Commercial Space Shuttle / Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles

The Heavy Lift Launch Solution NASA Refuses to Evaluate

April 2010

Executive Summary

NASA senior management has refused to evaluate a heavy lift launch program consisting of the existing space shuttle and existing heavy lift launch vehicles operated by United Launch Alliance (see Bolden $20 Bet). This failure of due diligence is the result of management decisions being made on conjecture rather than engineer analyses. Decades of failed NASA projects are the direct results of senior management miscalculations and have been allowed to continue by the failure of oversight responsibility by the president’s Office of Science and Technology and the Office of the NASA Inspector General. Will President Obama let NASA continue to drift into oblivion?  

Existing Heavy Launch Solution

The following Commercial Space Shuttle (CSS) / Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) report presents a feasible and realistic option that solves the following critical U.S. human space flight issues by privatization of the space shuttle operation and using the existing EELV system to deliver vehicle components and resources to a human space based transportation system:

·        Provides the most cost effective launch system for transporting human and cargo to low earth orbit (LEO) by privatizing the shuttle as previously approved by NASA.

·        Establishes the course of action for developing and operating a cost effective space based LEO and deep space transportation system for human and robotic missions and eliminates the need to develop heavy lift launch vehicles (HLV).

·        Transfers the space shuttle system to the private sector in an orderly manner and eliminates the International Space Station (ISS) supply gap by providing continuous crew and cargo support.

·        Removes the need to terminate thousands of skilled aerospace employees supporting space shuttle operations.

·        Abolishes the necessity to purchase foreign launch services for ISS and eliminates the single source Russian Soyuz crew transfer accessibility to the ISS.

·        Stimulates the U.S. commercial launch market which has been forfeited to foreign competitors.

·        Removes NASA from the responsibility of conducting routine human launch operations and allows the agency to focus on technology development. 

·        Establishes a space based transportation system which has the goal of returning extraterrestrial resources and establishing human safe haven facilities.

This report recommends that special emphasis must be made on solutions for upgrading the earth observations satellite system and the increasing threat of asteroids and comets impact on Earth.

The report also issues a warning that the “The Central People’s Government of The People’s Republic of China” will develop a space shuttle within the next ten years. If the U.S. space shuttle is not privatized and a space based transportation system established, China will become the dominant nation in human exploration and the colonization of space.

Don A. Nelson

Nelson Aerospace Consulting

Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer

Contact: nasaproblems@yahoo.com

Nelson’s Bio     

Letter to the President dated July 17, 2009

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NASA APPROVED SHUTTLE PRIVATIZATION

In response to the 107th Congress’s request to investigate privatizing the space shuttle program (SSP), NASA issued the following:

 

CONCEPT OF PRIVATIZATION OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM

//s/Ronald D. Dittemore 9/28/01

Ronald D. Dittemore September 28, 2001

Manager, Space Shuttle Program

Summary

It is believed that utilization of the Space Shuttle for human access to space will continue through at least 2015 and possibly beyond 2020. The longevity and operational aspects of this program demand a different approach to operational management for the future. A different management strategy needs to be employed.

Privatization of the SSP has the potential to provide significant benefits to the Government. However, timing is critical. The continuing erosion of NASA skills and experience threatens the safety of the program. It is critical to take advantage of the existing NASA SSP expertise before further erosion affects the ability to plan and safely implement privatization. Today, the skill and knowledge legacy still remain to formulate the appropriate merger of the NASA SSP and private industry.

Privatization of the space shuttle fleet eliminates the sole reliance on the questionable Ares I /Orion launch system. Allowing the space shuttle infrastructure to be dismantled and gather dust in museums will be a cost this nation its leadership in space.

http://www.nasawatch.com/shuttle/09.28.01.privatization.plan.pdf

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Commercial Space Shuttle (CSS)

Feasible and Realistic Goals for the Commercial Space Shuttle

·       Reduce the space shuttle launch cost to near the $300 million level (CSS II).

·       Support an initial flight rate of seven flights per year and can expand the flight rate to twelve flights per year.

·       Provide market competitive launch services for civil and military endeavors.

·       Establish a competitive commercial launch service.

·       Incorporate a crew escape pods system that provides escape avenues for all phases of flight.

·       Establish the foundation for a space based (reusable) transportation system, developed by NASA and commercially operated.

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Commercial Space Shuttle Business Plan

Preface

There is an old axiom that governs all space endeavors… “If you can’t get it into space…you can’t use it in space.” The ability of the United States to “get it into space” is being severely curtailed by the ever increasing cost of launch operations. If the U.S. continues to ignore the launch cost issue it will relinquish its leadership as the world’s predominant space-faring nation. Consider the following:

·       High U.S. labor cost to manufacture and launch the Atlas and Delta Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles have prevented the United Launch Alliance group from successfully competing in the commercial launch market. Obtaining commercial launch business was a key factor for reducing military launch costs. IT IS A KEY FACTOR FOR NASA’S LAUNCH COSTS

·       Failure of the Ares I /Orion space shuttle replacement vehicle will cause immeasurable damage to this Nation’s space endeavors! Even if the development problems can be overcome, the operations cost will be prohibitive. 

·       The Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) launch vehicles are under funded and unproven. The COTS cargo and crew modules development and operations cost remain more conjecture than reality.

·       NASA plans to purchase launch services from the Russian government for space station support and commercial U.S. satellites are routinely orbited by foreign launch vehicles. The U.S. is now a buyer and not a competitive provider of launch services.

There is a Solution…Reduce our launch cost by privatizing the Space Shuttle Fleet!!!

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The Current Space Shuttle Problems and Privatization Solutions

Too Expensive to Operate:

The current space shuttle’s operation consumes over 20 percent of NASA’s budget. The NASA management structure is too fragmented (managed by three NASA centers) to effectively and safely direct flight operations. There is no incentive to reduce operations cost. A presidential executive order prohibits commercial operations. This results in excessive operation cost.

Privatization solution:

There have been extensive undertakings to reduce the cost of expendable launch vehicles which has resulted in significant reductions in their operations costs. There has NEVER been any determined effort to reduce the cost of space shuttle operations. Competitive launch cost can be achieved by:

·       Removing all civil service support.

·       Consolidation of operation at the launch site.

·       Automation of ground and flight operations.

Reducing space shuttle launch cost is not a technical challenge…it is a political challenge. The following chart shows the breakdown where significant cost reductions can be achieved by privatization of the space shuttle operations:

Space Shuttle Extremely Difficult to Upgrade:

Since 1994 NASA has invested over $8 billion in upgrades for the shuttle launch system. The space shuttle ground and flight avionic systems were not designed to be upgraded. The glass cockpit upgrade is a dismal example of the upgrade problem. This project was started in 1992 and was not completed until 2006. The cost soared to over $300 million for an upgrade that provided only a cosmetic effect and marginal flight safety improvement.

Privatization solution:

Automation of the ground and flight control systems permits the introduction of modular subsystems. A ground and flight control system based on a modular subsystem design can be repaired or upgraded without interference to the central avionic control computing system. Modular subsystems were first introduced on the Boeing 777 civil airliner and are now standard designs on all modern aircraft. It was the design baseline for the X-33 VentureStar launch vehicle.  

Reentry Thermal Protective System is too Fragile:

Foam shedding from the external is not the problem that needs fixing. The entry thermal tiles are too fragile and must be replaced. NASA has failed to conduct extensive research on thermal reentry systems. However, the Air Force X-37 space research vehicle program is addressing this critical issue.

Privatization solution:

Automation will allow the introduction of vehicle ground and flight health monitoring systems to monitor and identify breaches in the thermal protective system, however the current tile system is unacceptable and must be replaced. On-orbit repair must be improvement until the TSP is addressed.

No Adequate Crew Escape System:

The space shuttle must have and can have a crew escape system for launch, on-orbit, and re-entry phases of flight.

Privatization solution:

Automation of shuttle flight provides sufficient margins to permit installation of crew escape pods. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SURVIVABILITY WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE CHALLENGER AND COLUMBIA CREWS IF THEY HAD CREW ESCAPE PODS! Continued operation of the space shuttle without crew escape pods is a failure of due diligence.

Crew escape pods cannot be installed in crew capsules making them an unacceptable safety single point failure!. 

Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods

 

SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT SAFETY and Mission Success COMPARISION

Shuttle reliability remains unrivaled

Robert L. "bob" Crippen | Special to the Orlando Sentinel

January 23, 2009

The space industry is approaching a fateful six-day period that has become an annual time of reflection and rededication, as it honors the memory of the three great space tragedies in our history: Apollo 1 (Jan. 27, 1967), Challenger (Jan. 28, 1986) and Columbia (Feb. 1, 2003).
These anniversaries serve as reminders that the price we sometimes pay for extending our reach beyond our earthly grasp can be high. For that reason, it is imperative that we base decisions about how to proceed with our nation's agenda in space on the right arguments.
There is an ongoing discussion among the aerospace and political community regarding the risks of flying the space shuttle beyond its current retirement date of 2010. Those who oppose it often cite aging and safety concerns. Too often, these arguments have been based on somewhat scary probability figures that, by themselves, are wholly inadequate to determine how much longer the shuttle should fly.
In weighing the options for our space program, the new administration will need qualified, independent sources to help define the associated risk, and a common language for discussing it. These kinds of discussions generally rely on one of two methods for defining and accepting risk: demonstrated reliability or predicted risk.
Using predictive models, the generally accepted number based on Probabilistic Risk Assessment of the shuttle is about a 1 in 77 chance for loss of a vehicle on any single mission.
However, as former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin has pointed out, PRA "depends very strongly on underlying assumptions, which are, in essence, impossible to verify. So, in the end, we can estimate risk levels but cannot know them accurately."
Furthermore, this approach does not factor in the multitude of safety enhancements made since Columbia, the ongoing improvement in the vehicle, or the performance of the team that maintains and operates it.
Orbiters returning from space today are among the cleanest in program history. From improvements to the thermal-protection system, to new wiring in the orbiter fleet and an enhanced process for building external tanks, the program never stops striving to improve performance and safety.
After 126 flights, the demonstrated reliability of the space shuttle is 98.4 percent. Other than the Russian Soyuz (98.2 percent), the demonstrated reliability of systems currently being considered for human spaceflight is zero, since those systems have not yet flown.
Ultimately, there is no way to eliminate risk in spaceflight. At best we can try to understand and manage it to an acceptable level. The risk of flying the shuttle has been successfully managed in 98.4 percent of the missions. The continuous efforts to improve the safety and reliability have resulted in a robust system that is, in many ways, safer each time it flies.
The decision to continue flying the shuttle involves a number of important considerations. As the new administration considers ways to meet the nation's goals in space, it should base its policy decisions on objective assessment of national needs, priorities and available resources
.

The space shuttle is the only available resource and with all its faults it is far safer system then the NASA HLV with Orion crew capsules!!!  Don A. Nelson

The space shuttle transportation system had completed a remarkable 67 consecutive missions before having a catastrophic mission. With crew escape pods the Columbia space shuttle disaster would have been an accident…not a human disaster.

Russia’s Soyuz had completed 68 consecutive missions before having a catastrophic mission. Two flight crews have been lost, both during entry phase of mission. Crew capsules are death traps.

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Procedure for Privatizing the Space Shuttle Fleet

  • The government enables space shuttle privatization by the transfer to a US Government corporation and then at a later date, a sale to the private sector (example: the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC).
  • The government would provide indemnification and tax exempt status during the period the fleet operated as a US Government Corporation.  NASA’s decommissioning of the fleet places its value to the government as “scrap value.”
  • During the period of operation as a US Government Corporation the private operator would use existing NASA facilities.
  • The private corporation will upgrade the fleet and construct private launch facilities (Space Florida) to improve safety and reduce operation costs.
  • NASA should be tasked to conduct technology research projects that expand the capability of the private space launch industry.

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Commercial Space Shuttle Development Phases

·       Operate two Orbiters from current facilities during US Government Corporation phase.

·       Third Orbiter is removed from flight operations and modified to reduce launch cost and improve safety. The vehicle will be Commercial Space Shuttle II (CSS II).

·       Private corporation will be permitted to sell bonds and stock to finance modifications and startup cost.

·       Launch market demands will determine when remaining two Orbiters will be scheduled for upgrades.

·       Space Shuttle III will be placed in service when NASA and DARPA second generation technologies become available.

Commercial Space Shuttle II (CSS II) Development Concept

CSS II is a four year development and flight test program. It is based on existing technology and proven ground and flight control systems. The goal is to prove that reusable automated space vehicles are the correct approach for developing the 21st century space transportation system. Technology development programs for further improvement in safety and launch cost reduction will be conducted for Commercial Space Shuttle III (CSS III).

·       The operational savings are gained from reductions in support personnel made possible by flight automation and consolidating operations at KSC. This is a similar approach used to reduce the Ariane 5 and Evolved Expendable Launch vehicles launch costs. Automated operation was also the program baseline for the X-33/VentureStar project.

·       The shuttle pilot training facilities will be closed. All flight monitoring will be conducted from the corporation flight control center(Space Florida). Personnel needed to operate the automated SS II launch system has been estimated to be in the 7,000 range. Estimated saving is approximately $1 billion per year. (Additional personnel will be required to support the requirements of increased payload activity.)

·       Automation provides nearly 3,700 pounds weight margin which permits installation of four escape pods.

·       This launch vehicle concept is to be tailored for a private operator. NASA will continue to have responsibility for flight crew operations as related to payloads.

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CSS II / CEP Development Cost Estimate
Four Years Program

 

Cost ~ $ Mil

Escape Pods

  500

Avionics

1200

Ground Support

  800

 

 

Contingency/Fees(40%)

1000

Got. Support(15%)

  375

 

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TOTAL

3875

Escape pods cost of $500 million is for the development and delivery of 12 pods.

Avionics cost of $1.2 billion is for all remaining Orbiters and includes integrated vehicle health management systems, automated flight control, and replacing wiring with fiber optics. Avionics design is to be based on modular subsystems to permit uncomplicated system upgrades.

Ground systems cost of $800 million is for new pre-mission planning support, ground monitoring, and integrated assembly/launch pad facilities. NO CSS II VEHICLE COMMAND FUNCTIONS WILL BE REQUIRED FROM THE NASA-JSC OR NASA-KSC FACILITIES.

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Commercial Space Shuttle II Safety and Performance Upgrade Priority List

Unlike the Ares launch vehicles there are viable avenues for improving the performance and safety of the CSS II. The following systems are high priority candidates for the CSS III configuration:

·       Thermal Protection System - consideration must be given to TPS improvement. The X-37 flight test for thermal protection must be reinstated.

·       External Tank - investigate lowering the cost of the tank.

o      Retractable thermal ground blanket at launch pad.

o      Explore using the tank for on orbit storage and deep space facilities.

·       Solid Rocket Booster Motors

o      Test large diameter hybrid motors.

o      Investigate removing thrust vectoring.

o      Consider additional manufacturer.

·       Mechanical and Power

o      Replace APU and hydraulics. Develop long life high density batteries.

·       Non Toxic OMS/RCS

o      Sole source for OMS/RCS hypergolic propellants unacceptable.

Removing flight operations from NASA permits the agency to conduct technology !!!

It is feasible that the CSS III can compete for commercial payloads and efficiently deliver enough payload mass to low earth orbit for construction of large space based vehicles. This would preclude development of a heavy lift launch vehicle.

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Conclusions

·        Expanded space exploration and utilization has been stymied in the United States by the high labor costs. Automation of the space shuttle provides the avenues to reduce high labor cost and transfer manpower to technology research endeavors.

·        Allowing a contractor to own (or lease) the orbiters and market launch services would give the contractor vested interest for reducing operations costs.

·        The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is a successful example of transferring government property to the private sector.

·        Privatization of the space shuttle provides a path of minimum obstacles for the development of a 21st century competitive space transportation system.

Commercial Space Shuttle and the Moon

There is only one valid reason for returning humans to the Moon…SURVIVAL.  If mankind is to survive we must have safe havens other than those on planet Earth. The Moon is the first logical step in establishing those safe havens. As the knowledge of our universe has increased so has the realization that planet Earth is vulnerable to threats from deep space as well as those created on our home planet.

Anthropologists have traced the extinction of the dinosaurs to asteroids impacting Earth and even today this occurrence may be looming in our not too distant future as asteroid Apophis is predicted to make an incredibly close pass by our planet in 2029.  Then the asteroid will return in 2036 with another chance to impact the Earth. Is this mankind’s timetable to establish permanent human presence on the Moon?

The commercial Space Shuttle II is the first step in establishing a feasible and realistic human REUSABLE space transportation system for colonization of the Moon.

Can we afford to continue on NASA’s Constellation or HLV path?

The President and Congress must take immediate action for space shuttle privatization!

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“It’s the Launch Cost…Stupid”  paraphrasing Bill Clinton’s presidential economy election theme. NASA must reduce its launch cost and the CSS is the only option!

 

Shuttle operational launch cost for space station support are significantly less than those of Delta IV (heavy) and the Ares I for space station crew and cargo support! The space shuttle “current” operations cost is based on 4 shuttle launches per year with two to ISS. The two missions to ISS meet the crew rotation and cargo support requirements. Only the space shuttle can deliver all critical replacement components for the station (solar arrays, mechanical arms, gyros, radiators, etc.). Privatization allows the shuttle launches to be used for a combination of commercial and government payloads. The shuttle launch cost number does not include the significant reduction in civil service employees.

Delta IV Ares I crew rotation launch cost with the Orion command service module are from the Aerospace study of June 2009 with both vehicles based on a 14 flight life cycle cost. Delta IV at $1.14b and Ares I at $1.36b per launch…Study Finds Human-rated Delta IV Cheaper  .

Another independent approach using Apollo 17 data indicates the cost to build the Orion would be $355 million (based on 2009 NASA inflation cost factor). This cost may be low because ESA’s Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) recently put in service for station cargo support is reported to be over $300 million (Each ATV mission produces an individual cost of about $532 million, while each spacecraft is worth about $304 million, according to ESA).

The ground/flight support for two missions per year is estimated to be $385 million per launch, based on two launches per year. This assumes that NASA’s optimistic Ares I Orion workforce goal of 6000 can be achieved. The ground/flight workforce cost for Apollo 17 was $573 million (2009). The 2009 ground/flight support workforce for shuttle is 12,500, therefore it is conceivable that the Ares Orion workforce cost could double (Based on NASA data workforce average cost of $125,000 per employee).

Delta IV heavy launch cost are reported to be $300 million.

These independent numbers total $1.1 billion and indicate that the Aerospace launch cost evaluations are a “ballpark” number. Another unconfirmed NASA estimate put the launch cost of the Ares I Orion at $1.8 billion for two launches a year.

The cargo launch cost numbers represent the cost of two ATV’s. The NASA cost or the manifesting of these vehicles has not been decided. 

Apollo 7 launch costs show that the cost trend for expendable launch vehicles will exceed that of the space shuttle especially when the additional cargo costs are included.

CSS: Only shuttle provides cargo delivery and return capability. The shuttle launch cost assumes four flights per year. The privatized commercial space shuttle (CSS) assumes increased flight rates from the commercial market. The advance commercial shuttle (CSS II) will have significant cost and safety improvements from the upgrades made available from a NASA proposed technology program. 

NASA has never made a conscientious effort to control the cost of the space shuttle operations. In fact, NASA space shuttle managers have rejected and in some instances ridiculed engineers making cost saving suggestions for shuttle operations. 

Note: Apollo data ref. http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/Apollo_00a_Cover.htm

           

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The Saturn V Mausoleum

The history lesson that expendable lunar vehicle were too expensive is being ignored by NASA’s management. There were three Saturn V’s available for flight when the Apollo Program was terminated because their launch cost were consuming 30 percent of NASA annual budget for two missions a year. With a four day lunar stay time and a cargo return of only 200 lbs., the President, Congress and science community would not support any more Apollo missions.

NASA’s HLV are predicted to have a seven day lunar stay time and a 400 lbs. cargo return capability.

http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/Apollo_18-16_Apollo_Program_Budget_Appropriations.htm

Cost Effective Space Based Lunar Transportation System Option

A space based lunar transportation system serviced by the space shuttle and the Delta IV heavy launch vehicles is a feasible option for establishing a manned lunar based. One shuttle launch (Crews plus cargo) and four Delta IV’s can construct and support (crew plus 100Mt cargo) a lunar program at operations costs significantly lower than the predicted $3.5 billion launch cost of the Ares I Orion / Ares V launch system. Space based trans-lunar and lunar landing vehicles permits the establishment of facilities for permanent manned lunar bases.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


The above launch cost numbers represent “ballpark” values and are not exact. For example the HLV is predicted to delivery only 80 Mt, however the space shuttle and Delta IV are existing vehicles that can put 100 Mt in LEO. The CSS vehicles have feasible and realistic upgrade options to further reduce operation launch cost.

However even the more cost effective space based concept does not pass the realistic test because of two key missing technologies…lunar surface electrical power and the inability to store cryogenics for long periods. In addition it is not realistic to expect that the crew and cargo annual logistic cost of at least $2 billion would be supported unless the robotic missions discover lunar resources which justify this expense or a lunar safe haven policy is adopted.

Conclusion: Continuing with the development of NASA’s HLV program is not an affordable venture in today’s dire economic environment especially with an agency that has management and technology problems. The commercial space shuttle and the Delta IV are existing launch systems that can support the far superior space based LEO and lunar transportation system. However, key technology issues must be solved before viable lunar bases can be achieved.

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Technology Development

NASA is technology bankrupt. For nearly three decades NASA has failed to institute a technology development program. Without advancement in technology there will be no advancements in aeronautics and space exploration. NASA’s policy of development technology during the program development contributes to excessive cost and program failures. Technology development must become NASA first priority. Technology programs must be established in the following disciplines:

·        Cryogenic Storage

·        Propulsion Systems

·        Structural Material

·        Electrical Power Systems

·        Avionics

·        Manufacturing Tooling Systems

·        Also see the author’s book.

In the late 1980’s NASA established technology teams in the above disciplines comprised of NASA employees and members of the aerospace community to identify and prioritize technologies need for future programs. No funding was ever provided for the technology programs. Having technology available can reduce program development cycles from the current 5-10 years to 2-4 years.

These technology working groups must be reestablished and funded or NASA programs will continue to fail.

Cryogenic Storage: There will be no extended human lunar or deep space missions until cryogenic fluids can be stored indefinitely.

Propulsion Systems:

The existing space transportation system launch and orbital vehicle performance capability is provided by chemical liquid oxygen/hydrogen (or RP-1 kerosene fuel) engines and solid rocket or hybrid boosters. These propulsion systems have reached their maximum performance potential. However significant cost reductions for this class of engines can be achieved with the development of reusable engines for launch vehicles and the development of propulsion systems for space based vehicles. Improved sensors that provide information to decrease maintenance and flight operations cost are key technology requirements for these class engines and, therefore must be assigned the highest priority. In addition space based propulsion systems would require the development of a long duration propellant storage system.

NOTE: The space shuttle main engine (SSME) is the only existing reusable engine. This technology must not be lost.

The long range advance propulsion technology concepts have a wide range of possibilities. Several propulsion systems for long range consideration are:

Solar Propulsion— Incorporating a reflective solar concentrator to heat liquid hydrogen to a vapor which is expanded through a nozzle to generate thrust.

Sunlight Sail—An extremely thin and large sheet of material is expanded in space to capture the force of the sunlight like sailboats capture the wind for their propulsion force.

Nuclear Propulsion—Same principal as solar propulsion except nuclear energy is used to heat the liquid hydrogen.

Anti-matter—Collides a proton with a positive charge into an antiproton with a negative charge that produces a tremendous force for propulsion.

Plasma Rocket—hydrogen gas is heated to extreme temperatures and accelerated by magnetic fields to provide thrust.

The long range propulsion technologies will be extremely challenging to develop and will require extensive laboratory research testing.

Structural materials—technologies are needed to decrease the structural weight of space vehicles. Carbon nanotubes materials appear to have tremendous potential for space structures. They are light weight and stronger than existing spacecraft materials. The tubes also have the potential to

solve the storage and leakage problems for cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen. The tubes can only be produced under laboratory conditions. A top priority must be assigned to the development and large scale production of this material.

Research is required for materials to replace the shuttle thermal protective system. Ceramic materials for engine components also have shown promise.

Electrical Power Systems—are limited to the capability of batteries, solar arrays, and nuclear power generators. Extensive research is required in all these areas. Electro-mechanical actuators research is required to remove hypergolic generator from flight systems. 

Avionics—will present an extremely difficult management problem for the development of a space based autonomous vehicle. Foremost in these problems will be costs that may exceed 50 percent of the vehicle total cost. The integrated health monitoring and autonomous control system of

reusable space vehicles also presents formidable technology challenges in the areas of software and sensors.

Autonomous navigation systems must be developed and verified. One of the more exciting avionics technologies being investigated is in the field of nano-electronic devices. Laboratory demonstrations of accelerometers, gyros, pressure sensors, thermal actuators, and optical devices

are resulting in encouraging indications that this technology can significantly reduce space vehicle weight, improve safety by providing additional layers of redundancy, and reduce operations costs.

Manufacturing Tooling Systems- Advanced materials for future space programs must have machines that can process them. The transfer of manufacturing to foreign countries with low labor cost has diminished this nation capability to made manufacturating tools. There is an acute need for machines that process existing and advance materials which allow U.S. companies to produce products that can compete in the market.

Science

Launch costs can consume nearly half of a science program budget. Launch cost must be significantly reduced or science programs will continue to struggle with funding. Launch cost reduction must be NASA’s top priority. Reusable space based vehicles will provide a standard capability from which science payloads can be designed. Expendable deep space vehicle must also be standardized to prevent science programs failures caused by transportation system failures and budget overruns.

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Human Survival Safeguards

Earth Observation Program

This is a time for unprecedented urgency for earth science research, however there continues to be cuts in this budget. This must be reversed. NASA technology programs must identify opportunities to reduce earth science mission cost and still expand gathering of scientific data. The National Research Council has warned that the Earth Observation Program is at risk. The space observation capability has been diminished as the earth observation satellite system deteriorates.

Near Earth Object Program

The Near Earth Object Program has a congressional mandate to catalogue all asteroids and comets passing near Earth that have the potential of catastrophic effects. NASA must do more to protect Earth from asteroid and comets impacts. Cataloging 90% of near earth asteroids by 2020 is an inadequate goal with dire consequences. Nearly one thousand have been found, however the technology to deter these asteroids and comets does not exist. The increased number of identified asteroids and comets passing near Earth is a warning sign that must not be ignored. Earth must have an early warning system and options must be developed for diverting or destroying “keyhole” asteroids that will impact Earth.

Asteroids passing in the near earth range should be studied as possible observation bases for monitoring threats from deep space. International cooperation must be established! President Obama’s programs may solve the domestic and international challenges of the nation but the greatest challenge may come from a terrestrial and extraterrestrial disaster. The Near Earth Object Program must have the highest NASA priority to start planning for this threat to mankind’s very existence. 

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China’s Space Shuttle

The China National Space Administration (CNSA) can be expected to introduce a reusable space shuttle transportation system by 2020.  The program is designated Project 921-3 and is convincing evidence that   CNSA understands that a 21st century space program must be based on 

reusable space vehicles with the capability to launch and return crew  and cargo from space based facilities.

With a space shuttle and a space based infrastructure system, China will become the dominate space faring nation.

Ref:   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_921-3      http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.174/pub_detail.asp   http://www.astronautix.com/articles/china.htm 

 

 

 

 

 

In October 2006 the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) revealed that China is developing a winged space shuttle for use in the 2020 time frame.[9] Concept images indicate the planned space plane may be about 2/3 the size of the U.S. and Russian space shuttles. But instead of a using a large fuel tank that powered launch engines in the space plane, it uses a separate three-part liquid fuel booster.

 

 

 

 

Tian Jiao 1

The Tian Jiao 1 (Pre-eminent in Space 1) manned spaceplane was proposed by the First Academy (now the China Academy of Launch Technology) in 1988. It duplicated the aerodynamic shape of the American shuttle, but at 16.5 m long and a wingspan of 12 m, had a launch mass of only 20 to 25 metric tons. The spaceplane would be launched by an expendable booster. Pursuing this as a more modest first objective would allow China to take an incremental approach to eventually achieving a reusable shuttle. Conceived as being able to fly in both unmanned and manned modes, Tian Jiao 1 could have been available by 2003. Instead it was decided to pursue the Shenzhou ballistic manned space capsule in the short term, although development of spaceplanes of the Tian Jiao type continued in the 21st Century.

 

 

 

V-2 VTOHL

The V-2 vertical takeoff / horizontal landing two-stage reusable space shuttle was proposed by Beijing Department 11 of the Air Ministry in 1988. The first stage would use liquid oxygen/kerosene engines, while the second would use liquid oxygen/hydrogen engines. Both stages would be winged, and first flight would be no earlier than 2015.

 

Ref:   http://www.astronautix.com/craftfam/chicraft.htm

Four Are Charged in Espionage Cases Tied to China

By Evan Perez

 Companies Featured in This Article: Boeing

WASHINGTON -- The Justice Department unveiled charges against a U.S. military analyst and a former Boeing Co. engineer in separate cases that officials said underscore intense economic and military espionage efforts by China in the U.S.

The unrelated cases, filed in Los Angeles and Alexandria, Va., center on allegations that sensitive information about the Space Shuttle and Delta IV rocket programs, as well as U.S. military sales to Taiwan, were exposed to Chinese spies.

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-charges-four-in-espionage-cases-tied-to-china

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Long Range LEO and Lunar Space Based Objectives

NASA must have a space transportation system which is reusable and space based and operated by the private sector. The space shuttle and the Delta IV heavy offer the only feasible option for a near term 21st century lunar transportation system. This system provides lower operations cost and the mandatory requirement of a minimum 10 Mt lunar cargo return. This concept can support the only valid reason for human on the Moon…SAFE HAVEN! The following charts outlines a development plan.

Space Based Tug- Space tugs must be a top priority for NASA’s space transportation. They are a key factor for reducing mission cost and increasing mission success. Tugs can be supplied by the shuttle and expendable launch vehicles. ONLY THE SPACE SHUTTLE CAN RETRIEVE TUG PAYLOADS! Tugs can support near earth, lunar, and deep space missions.

Lunar Program: The near term lunar program should continue with the robotic exploration of the moon. The lunar exploration must be defined to not only explore but also to identify the requirements for establishing the moon as a safe haven for human survival. Lunar safe haven is the only valid reason for establishing a human lunar base. The schedule for that plan is outline in the above space transportation plan.

The following proposed Lunar space transportation system (STS) provides the guidelines for the technology development program.

 

Note: The lunar excursion vehicle is space based in Moon orbit. The following technology programs must be developed by NASA’s technology programs:

 

 

 

Mars Program: Today’s technology limitations prevent human exploration of Mars from being considered as a feasible and realistic goal. However, the Mars STS would follow the same space based development plan envisioned for the lunar STS. Until technology is available significant knowledge has and can be achieved by robotic exploration.

 

 

 

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International Space Station Decision

There are many factors the President and Congress must consider in deciding the future of the $120 billion International Space Station (ISS).

·        First and foremost is the station worth the $2 billion annual cost for operations support?

This decision must be made by consensus of all the international partners. This nation has made a commitment that must be kept. However, operation costs must be considered and a long duration manned tended station instead of the current permanently manned operation may be a cost effective option and still provide productive scientific investigations.

·        Will the ISS be able to operate without the space shuttle from 2010 till 2020?

The ISS was designed for space shuttle support. Station electrical power is already a critical resource. The solar arrays can only be replaced by the space shuttle. With the existing problems of the station solar arrays it is unrealistic to believe that existing electrical power level supply will be available after 2010. Without the space shuttle only 132 pounds of experiments can be returned on each Soyuz flight.

It is extremely doubtful that the ISS can operate until 2015 without shuttle support. 

NOTE: The Commercial Space Shuttle offers the most feasible and realistic approach for providing cost effective crew and cargo transportation to the ISS.

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Author Biography

Don A. Nelson is an aerospace media consultant and writer. He has made numerous appearances on national and foreign television. Mr. Nelson has consulted with congressional and government offices on NASA issues since his retirement from NASA in January 1999 after 36 years with the Agency. He participated in the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Projects as a mission planner and operations technologist. Mr. Nelson was a supporting team member for the first rendezvous in space, first manned mission to the moon, first manned lunar landing, and the first flight of the Space Shuttle. During his last 11 years at NASA, he served as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation projects. He was a member of the design team for the space shuttle. His NASA experiences give him a unique knowledge of NASA’s problems and for seeking feasible and realistic solutions. Mr. Nelson is a graduate of Southern Methodist School of Engineering. He is a certified private pilot and holds a Phase VI Pilot Proficiency Wings award from the Federal Aviation Administration.
Mr. Nelson is the author of:

NASA New Millennium Problems and Solutions

by Don A. Nelson

Written by a retired NASA engineer, this easy-to-read book is insider's look at many of the space program's current problems. Not only does it predict the most recent shuttle disaster, it provides a detailed understanding of why our nation's exploration of its 'last frontier' is headed for disaster. With aging shuttles, no definitive plans for future of the vehicle, and poor management, Nelson's book is a wake-up call to all Americans to take note and action...or lose the hope of conquering the stars (Barnes & Noble review).

Now is the time to: ”Speak out…or forever suffer the consequences of remaining silent!”

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References and Supporting Documentation

Space Shuttle Privatization

Privatization must be reinstated with the following goals: Establish a government corporation to operate the existing fleet for NASA. The space shuttle government corporation will take one orbiter out of service and upgrade the vehicle for unmanned operations, install crew escape modules, and build a new launch facility. Funding for these upgrades would be provided by the corporation by selling government bonds. When available the remaining orbiters will receive these upgrades and the government corporation sold to the private sector. The then private corporation will provide commercial, civil, and military launch service with these upgrade orbiters. A technology program directed by government agencies (NASA, DARPA and others) will be established to promote the safe and efficient operations for private space systems operators.

There is no doubt that the space shuttle in its current configuration is a costly and unsafe human transportation system. However, even with two tragic failures, the “reusable” space shuttle has proven to be a most reliable and practical concept for space transportation and there are feasible and realistic solutions for making the space shuttle safer and cost effective. As a privatized transportation system, the space shuttle can reduce operations cost by offering commercial launch services.

Over 40 percent of the shuttle cost is for operations compared to 20 percent for the expendable Atlas II. In previously Shuttle accountings another 10 percent was charged for government resources and program management (R&PM). Privatization reduces the shuttle operations cost to slight over 20 percent of the flight cost which frees up skilled employees to work technology research programs. 

Crew safety can be significantly insured with the installation of crew escape pods in the Orbiter.

Prior to the space shuttle Columbia disaster, plans were in progress to privatize the space shuttle operations.

Note: Privatization will allow continuation of space shuttle service to space station and allows the $200 billion space shuttle investment from becoming a museum exhibit. Privatization saves thousand of jobs and will make the U.S. a competitive provider of launch services for the government and commercial sectors. The U.S. is at a critical junction as the leading space-faring nation. We can go forward with the commercial space shuttle or we can become history. However there are four problems that have prevented the space shuttle from achieving its potential: It’s too expensive to operate, there is no crew escape system, and the re-entry thermal protection system is too fragile. All three of these problems have technical solutions. It is the fourth problem, the political problem that is most challenging.

 

 

SSME – The “ONLY” Reusable Rocket Engine

Boeing image

Should the only reusable rocket engine in the world be abandoned? NASA’s announcement to not use the Space Shuttle Main Engines on the Ares I and V is another indication that the U.S. space transportation program is on the verge of collapse. Lost of the design and manufacturing team of the only proven reusable space launch engine is another dire warning sign.

Current U.S. Expendables Launch Vehicles: The current expendable space transportation vehicles will be required to support the current and near future robotic space exploration endeavors. However the high operations cost of the heavy lift U.S. launch vehicles severely penalizes science and military missions. The high operations cost of these U.S. vehicles has in effect loss the commercial launch market to foreign competition. A privatization of the space shuttle modeled after the highly successful Arianespace Corporation launch operations must be adopted if the U.S. is to continue to be a space faring nation.

 

Reusable Space Vehicles Transportation Plan

Russia, China, Japan, and India have all recognized that reusable space vehicles will be required for safe and cost effective 21st century space transportation system and are proceeding to that goal. NASA has a reusable launch vehicle in the space shuttle. To discard the space shuttle and its technology will be a devastating blow to this Nation’s space enterprises.

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Letter to the President

July 17, 2009

The Honorable Barack Obama

President of the United States

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20500

 

Dear Mr. President:

 

NASA’s management has been unable and/or unwilling to eliminate the detrimental policies employed in their human space program as is again being revealed by their failing Ares I Orion shuttle replacement program. Their inept management of space station Freedom, Space Exploration Initiative,  X-33 VentureStar, and now the Ares I Orion shuttle replacement is a stern warning that the agency is not ready to embark on leading the nation’s return to the Moon and beyond.

There is the mistaken belief that NASA’s human space initiatives and programs have been or are being thoroughly analyzed and reviewed and therefore can be trusted. Instead too often NASA’s management has relied on conjecture instead of verified analyses to formulate and justify their human space endeavors. Without impartial internal and external oversight, NASA’s programs will continue to experience significant cost and/or schedule growth. It is requested that a presidential directive be issued that establishes the mechanism for internal and external oversight of NASA. Without authoritative oversight there is no accountability.

The absence of authoritative oversight has created the potential seven year space station launch supply gap and the prospects of losing thousands of skilled aerospace jobs (economic recovery ). These dire consequences and the questionable reliance on foreign launch services can be avoided if the space shuttle is not decommissioned. An unsolicited comparison of a privatized space shuttle with automated flight systems and crew escape pods concludes it is the far superior to any of the proposed expendable launch systems. It should be no surprise that a Chinese space shuttle launch system can be expected and will propel that nation to forefront of space exploration. NASA’s refusal to evaluate the automated privatized shuttle is a failure of due diligence that must be corrected.

The Shuttle privatization solution eliminates the station supply launch gap and the need for foreign launch services, keeps the capability to replace critical space station systems, returns cargo, lowers operation cost,  competes in the commercial launch market, and provides the foundation for a 21st century space based human transportation system.

Mr. President, your administration has endorsed change, however the window of opportunity  for change to NASA’s human space projects is rapidly closing. There must be presidential directives for NASA oversight and space shuttle privatization or the 21st century’s human space transportation will be labeled “Made in China.” 

 

Don A. Nelson

Nelson Aerospace Consulting

Retired NASA Engineer

1407 Moller Rd     Alvin TX, 77511  

NASA’s Management Problems and Solutions

I think it's fair to say that there's been a sense of drift to our space program over the last several years” President Barack Obama

NASA’s ongoing inability to meet schedules, control costs, and prevent cancellation of projects is caused by their unwillingness to resolve the agencies internal problems. Internal problems that have been festering for years and must be addressed before NASA can again significant contribute to expanding mankind’s knowledge of the space frontier. This report identifies the problems and recommends solutions to stop the “drift to our space program” into oblivion.

Identifying the problems:

·        NASA has dysfunctional management. The “One NASA” problem has never been solved and each NASA center continues to operate like an independent “fiefdom”. Program costs soar because there is no accountability for failure. The objective is get the program funded with the belief that Congress will provide for cost overrun rather than cancel the program.

·        Manned spaceflight operations cost are excessive and consume too much of NASA’s resources. NASA has no incentive to reduce manned launch operation costs.

·        Technology development programs have been neglected for decades and NASA today is technologically bankrupt. The troubled “Apollo on Steroids” Constellation Program’s development problems are the results of trying to build a 21st century space transportation system with 20th century technology.

Who is really in charge at NASA?

The President makes three political appointments to NASA: the Administrator, Assistance Administrator, and the Inspector General. Too often these appointees are unwilling or unprepared to challenge the NASA civil servant senior managers who have their own agendas. The conflict in the NASA Inspector General Office leading to the resignation of the Inspector General typifies the problem and the damage it has done to the agency.

Senior members of Congress with NASA oversight also contribute to the problem when they use their position to promote agendas that dilute the primary strategic plan for the Agency or continue to support programs that have failed to meet their development goals and have exceeded budget limits. The internal agency resistances to change the cultural impairment are major factors why many qualified political candidates refuse to accept appointment to NASA.

NASA Administrator

Must have the unique qualification of a Washington politician, engineer, scientist, and program manager with the ability to determine what passes the test of being both feasible and realistic.

The Administrator must have “independent” advisors who can challenge the “entrenched” NASA civil service managers. The general rule in today’s NASA is to tell the Administrator what you want him to hear and not what he needs to know.   

NASA Inspector General

The NASA Inspector General Office has the NASA oversight responsibility; however this office is plagued by internal dissension and its technical evaluation capability is virtually nonexistent. The Inspector General must have outside independent evaluator(s) on technical issues. The Inspector General must also identify to the Administrator those project managers whose management decisions created program problems. In general, accountability of senior management doesn’t exist at today’s NASA.

The President must appoint a NASA inspector generals whose background knowledge relates to the agency…not just government career bureaucrats. To have accountability, there must be responsible oversight.

NASA Office of the Chief Engineer

This office must become the “eyes and ears” for the Administrator. The NASA chief engineer must be the administrator’s must trusted advisor and not necessarily a career civil service employee. The Administrator must provide this office with the resources to serve as the agency’s independent internal evaluator of proposed projects and monitor of existing projects. Each NASA’s center chief engineer office must serve as the coordinator agent for using the resources of their office in evaluating that center’s projects and report directly to the Headquarter Chief Engineer. They will have no allegiance to the center director. All evaluations will be public record. The peer pressure of internal monitoring by the NASA Chief Engineer will be the most effective mechanism the Administrator can have.

The Office of the Chief Engineer must be used as the training ground for future executive program managers for Senior Executive Service positions. Invaluable management experience can be obtained by appointing promising candidates to the Chief Engineer Office and rotate them around the various centers to gain insight into program management and each center’s capability. NASA’s management creditability problems can be attributed to the lack of extensive experience in project management. This process solves that inexperience problem and addresses the “One NASA” issue by creating a NASA senior management team with knowledge and a relationship with other NASA centers.

NASA Advisory Council

The NASA Administrator current appoints the members of this “advisory” council. This appointment policy defeats the objective of providing independent unbiased advice for the Administrator. Public input to the Council is not permitted and that must be corrected. Council members have been removed for issuing proclamations unfavorable to the Administrator position. This policy has been detrimental to the oversight of the Agency.

The NASA Advisory Council must be appointed by the executive branch and report to the President and Congress and not be subservient to the NASA administrator. The Council must also serve as forum where NASA employees and contractor can voice concern on NASA programs and policies without fear of management reprisal.

NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This panel effectiveness has been negated by the appointment of members with limited technology knowledge.

For Example:

Safety Experts Call for Shuttle Shutdown (Source: Orlando Sentinel , 4/17/2009)
Saying NASA is at a critical crossroads, independent safety experts have called for the agency to stay the course and shut down the shuttle program after nine remaining missions. Keeping NASA’s shuttle fleet flying beyond 2010 would endanger astronauts and sap money from efforts to return American astronauts to the moon by 2020, the group said. “Continuing to fly the shuttle not only would increase the risk to crews, but also could jeopardize the future U.S. exploration program by squeezing available resources,” the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel said in its latest annual report, released Thursday. The panel was created by Congress after the 1967 Apollo 1 launch pad fire killed three astronauts
.

These are the same “experts” that said they “didn’t do tech analyses” when requested to investigate the safety of Ares I. Their call for shuttle shutdown was based on a non-existence safety evaluation of the two transportation system. A competent evaluation would have shown that the Ares I Orion excessive launch vibrations and water landing makes it the least safe system of any manned vehicles.

http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oer/asap/documents/9_12_2007.pdf   page 9.

It is recommended that membership on the ASAP consist of aerospace engineers and they not be appointed by the NASA administrator.

NASA Credibility Issue

GAO: NASA Still 'High Risk' for Waste (Source: Orlando Sentinel  1-22-09)
NASA remains a "high risk" investment of taxpayer dollars because it cannot complete major projects on time or on budget, according to a watchdog report. The news is hardly surprising. Federal auditors at the Government Accountability Office have included NASA on their "high risk" list since it was first created in 1990. At the time, the GAO said NASA missions faced "persistent cost growth and schedule slippage." Little seems to have changed.
Since 2006, NASA has broken the bank on 10 of 12 major projects.

The Apollo Program spent $165 billion (2005 dollars) through the first lunar landing. NASA management has estimated in their 2006 Exploration System Architecture Study that the Constellation program through the first lunar landing would cost only $124 billion. NASA management concluded that the costs were estimated conservatively because they included $20 billion for ISS servicing by the Ares I Orion (CEV). In other words the cost of Constellation up to the first lunar landing would only be $102 billion! NASA would develop a stand alone crew launch vehicle (which Apollo didn’t require) and develop the largest cargo launcher ever built for a cost nearly 40% less the Apollo Program.

THIS IS WHY NASA MUST HAVE EFFECTIVE INDEPENDENT PROGRAM OVERSIGHT.  

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Commercial Orbital Transportation Services

COTS…too many negatives! Neither, the Orbital Science’s Taurus/Cygnus or SpaceX’s Falcon 9/Dragon heavy lift launch system exists. The lofty and improbable goals of these companies still cannot eliminate the need to secure foreign launch services for ISS support. Neither vehicle solves the reusable issue required to reduce launch costs to competitive levels.

NASA’s plan to spend $3.5 billion for twelve SpaceX vehicles will cost $130 million per flight and eight Orbital Science vehicles will cost $237 million per flight. It will require seven flights for the SpaceX Dragon and Orbital Cygnus to deliver 15 Mt to ISS. Only two ATV flight are required but ESA plan to support only one flight per year. The Japanese H-2A first launch is scheduled later this year.

Crew transportation on COTS vehicle is an unrealistic goal. Privatization of the space shuttle eliminates the need for NASA to spend billions on launch systems that are inferior to the space shuttle.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


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Shuttle Derived HLV Configurations:

 

 

Development cost of the HLV Sidemount is report to be $11 billion and the HLV In-line to be $15 billion. Operation cost for the lunar seven day mission is estimate to be a conservative $2 billion.

 

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NASA Management Timeline of Failures:

 

1988- Space Shuttle returns to flight status. Presidential Executive Order prohibits any commercial payload flights. The Space Shuttle launch system has become a government “jobs program” for 24,000 employees and is too large to manage as was evidenced by the two shuttle disasters caused by safety oversights. NASA senior managers also failed to make launch cost reduction a priority and used the safety concern to discourage attempts to reduce shuttle operations cost. Launch costs soared to a staggering $500 million per flight and impacted funding for NASA programs.

 

1989—NASA’s Advanced Launch System (also called the National Launch System) program to develop expendable launcher capable of putting heavy NASA, military, and commercial payloads into orbit was cancelled. Expendable heavy lift launch vehicles were determined to be too costly to develop and operate.

NOTE: NASA management has again ignored that expendable heavy lift launch vehicle are too costly.

 

1991- First Lunar Outpost (FLO) was initiated to develop human lunar transportation system. A Super Saturn launch vehicle was to be developed to carry 6 to 8 astronauts to the moon. It was conceived by one of NASA management’s infamous 60 days study. It was cancelled after development cost predictions soared to $50 billion and a lunar manned mission could cost $4 billion.

NOTE: The same NASA manager who directed the failed FLO, as NASA Administrator directed the Constellation lunar program. Learn from your mistakes?

 

1990-Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (Augustine Committee) stated that, “the overall technical base underpinning the space program has been permitted to languish in terms of funding for several decades.”

NOTE: NASA management continued to disregard the need for technology development. NASA is technologically bankrupt.

 

1993­-Space Station Freedom program was canceled after a 9 year development program and spending $11 billion. Replaced with the International Space Station program (ISS).

NOTE: Technology and available funding was not a factor in the cancellation. This was a NASA management blunder caused by the “NASA Fiefdom” managers.

 

1996—NASA contracts with Lockheed Martin to build X-33 half scale flight demonstrator to verify feasibility of the single stage to orbit VentureStar as the shuttle replacement vehicle. Development cost and flight safety issues were ignored and the program was cancelled in 1999.

NOTE: This $1.3 billion program failure emphases the necessity to develop technology before committing to major development projects.

 

1999—Shuttle safety problems keeps fleet grounded most of the year. NASA management ignores request to evaluate automate flight systems and provide crew escape pods.

 

2000—International Space Station is $1 billion over budget and behind schedule. Commercial interest in ISS is lacking. Congress placed budget limits on the station development.

NOTE: Budget limit was exceeded and Congress took no action.  

 

2001 – Congress requested NASA to Investigate Space shuttle privatization. NASA reported: ”The longevity and operational aspects of this program (Space Shuttle) demand a different approach to operational management for the future. Privatization of the SSP has the potential to provide significant benefits to the Government. However, timing is critical.” Ref.:  http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=3828

NOTE: NASA and Congress missed this window of opportunity, however if it’s too late to save space shuttle, it is in all probability too late to save this nation’s human space program.

 

2002 - GAO report found NASA could not implement key management controls for the $4.8 billion Space Launch Initiative (SLI) basic requirements. In response to the GAO report, NASA indefinitely postponed the System Readiness Review for SLI.

 

Jan. 14, 2004 - President Bush announces plans for Moon and Mars exploration and plan to decommission the Space Shuttle by 2010 and have its replacement in service by 2014.

NOTE: NASA management sold this program on a “go as you pay” budget with a four year gap of depending on the Russian government for crew access to ISS.

 

2004 - Retired Navy Rear Adm. Craig Steidle, head of NASA's new Office of Exploration Systems, identifies the Crew Exploration Vehicle as the Shuttle replacement. Suggests a contractor fly off in 2008.

NOTE: Adm. Steidle had no space vehicle background and no experience dealing the NASA “fiefdom” culture. He resigns in 2005.

 

2005 – The NASA Inspector General office’s failed to conduct a requested independent evaluation for space shuttle crew safety (IGO report: “Crew Escape System and Automated Flight Control System”, March 29, 2005).

 

2005 - Michael Griffin becomes NASA Administrator. Halts Vision for Explorations activities and initiates another infamous 60 day study to redefine approach for shuttle replacement and manned lunar program. The space shuttle replacement program loses 16 months of development time.

Note: "We have ways to construct such vehicles using shuttle solid-rocket motors and external tanks and shuttle main engines," Griffin said of the new boosters Friday. "We think the existing components offer us huge cost advantages as opposed to starting from a clean sheet of paper, and that's what I've proposed doing." Orlando Sentinel. None of the “existing components” worked!

July 2005 “The estimated cost of these new vehicles (Ares) is from $10 billion to $15 billion through 2015. Operating costs for the single-stick series (Ares I) would run about $3 billion a year--approximately $1 billion less than the shuttle cost before Columbia's failure. NASA hopes to pay the tab from its scheduled modest budget increases and savings from falling shuttle return-to-flight costs. But one official says that those return-to-flight costs will climb as high as $7 billion over 5 years--$2 billion more than previously estimated. That figure would leave little room for new ventures, the cost of which have traditionally been underestimated.”    Space News

2006 GAO Report:NASA has had difficulty bringing a number of projects to completion, including several efforts to build a second generation of reusable human spaceflight vehicle to replace the space shuttle. NASA has attempted several expensive endeavors such as the National Aero-Space Plane, the X-33 and X-34, and the Space Launch Initiative, among others. While these endeavors have helped to advance scientific and technical knowledge, none have completed their objective of fielding a new reusable space vehicle. We estimate that these unsuccessful development efforts have cost approximately $4.8 billion since the 1980s.”

Ref: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06817r.pdf  

 

2008NASA cleared to conclude a $700 million-plus deal with Russia for periodic Soyuz and unmanned Progress re-supply flights to the international space station through 2011.

Note: Russian space agency has already announced the cost to transport astronauts to space station will increase in 2012.

 

2009 – Augustine Report: Human exploration beyond low earth orbit is not viable under FY 2010 budget guideline and to continue would require annual increase of approximately $3 billion.

 

2010 –GAO Report: NASA has had difficulty meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives for many of its projects. The need to effectively manage projects will gain even more importance as NASA seeks to manage its wide-ranging portfolio in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment. The GAO has designated NASA's acquisition management as a high risk area since 1990.”

2010 – Constellation Program is cancelled, wasting $11.5 billion and will cause still yet to be seen impact to the U.S. space program.

NOTE: The Constellation Program failed because of shoddy management. NASA programs will continue to fail until NASA senior management has independent oversight and is made accountable

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Bolden $20 Bet

March 5, 2010

NASA Headquarters

Office of the Administrator

Attn: Gen. Charles F. Bolden Jr. 

 

Subject: $20 “Plan B” Bet

 

Charlie,

The Commercial Space Shuttle is the only option for the “Plan B” manned spacecraft heavy-lift launch vehicle compromise. It solves the launch gap problem, has the least development cost, is commercially operated, provides the highest level of safety with crew escape pods, has proven heavy lift capability, provides the only heavy payload return capability, and has the lowest mission operation cost.

History will record that NASA management ignored requests to evaluate the commercial space shuttle as the lunar heavy lift vehicle before proceeding with their disastrous Ares Orion launch system. The hand writing is already on the wall that the Chinese space program will have a reusable space transportation system and therefore must have a space shuttle. Will history record that it was on your watch that this nation conceded human space exploration to China?

Gave the attached supporting data to Mike Coats at JSC, bet you $20 that it will never reach your desk unless Mike sends it to you.

Don

Don A. Nelson

Nelson Aerospace Consulting

Retried NASA Aerospace Engineer

 

NASA REPLY:

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Headquarters

Washington, DC 20546-0001

April 1, 2010

Space Operations Mission Directorate

 

Mr. Don A. Nelson

Nelson Aerospace Consulting

1407 Moller Road  Alvin,TX 77511

Dear Mr. Nelson:

Thank you for your recent letter to our National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Administrator, Charlie Bolden, proposing that NASA consider developing a Commercial Space Shuttle as the only Plan B option for a heavy-lift launch vehicle. After discussing your proposal and enclosures with Mr. Bolden, I have a few observations and comments to share.

Although NASA does not have a Plan B, we are actively developing the technology, tools, and safety enhancements to make a future mission to Mars both realistic and achievable. Key to that effort will be a reliable heavy-lift propulsion system. Your letter suggests that lower operations costs can be achieved by turning the Space Shuttle over to a commercial entity. A sound business case, however, would be highly dependent on market demand beyond potential NASA requirements. Various studies and surveys, such as the annual commercial space transportation market forecast published by the Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space, indicate that there is not projected growth in the launch market. For the United States (U.S.) launch vehicle services, the market is primarily for U.S. Government payloads. Consequently, there may not be the market demand to profitably sustain a commercially-operated Space Shuttle. NASA's Fiscal Year 2011 budget request includes funding for a broad scope of Research and Development (R&D) activities aimed at developing next-generation space launch propulsion technologies. These activities aim to both reduce costs and shorten development timeframes for future heavy-lift systems. More specifically the R&D will target new approaches to first-stage launch propulsion, in-space advanced engine technology development and demonstrations, and foundational or basic propulsion research.

Hopefully this brief explanation gives a little more insight into understanding NASA's forward plan. Thank you for your continued dedication to human spaceflight and crewed vehicle safety enhancements. These are noteworthy contributions and your comments are greatly appreciated.

Lynn Cline for

William H. Gerstenmaier

Associate Director for Space Operations

 

Nelson reply to Bolden:

Email dated April 8. 2010

Charlie:

Ms. Cline's reply to the Commercial Space Shuttle option typifies the disconnect between NASA's senior management decisions based on conjecture and decisions made on unbiased engineering analyses.

In her letter she states:

1) There may not be the market demand to profitably sustain a commercially-operated Space Shuttle.

The United States had lost its profitable commercial space launch market before the downturn in the satellite launch business. Our space launch industry is dependant on government support for its survival. However, while significant efforts were made to lower the operation cost of the privatized expendable launch vehicles (EELV’s), none were made for the reusable space shuttle even though a NASA JSC study report that: “Privatization of the SSP has the potential to provide significant benefits to the Government. (Ref.: “Concept of Privatization of the Space Shuttle”, Space Shuttle Program Office, Sept. 28, 2001).

2) The R&D will target new approaches to first-stage launch propulsion, in-space advanced engine technology development and demonstrations, and foundational or basic propulsion research.

Exhaustive launch propulsion systems evaluations have proven again and again that no significant improvements in the performance of first stage chemical engines can be achieved. In other words, we’re stuck with what we got.

 In-space advance engine development can best be conducted if the engine can be tested in space and returned for evaluation. Only the space shuttle has heavy cargo return capability.

3) NASA does not have a Plan B.

While there may be no Plan B, NASA is investigating a heavy launch vehicle (HLV) space transportation solution for the failed Ares Orion launch system.  The HLV’s will cost a minimum   $11 billion to develop, has no commercial applications, has no cargo return capability, and fails to solve the launch gap. The HLV like the Constellation program requires two launches to lift 66 MT to LEO for a seven day manned lunar mission.

The existing space shuttle and EELV space transportation systems can delivery the same cargo mass to LEO and avoid the launch gap and loss of thousands of shuttle jobs. Using the space shuttle and EELV eliminates the HLV development risk and cost. A commercial space shuttle further reduces operations cost. The commercial space shuttle and EELV are the better candidates for establishing a human space based transportation system for lunar, deep space, and Mars missions. A space based transportation system is mandatory for human space exploration. To continue on the Apollo expendable vehicle concept path invites failure and disaster.

In addition there is a safety issue associated in transporting astronauts to and from LEO in space capsules that has not been addressed. The Soyuz capsule has experience two fatal incidences. Warning signs of another catastrophic Soyuz capsule failure are becoming increasingly alarming. The commercial space shuttle not only significantly lowers the cost of mission operation, it can provide crew escape pods. Has NASA forgotten that crew safety is their number one priority?

I strongly recommend that NASA have an unbiased external evaluation of the commercial space shuttle and EELV space transportation system…due diligence is mandatory in this nation’s critical stage of human space exploration.

Once again Charlie…this is happening  on your watch.

Don

Don A. Nelson

Nelson Aerospace Consulting   see: www.nasaproblems.com

Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer

1407 Moller Road  Alvin, TX 77511

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