nasaproblems.com

May 2008

Privatize the Space Shuttle

Coordinated by: Don A. Nelson, Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer

Contact: nasaproblems@yahoo.com

A countdown clock has started, but unfortunately it is not to launch; rather, it is a countdown to crisis.” Sen. Bill Nelson

NASA has failed to meet their development goals for the space shuttle replacement. Their Ares I Orion, the promised “safe, simple, and soon” space shuttle replacement which was to the cornerstone for human space transportation in their Constellation Program, has instead become a crisis that threatens to devastate the U.S. civil space program. NASA now has the U.S. space program on a course where the human access to space will be at the discretion of the Russian government. NASA’s backup plan, the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) is based on questionable launch vehicle concepts, still in the early stages of development and provides no solution to the looming crisis.

Funding that is needed for research and exploration programs will be diverted for years to purchase foreign launch service support to space station. Even “if” the numerous development problems with Ares I Orion could be solved it would be a sub-standard, costly, and unsafe launch system. 

The President and Congress have three options for addressing this crisis:

One: Continue on the course NASA management has set and be willing to accept the devastating consequences.

Two: Abandon the space station and renege on the agreement with the international partners.

Three: Continue to support space station with space shuttle and restructure the goals of the Constellation Program.

There is only one solution to this crisis…continue with the space shuttle. However, the shuttle must be privatized to make it a safe and affordable space transportation system. Privatization lowers the launch cost to competitive commercial levels, provides crew escape pods, saves shuttle technology, saves thousand of skilled space jobs, and eliminates the space station supply gap, and most importantly provides a feasible and realistic space transportation system for access to space.  HOWEVER, ACTION MUST BE IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENTED…OR THE SHUTTLE VENDORS WILL BE LOST!  

 

Index

Commercial Space Shuttle Business Plan

          Flight Cost Reductions

          Crew Escape System

          Privatization Plan

          Launch Cost Comparisons

          Backup Information and Charts

Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Problems

Ares I Orion (shuttle replacement vehicle) Warning Signs of Failure

Ares V More Problems

Why the Ares Orion Failed

Constellation Funding Problems

Refocus the Space Vision

NASA’s “Pig in a Poke” Modus Operandi

Foreign Space Agencies Select Reusable Next Generation Vehicles

21st Century Reusable Space Based Transportation Plan

Contact for Additional Information

 

 

Commercial Space Shuttle Business Plan

Executive Summary

The existing space shuttle fleet and assets will be transferred to a government corporation and be operated in the current flight and support modes. The government corporation will initiate plans to transfer the fleet and assets to a privately operated company. The procedure will be the same as was conducted with the transfer of the U.S. nuclear facility to United States Enrichment Corporation. The private company will be responsible for upgrading the space shuttle fleet with crew escape pods and make other flight systems and ground facilities improvements needed for commercial operations.

Commercial Space Shuttle

Privatization Business Plan

Preface

There is an old axiom that governs all space endeavors… “If you can’t get it into space…you can’t use it in space.” The ability of the United States to “get it into space” is being severely curtailed by the imminent decommissioning of the space shuttle and the ever increasing cost of launch operations. If the U.S. continues to ignore these critical issues it will relinquish its leadership as the world’s predominant space-faring nation.

Why the space shuttle fleet must be privatized:

·        There is compelling evidence that the success of the Ares I Orion space shuttle replacement is threatened by costly development problems which will extend the space station supply launch gap beyond the current five years. NASA has conceded that more funding will not eliminate the launch gap. 

·        The Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) launch systems do not exist and their development success is extremely questionable.

·        A human space transportation using the heavy lift Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles cannot be developed in time to prevent a launch gap. These launch vehicles cannot compete in the commercial launch market because of high labor cost.

·        There are feasible and realistic cost effective approaches for making the space shuttle a competitive launch system.

Why the space station supply launch service gap must be eliminated:

·        The troubling relationship with the Russian government puts in question the availability or affordability of the Soyuz transportation system.

·        The space station could be lost because critical components (control moment gyros) can only be delivered by the space shuttle.

·        Thousands of critical skilled space jobs and are at risk of being lost.

·        The increasing development problems of the Ares Orion shuttle replacement vehicle are warning signs of cancellation.

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Chart 2

Commercial Space Shuttle Development Phases

PHASE I   

·        Shuttle fleet operations will be conducted jointly by NASA and the government corporation teams from NASA facilities during the Phase I transition period.  The government corporation will be permitted to continue to use NASA facilities until the private company has established operations facilities.

Phase II

·        Third orbiter is removed from flight operations and transferred to the private company which will modify the orbiter to reduce launch cost and improve safety (Commercial Space Shuttle II). The private company will be permitted to sell bonds and stock to finance modifications and startup cost.

·        The company will establish control and launch facilities for the Shuttle II operations

·        Launch market demands will determine when the remaining orbiters will be scheduled for upgrades.

Phase III

·        Space Shuttle III will be a launch vehicle development in coordination with NASA and the company for improvements in operations and increased safety. 

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Chart 3

The Current Space Shuttle... Too Many Negatives

 

Too Expensive to Operate:

The current space shuttle’s operation consumes over 20 percent of NASA’s budget. The NASA management structure is too fragmented to effectively direct flight operations. There are too many employees (17,000) at too many centers. This results in excessive operation cost.

Extremely Difficult to Upgrade:

Since 1994 NASA has invested over $8 billion in upgrades for the shuttle launch system. The space shuttle integrated avionic system was not designed to be upgraded. The glass cockpit upgrade is a dismal example of the upgrade problem. This project was started in 1992, was first flown in April 2000, and was not completed until 2006. The cost soared to over $300 million for an upgrade that provided only a cosmetic effect and marginal flight safety.

Flight and Ground Systems are Obsolete and Fragile:

Since 1999 the aging shuttle fleet has sent 20 warnings of an impending disaster. There is no reason to believe that these warnings will not continue and that one of these warnings will be missed!

No Acceptable Crew Escape System:

It was a mistake to believe that the shuttle flight safety could be that of aircraft safety.  The space shuttle must have a crew escape system for launch, on-orbit, and re-entry phases of flight.

 

The privatized Commercial Space Shuttle solves these problems!

 

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Chart 4

Flight Cost Reductions

Commercial Space Shuttle reduces operations expense:

Proven automated flight and ground systems will drastically reduce operations cost. Modular system components provide cost effective upgrades. Corporate consolidation of flight and launch operations significantly reduce operation cost and increase flight rate. Commercial Shuttle launch costs of $205 mil/mission are realistic.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Million $

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Index

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Chart 5

Space Shuttle Flight Safety Comparisons

Space Shuttle had completed 67 consecutive missions before having a catastrophic mission. The two fatal missions were survivable if crew escape pods have been available.

Russian Soyuz had completed 68 consecutive missions before having a catastrophic mission. Two flight crews have been lost, both during entry phase of mission.

Sea Launch had completed 20 consecutive launches before the January 30th 2007 failure.

Atlas V has launched 76 times without a failure.

Delta II had 72 consecutive launches.

Ariane has 68 consecutive launches.

Ariane 5 has 19 consecutive launches since the December 2002 failure.

SPACE SHUTTLE HAS PROVEN TO BE AS RELIABILE AS ANY LAUNCH SYSTEM…ALL IT NEEDS IS A CREW ESCAPE SYSTEM!

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Chart 6

Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods System

Automation of the flight control system provides enough weight saving (see wt. chart) to install four to five crew escape pods. The pods provide protection for all phases of flight

Index

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Chart 7

Privatizing the Space Shuttle Fleet

  • The government enables space shuttle privatization by the transfer to a US Government corporation and then at a later date, a sale to the private sector (example: the United Stated Enrichment Corporation (USEC).
  • The government would provide indemnification, tax exempt status, and government loans until the corporation establishes a profitable operating mode. (Example: Arianespace Corporation).
  • During the period of operation as a US Government Corporation the private operator would use existing NASA facilities as a non-interference operator to the NASA’s Ares/Orion program.
  • The private corporation will upgrade the fleet and construct private launch facilities (Space Florida) to improve safety and reduce operation costs.
  • NASA would be tasked to conduct technology research projects that expand the capability of the private space launch industry.

See other options chart

Index

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Chart 8

Shuttle II / CEP Development Cost Estimate
Phase II  Four Years Program

 

Cost ~ $ Mil

Escape Pods

  500

Avionics

1200

Ground Support

  800

 

 

Contingency/Fees(40%)

1000

Got. Support(15%)

  375

 

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TOTAL

3875

Escape pods cost of $500 million is for the development and delivery of 12 pods.

Avionics cost of $1.2 billion is for all remaining Orbiters and includes integrated vehicle health management systems, automated flight control, and replacing wiring with fiber optics. Avionics design is to be based on modular subsystems to permit uncomplicated system upgrades.

Ground systems cost of $800 million is for new pre-mission planning support, ground monitoring, and integrated assembly/launch pad facilities. NO SS II VEHICLE COMMAND FUNCTIONS WILL BE REQUIRED FROM THE NASA-JSC OR NASA-KSC FACILITIES.

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Chart 9

Commercial Space Shuttle III Safety and Performance Upgrade Priority List

Phase III

Unlike the Ares launch vehicles there are viable avenues for improving the performance and safety of the commercial SS II. The following systems are high priority candidates for the SS III configuration:

·        Thermal Protection System - consideration must be given to TPS improvement. The X-37 flight test for thermal protection must be reinstated.

·        External Tank - investigate lowering the cost of the tank.

o       Retractable thermal ground blanket at launch pad.

o       Explore using the tank for on orbit storage and deep space facilities.

·        Solid Rocket Booster Motors

o       Test large diameter hybrid motors.

o       Investigate removing thrust vectoring.

o       Consider additional manufacturer.

·        Mechanical and Power

o       Replace APU and hydraulics. Develop long life high density batteries.

·        Non Toxic OMS/RCS

o       Sole source for OMS/RCS hypergolic propellants unacceptable.

Removing flight operations from NASA permits the agency to conduct these technology needs !!!

It is feasible that the Space Shuttle III can compete for commercial payloads and efficiently deliver enough payload mass to low earth orbit for construction of large space based vehicles. This would preclude development of a heavy lift launch vehicle.

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Chart 10

Shuttle III / Technology Programs Development Cost

Estimations

                                                                                         Cost ~ $Mil.

                    

                           Thermal Protection                                    1250

                           Rocket Booster Motors                                750

                           External Tank                                              650

                           Replace Fuel Cells                                       750

                           Replace APU/Hydraulics                                    950

                           Non Toxic OMS/RCS                                   650      

                           Contingency/Fee (40%)                             2000

                            Govt. Support (15%)                                   750

                                                                                                ====

                     TOTAL                                                              7750      

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Chart 11

Shuttle III / EELV / Ares I Launch Costs Comparison

International Space Station Mission

There have been extensive undertakings to reduce the cost of expendable launch vehicles which has resulted in significant reductions in their operations costs. There has NEVER been any determined effort to reduce the cost of space shuttle operations.

 

·        Space Shuttle (SS) 2006 cost to deliver crew and cargo to station.

·        Predicted commercial Space Shuttle III cost for station mission.

·        Boeing EELV heavy cost for two launches does not include cost of crew and cargo vehicles.

·        Ares I / ATV station support requires the Ares I for crew and two ATV launches on Ariane V to achieve SS payload capability.

Note: In the last five years only 17 of 97 commercial payloads were on U.S. launch systems. Last commercial launch from Florida was in April 2006.

Index

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Chart 12

Conclusions

·        Expanded space exploration and utilization has been stymied in the United States by the high labor costs. Automation of the space shuttle provides the avenues to reduce high labor cost and transfer manpower to technology research endeavors.

·        Allowing a contractor to own (or lease) the orbiters and market launch services would give the contractor vested interest for reducing operations costs.

·        Privatization permits the U.S. to compete for commercial launch services.

·        The commercial space shuttle fleet eliminates the space station launch supply gap.

·        Privatization solves the space station critical replacement components problem.

·        Privatization provides access to the space station for the $1.5 billion Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer.

·        The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is a successful example of transferring government property to the private sector.

·        Privatization of the space shuttle provides a path of minimum obstacles for the development of a 21st century competitive space transportation system.

Now is time for the aerospace community to: Speak out…or forever suffer the consequences of remaining silent!”

Join the challenge…petition the President and Congress to:

Stop our jobs from going overseas…privatize the Space Shuttle…and refocus the vision for space exploration.

Contact them at:

http://mygov.governmentguide.com/mygov/dbq/officials/

Return Index

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Backup Information and Charts

 

Feasible and Realistic Goals for the Commercial Space Shuttle

·        Significant commercial space shuttle launch cost reductions are feasible ($200 million per flight?).

·        Support an initial flight rate of seven flights per year and expand the flight rate to twelve flights per year.

·        Provide launch services for civil and military endeavors.

·        Establish a competitive commercial launch service.

·        Incorporate a crew escape pods system that provides escape avenues for all phases of flight.

·        Establish the foundation for a space based (reusable) transportation system, developed by NASA and commercially operated.

In response to the 107th Congress’s request to investigate privatizing the space shuttle program (SSP), NASA issued the following statement: “Privatization of the SSP has the potential to provide significant benefits to the Government. However, timing is critical.

Privatization of the space shuttle fleet eliminates the sole reliance on the questionable Ares I /Orion launch system. Allowing the space shuttle infrastructure to be dismantled or gather dust in museums will be a costly mistake.

The President and Congress must take immediate action for space shuttle privatization!

Ref.: “Concept of Privatization of the Space Shuttle”, Space Shuttle Program Office, Sept. 28, 2001

Index

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Commercial Space Shuttle Development Phases

Phase I

·        Complete the space station assembly and Hubble repair missions with current NASA shuttle operations and integrated support from the government sponsored space shuttle corporation. Operate two Orbiters from current facilities during phase over to private corporation control.

·        Third Orbiter is removed from flight operations and modified to reduce launch cost and improve safety (Commercial Space Shuttle II). Private corporation will be permitted to sell bonds and stock to finance modifications and startup cost.

·        Launch market demands will determine when remaining two Orbiters will be scheduled for upgrades.

·        Space Shuttle III will be placed in service when NASA and DARPA second generation technologies become available.

Shuttle II Development Concept

Phase II

The commercial Space Shuttle II is a four year development and flight test program. It is based on existing technology and proven ground and flight control systems. The operational savings are gained from reductions in support personnel made possible by flight automation and consolidating operations at KSC. This is a similar approach used to reduce the Ariane 5 and Evolved Expendable Launch vehicles launch costs. Automated operation was also the program baseline for the X-33/VentureStar project.

·        The shuttle pilot training facilities will be closed. All flight monitoring will be conducted from the corporation flight control center(Space Florida). Personnel needed to operate the automated SS II launch system has been estimated to be in the 7,000 range. Estimated saving is approximately $1 billion per year.

·        Automation provides nearly 3,700 pounds weight margin which permits installation of four escape pods.

·        This launch vehicle concept is to be tailored for a private operator. NASA will continue to have responsibility for flight crew operations as related to payloads.

·        A GOVERNMENT AGENCY DOES NOT HAVE THE “INCENTIVE” TO OPERATE A COST EFFECTIVE LAUNCH SYSTEM.

Index

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Phase II Potential Launch Rate

 

 

Space Station                                                  4 to 5

Earth/Deep Space Science                                 1 to 2

Military                                                         0 to 2

Commercial                                                      2 to 3

 

Note: Launch rate is limited to 12 flights per year which is maximum number of solid rocket motors sets which can be built in one year.

Return to Chart 2

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Other Space Shuttle Privatization Options

 

Government Owned Company Operated – Contract with government must allow company to compete in launch market.

Long Term Lease – would allow company to market shuttle services. Option to purchase at lease termination (U.S. Energy Corporation).

Government Corporation – permits corporation to use business market methods while assets still in ownership of government (U.S. Postal Service).

Return to Chart 7

======================

Autonomous Shuttle with Four Crew Pods Crew Escape Weight Summary

(Data from January 2004 Shuttle Project Office FOIA*)

 

Ref. Boeing DRM 2 (page 92)

Removed                                                                       Weight  (lbs)

Crew (5) Crew and suits                                                   -1285          

Crew Survivability                                                                -364

Flight deck seats (4)                                                              -326

Seat (1 m/d)                                                                           -128

Window shades                                                                       -68

Ref. Boeing DRM 3 (page 95)        

Windows top & front                                                            -1475

Displays and controls                                                             -800

          Total removed                                                             -4446

 

Required for automation and four crew

 

Automation hardware “Kit” (page 90)                                   1000

Docking Sensor                                                                           70

Range Safety package                                                            150

Window closeouts                                                                   205

Crew (4)                                                                                1029

                                                                                                 -------

          Total less Pods                                                              2454                                 

                  

Available weight margin for four escape pods                        1992

 

*Ref. pages from: Autonomous Shuttle Previous Studies Assessment, Nov. 2003,  Boeing/USA, Shuttle Project Office FOIA release.

NOTE: This evaluation proves weight margin is available to provide crew escape. It was NEVER EVALUATED by NASA!!! This is unacceptable!

 

Return to Chart 6

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Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Problems

 

NASA’s COTS requirement is to demonstrate the capability to deliver cargo to the ISS, disposal and return of cargo, and have an option for crew transportation. NASA’s budget of $2.1 billion for COTS is grossly under-funded.

         Rocketplane-Kistler                                 Space X                                  ATV

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