inspector General must have outside independent
evaluator(s) on technical issues. The Inspector General must also identify to
the Administrator those project managers whose management decisions created
program problems. In general, accountability of senior management doesn’t
exist at today’s NASA.
The
President must appoint a NASA inspector generals
whose background knowledge relates to the agency…not just government
career bureaucrats. To have accountability, there must be responsible
oversight.
NASA Office
of the Chief Engineer
This
office must become the “eyes and ears” for the Administrator. The
NASA chief engineer must be the administrator’s must trusted advisor and
not necessarily a career civil service employee. The Administrator must provide
this office with the resources to serve as the agency’s independent
internal evaluator of proposed projects and monitor of existing projects. Each
NASA’s center chief engineer office must serve as the coordinator agent
for using the resources of their office in evaluating that center’s
projects and report directly to the Headquarter Chief Engineer. They will have
no allegiance to the center director. All evaluations will be public record.
The peer pressure of internal monitoring by the NASA Chief Engineer will be the
most effective mechanism the Administrator can have.
The
Office of the Chief Engineer must be used as the training ground for future
executive program managers for Senior Executive Service positions. Invaluable
management experience can be obtained by appointing promising candidates to the
Chief Engineer Office and rotate them around the various centers to gain
insight into program management and each center’s capability.
NASA’s management creditability problems can be attributed to the lack of
extensive experience in project management. This process solves that
inexperience problem and addresses the “One NASA” issue by creating
a NASA senior management team with knowledge and a relationship with
other NASA centers.
NASA Advisory
Council
The
NASA Administrator current appoints the members of this “advisory”
council. This appointment policy defeats the objective of providing independent
unbiased advice for the Administrator. Public input to the Council is not permitted
and that must be corrected. Council members have been removed for issuing proclamations
unfavorable to the Administrator position. This policy has been
detrimental to the oversight of the Agency.
The
NASA Advisory Council must be appointed by the executive branch and report to
the President and Congress and not be subservient to the NASA administrator.
The Council must also serve as forum where NASA employees and contractor can
voice concern on NASA programs and policies without fear of management
reprisal.
NASA
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
This
panel effectiveness has been negated by the appointment of members with limited
technology knowledge.
For
Example:
Safety
Experts Call for Shuttle Shutdown
(Source: Orlando Sentinel , 4/17/2009)
Saying NASA is at a critical crossroads, independent safety experts have called
for the agency to stay the course and shut down the shuttle program after nine
remaining missions. Keeping NASA’s shuttle fleet flying beyond 2010 would
endanger astronauts and sap money from efforts to return American astronauts to
the moon by 2020, the group said. “Continuing to fly the shuttle not only
would increase the risk to crews, but also could jeopardize the future U.S.
exploration program by squeezing available resources,” the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel said in its latest annual report, released Thursday. The
panel was created by Congress after the 1967 Apollo 1 launch pad fire killed three
astronauts.
These
are the same “experts” that said they “didn’t do
tech analyses” when requested to investigate the safety of Ares I. Their
call for shuttle shutdown was based on a non-existence safety evaluation of the
two transportation system.
It
is recommended that membership on the ASAP consist of aerospace engineers and
they not be appointed by the NASA administrator.
NASA
Credibility Issue
GAO: The
GAO said NASA missions faced "persistent cost growth and schedule
slippage." Little seems to have changed. Since 2006, NASA has broken the bank on 10 of 12 major projects.
==========================================
NASA
is technology bankrupt. For nearly three decades NASA has failed to institute a
technology development program. Without advancement in technology there will be
no advancements in aeronautics and space exploration. NASA’s policy of
development technology during the program development contributes to excessive
cost and program failures. Technology development must become NASA first
priority. Technology programs must be established in the following disciplines:
·
Propulsion Systems
·
Structural Material
·
Electrical Power Systems
·
Avionics
·
Manufacturing Tooling Systems
·
Also see the author’s book.
In
the late 1980’s NASA established technology
teams in the above
disciplines comprised of NASA employees and members of the aerospace community
to identify and prioritize technologies need for future programs. No funding
was ever provided for the technology programs. These technology working groups
must be reestablished and funded or NASA programs will continue to fail.
Propulsion Systems:
The existing space transportation
system launch and orbital vehicle performance capability is provided by
chemical liquid oxygen/hydrogen (or RP-1 kerosene fuel) engines and solid
rocket or hybrid boosters. These propulsion systems have reached their maximum
performance potential. However significant cost reductions for this class of
engines can be achieved with the development of reusable engines for launch
vehicles and the development of propulsion systems for space based vehicles.
Improved sensors that provide information to decrease maintenance and flight
operations cost are key technology requirements for these class engines and,
therefore must be assigned the highest priority. In addition space based
propulsion systems would require the development of a long duration propellant
storage system.
NOTE: The space shuttle main
engine (SSME) is the only existing reusable engine. That technology must not be
lost.
The
long range advance propulsion technology
concepts have a wide range of possibilities. Several propulsion systems for
long range consideration are:
Solar Propulsion— Incorporating a reflective solar concentrator to heat liquid
hydrogen to a vapor which is expanded through a nozzle to generate thrust.
Sunlight Sail—An extremely thin and large sheet of material is expanded in
space to capture the force of the sunlight like sailboats capture the wind for
their propulsion force.
Nuclear Propulsion—Same principal as solar propulsion except nuclear energy is
used to heat the liquid hydrogen.
Anti-matter—Collides a proton with a positive charge into an antiproton
with a negative charge that produces a tremendous force for propulsion.
Plasma Rocket—hydrogen gas
is heated to extreme temperatures and accelerated by magnetic fields to provide
thrust.
The long range propulsion technologies
will be extremely challenging to develop and will require extensive laboratory
research testing.
Structural materials—technologies
are needed to decrease the structural weight of space vehicles. Carbon
nanotubes materials appear to have tremendous potential for space structures.
They are light weight and stronger than existing spacecraft materials. The
tubes also have the potential to
solve the storage
and leakage problems for cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen. The tubes can only be
produced under laboratory conditions. A top priority must be assigned to the
development and large scale production of this material.
Research is required for materials
to replace the shuttle thermal protective system. Ceramic materials for engine
components also have shown promise.
Electrical Power
Systems—are
limited to the capability of batteries, solar arrays, and nuclear power
generators. Extensive research is required in all these areas.
Electro-mechanical actuators research is required to remove hypergolic
generator from flight systems.
Avionics—will
present an extremely difficult management problem for the development of a
space based autonomous vehicle. Foremost in these problems will be costs that
may exceed 50 percent of the vehicle total cost. The integrated health
monitoring and autonomous control system of
reusable space
vehicles also presents formidable technology challenges in the areas of
software and sensors.
Autonomous navigation systems must
be developed and verified. One of the more exciting avionics technologies being
investigated is in the field of nano-electronic
devices. Laboratory demonstrations of accelerometers, gyros, pressure sensors,
thermal actuators, and optical devices
are resulting in
encouraging indications that this technology can significantly reduce space
vehicle weight, improve safety by providing additional layers of redundancy,
and reduce operations costs.
Manufacturing Tooling
Systems-
Advanced materials for future space programs must have machines that can
process them. The transfer of manufacturing to foreign countries with low labor
cost has diminished this nation capability to made manufacturing tools. There
is an acute need for machines that process existing and advance materials which
allow U.S. companies to produce products that can compete in the market.
=============================
==============
Don A. Nelson is an aerospace
consultant and writer. Mr. Nelson has consulted with congressional and
government offices on NASA issues since his retirement from NASA in January
1999 after 36 years with the agency. He has made numerous media appearances on
national and foreign television. He participated in the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab,
and Space Shuttle Projects as a mission planner and operations technologist.
Mr. Nelson was a supporting team member for the first rendezvous in space,
first manned mission to the moon, first manned lunar landing, and the first
flight of the Space Shuttle. During his last 11 years at NASA, he served as a
mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation
projects. He was a member of the design team for the space shuttle. His NASA experiences give him a unique
knowledge of NASA’s problems and for seeking feasible and realistic
solutions. Mr. Nelson is a graduate of Southern Methodist School of
Engineering. He is a certified private pilot and holds a Phase VI Pilot
Proficiency Wings award from the Federal Aviation Administration.
Mr. Nelson is the author of:
“NASA New Millennium Problems and
Solutions”
by Don A. Nelson
Written by a retired NASA engineer, this easy-to-read book is insider's
look at many of the space program's current problems. Not only does it predict
the most recent shuttle disaster, it provides a detailed understanding of why
our nation's exploration of its 'last frontier' is headed for disaster. With
aging shuttles, no definitive plans for future of the vehicle, and poor
management, Nelson's book is a wake-up call to all Americans to take note and
action...or lose the hope of conquering the stars (Barnes & Noble review).
Now
is the time to: ”Speak out…or forever suffer the
consequences of remaining silent!”
