NASA’s
Constellation Problem Solution…Cancel the ISS Orion and Privatize the
Space Shuttle
Last
Update 04/20/2009
Executive
Summary
There are continuing warning signs that the Ares I Orion space shuttle
replacement vehicle is a failure. However NASA management will begin shutting
down the space shuttle May 1st…unless President Obama
intervenes (see letter to President). Will the President commit this nation
to a position of “begging” the Russian government for access to
space station…or will President Obama save the space shuttle…and in
doing so…save our space program. It can be expected that the first ISS
crew rotation by the Ares I Orion 4 will not occur until after the
station scheduled
decommissioning in 2016. The development cost has
increased by $7 billion with more significant increases predicted. Reports of
internal management disconnects are persistent. Flight operations costs can be
expected to exceed that of the space shuttle. NASA’s commercial orbital transportation
services (COTS) is more conjecture than reality. Foreign launch
service to station can be expected to exceed $2 billion during the now six year
gap and the launch vehicles would be unable to deliver critical replacement
station components. There is a solution…cancel the Orion space station
crew rotation vehicle which is designed to service only the space
station and privatize
the space fleet to provide continuous space station service.
Cancellation of the Orion crew rotation vehicle will eliminate the launch gap.
NASA is “struggling” with developing the Orion vehicles…one
for space station crew rotation and another for the lunar mission. It is the
Orion space station crew rotation vehicle problems that is
causing the launch gap. Privatization of the shuttle fleet solves these
problems and allows NASA the time, resources, and budget to restructure the Constellation
Program (CxP) for their primary goal of returning
humans to the Moon and beyond. Privatization of the fleet avoids the
costly and embarrassing space gap, saves critical space jobs, and insures the
operation of the space station. Privatization provides avenues to regain a
share in the commercial
launch market, crew escape pods, and the foundation for 21st
century reusable space based transportation system.
Orion crew rotation vehicle cancellation and Space Shuttle
privatization is a win win solution!
If President Obama does his homework he will buy “Made in the
Don
A. Nelson
Aerospace
Consultant
Retired
NASA Aerospace Engineer
Contact: nasaproblems@yahoo.com
Nelson’s Bio and Book Get Involved COTS Lunar / Mars Program
=======================================================
Can this Nation Afford the Ares I Orion Space
Station Supply Vehicle?
·
Full
operational capability for station crew rotation by Ares I Orion will unlikely
be achieved by the ISS decommissioning date of 2016.
·
The Orion
command module designed for the station crew rotation is predicted to incur an
18 month schedule slippage and can be expected to have further delays and cost
increases as crew size and other critical design issues are still begin
investigated.
·
The now six year space station supply
launch gap cost can be expected to be over $2 billion for Russian and other
foreign launch suppliers. The economic environment makes the availability of
these vehicles questionable.
·
Extending the
space station operations beyond 2016 will cost an addition $4 billion per year
for launch support and station operations.
·
SERIOUS CREW
SAFETY ISSUES EXIST FOR THEARES I ORION CREW ROTATION VEHICLE…ESPECIALLY
WATER LANDINGS!
Ares/Orion slipping up to 18 months - Shuttle extension gains upper hand
March 27th, 2009 by Chris Bergin www.nasaspaceflight.com
NASA’s
Constellation Program (CxP) will conduct a “Content and Schedule”
summit meeting in the next few months, after it was evaluated their current
schedules are “broken”. The meeting will aim to protect against a
slip that is estimated to be as serious as 18 months, or outright cancellation
for Ares I.
Constellation’s
schedules have been slipping at an alarming rate over the past few years, with the last
PMR (Program Milestone Review) confirming a 12 month slip in the IOC (Initial
Operational Capability) to March, 2015. This date relates to Orion
2, with Orion 4 - currently classed as the first crew rotation for the
International Space Station (ISS), otherwise known as FOC (Full Operational
Capability) - launching one year later in March, 2016. While these dates continue
to be the official timeline, internal reviews have found those schedules to be
“broken”, with CxP departments across the program reporting they
are at “zero percent confidence” for keeping to the March, 2015
(IOC) timeline. The problem isn’t just funding - which has become
problematic for CxP over the last few years - but also what is described as
“serious disconnects” between related departments, such as Orion,
Ground Ops and Ares. CxP attempted to protect the schedule and budgetary
pressures by offsetting these additional strains by deleting
test items - notably on the Upper Stage. However, this only
proved to cause further disconnects throughout the program. Issues with the Ares I Upper
Stage engine, J-2X, have also been noted, although no specific
information has been made available due to the classified nature of certain
vehicle elements. Orion contractor Lockheed Martin were already complaining
last year about continued changes to the requirements of vehicle,
which is likely to undergo another major change during the upcoming summit
meeting, after it was noted the switch
from a crew of six to four will be a lead item for discussion.
The serious nature of the “broken” schedules have been known for a
few months, with an immediate slip of six months added internally to the master
schedule, during a period when CxP
were evaluating acceleration options. This occurred prior to the
latest estimate of a slip of between 12 to 18 months - in total - on top of the
current schedule. The priority now is to attempt to find a “magic
solution” of bringing Ares/Orion in with a shot of making the March, 2015
IOC date. Avoiding further slips to the right is the goal, as opposed to
acceleration of the schedule. The situation with Ares is known in key areas
of the Agency, with a “9th Floor” NASA HQ effort already taking
place to evaluate the viability of cancelling Ares I.
===================
April 20, 2009
The Honorable
Barack Obama
President of the
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
NASA management has directed the decommissioning of the space shuttle fleet to begin April 30
of this month. If this directive is
allowed to proceed it will commit this nation to a six year space station
supply launch gap and require purchasing from $2 to $6 billion of foreign
launch services. The uncertainty in the availability of foreign launch services and the incapability
of those launch systems to provide timely and critical station replacement components exposes the station
to risk of being destroyed.
NASA has been unable to resolve the numerous development
problems with the Ares I Orion shuttle replacement vehicle and the launch date
for full operation crew rotation service to station is now
predicted to be no earlier than March 2016…the same year the
International Space Station is scheduled to be decommissioned. The Orion crew
rotation vehicle is a unique design for station support and must be redesigned
for the lunar mission. Safety issues, significant development cost overruns and excessive operation costs, and the failure
to meet a full operational date before space station decommissioning justify
the cancellation of the Orion crew rotation vehicle.
Space Shuttle is still the only viable vehicle for space station support. However, the
fleet is not cost effective or is it safe to operate in the current
configuration until station decommissioning in 2016. Shuttle privatization
offers solutions to these problems and provides the opportunity for this
nation to regain dominance in the commercial launch market. Shuttle privatization was requested by the 107th Congress
and was evaluated by the Shuttle Program Office to have significant benefit to
the government.
Cancellation of the Orion crew rotation vehicle permits NASA
the time and resources to focus on the primary objective of the Constellation
Program’s to return human to the Moon and beyond. The Shuttle
privatization solution eliminates the station launch gap and the need for foreign
launch services, keeps the capability to replace critical station systems and
return cargo, lowers operation cost, and contributes to the economic recovery. However, this window of opportunity will close if NASA is permitted to
proceed with shuttle decommissioning.
Mr. President, if you approve the decommissioning of the
space shuttle your administration will condone the mistakes of the previous
administration that are devastating our space endeavors. Mr. President you do
have another option…cancel the ISS Orion and privatize the “Made in
the
Nelson Aerospace Consulting
Retired NASA Engineer
======================================
Arianespace confirmed its world leadership, as it carried out six Ariane 5 launches, orbiting 10 geostationary
satellites plus the Jules Verne ATV to the International Space Station. It won
13 of the 18 launch contracts open to competition during the year.
Following
the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders on Wednesday, April 8, 2009 in
NASA must be removed from the space transportation business
in order for this nation to regain the commercial launch market. NASA’s
will no longer require the costly and wasteful “marching army” for
shuttle operations which has consumed 25% of past budgets and the launch cost
can be cut in half. Privatization will overcome the internal cultural obstacles
that have prevented shuttle flight automation and crew escape pods.
Privatization
must be reinstated with the following goals: Establish a government corporation
to operate the existing fleet for NASA. The space shuttle government
corporation will take one orbiter out of service and upgrade the vehicle for
unmanned operations, install crew escape modules, and build a new launch facility.
Funding for these upgrades would be provided by the corporation by selling
government bonds. When available the remaining orbiters will receive these
upgrades and the government corporation sold to the private sector. The then
private corporation will provide commercial, civil, and military launch service
with these upgrade orbiters. A technology program directed by government
agencies (NASA, DARPA and others) will be established to promote the safe and
efficient operations for private space systems operators.
There is no doubt that the space shuttle in
its current configuration is a costly and unsafe human transportation system.
However, even with two tragic failures, the
“reusable” space shuttle has proven to be a most reliable and
practical concept for space transportation and there are feasible and realistic
solutions for making the space shuttle safer and cost effective. As a
privatized transportation system, the space shuttle can reduce operations cost
by offering commercial launch services.
Over 40 percent of the shuttle cost is for operations
compared to 20 percent for the expendable Atlas II. In previously Shuttle
accountings another 10 percent was charged for government resources and program
management (R&PM). Privatization reduces the shuttle operations cost to
slight over 20 percent of the flight cost which frees up skilled employees to
work technology research programs.
Crew
safety can be significantly insured with the installation of crew escape pods
in the Orbiter.
Prior
to the space shuttle
Note: Privatization will allow continuation of space shuttle service to
space station and allows the $200 billion space shuttle investment from
becoming a museum exhibit. Privatization saves thousand of jobs and will make
the
============================
Commercial Space
Shuttle Business Plan
Preface
There is an old
axiom that governs all space endeavors… “If you can’t get it
into space…you can’t use it in space.” The ability of the
·
High
·
There
is compelling evidence that the Ares launch vehicles are
burdened with costly development problems and will fail. Failure of the Ares I
/Orion space shuttle replacement vehicle will cause immeasurable damage to this
Nation’s space endeavors! Even if the development problems can be
overcome, the manpower cost required to manufacture and operate the Ares /
Orion vehicles will be prohibitive.
·
The
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) launch vehicles are
under funded and unproven. The cargo and crew modules development and
operations cost remain more conjecture than reality.
·
NASA
plans to purchase launch services from the Russian government for space station
support and commercial
There is a Solution…Privatize the Space Shuttle Fleet!!!
=================================
Feasible and
Realistic Goals for the Commercial Space Shuttle
·
Reduce
the space shuttle launch cost to near the $200 million level.
·
Support
an initial flight rate of seven flights per year and can expand the flight rate
to twelve flights per year.
·
Provide
launch services for civil and military endeavors.
·
Establish
a competitive commercial launch service.
·
Incorporate
a crew escape pods system that provides escape avenues for all phases of
flight.
·
Establish
the foundation for a space based (reusable) transportation system, developed by
NASA and commercially operated.
In response to the 107th Congress’s request
to investigate privatizing the space shuttle program (SSP), NASA issued the
following:
CONCEPT OF
PRIVATIZATION OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
//s/Ronald D.
Dittemore 9/28/01
Ronald D. Dittemore
September 28, 2001
Manager, Space
Shuttle Program
Summary
It is believed that utilization of the Space Shuttle for
human access to space will continue through at least 2015 and possibly beyond
2020. The longevity and operational aspects of this program demand a
different approach to operational management for the future. A different
management strategy needs to be employed.
Privatization of the SSP has the potential to provide significant
benefits to the Government. However, timing is critical. The continuing erosion of NASA skills and experience
threatens the safety of the program. It is critical to take advantage of the
existing NASA SSP expertise before further erosion affects the ability to plan
and safely implement privatization. Today, the skill and knowledge legacy still
remain to formulate the appropriate merger of the NASA SSP and private
industry.
Privatization
of the space shuttle fleet eliminates the sole reliance on the questionable
Ares I /Orion launch system. Allowing the space shuttle infrastructure to be
dismantled or gather dust in museums will be a costly mistake.
======================================
The Current Space
Shuttle Problems and Privatization Solutions
Too
Expensive to Operate:
The
current space shuttle’s operation consumes over 20 percent of
NASA’s budget. The NASA management structure is too fragmented to
effectively direct flight operations. There are too many employees (17,000) at too many centers.
There is no incentive to reduce operations cost. Executive order prohibits
commercial operations. This results in excessive operation cost.
Privatization
solution:
There
have been extensive undertakings to reduce the cost of expendable launch
vehicles which has resulted in significant reductions in their operations
costs. There has NEVER been any determined effort to reduce the cost of space
shuttle operations. Competitive launch cost can be achieved by: Removing all
civil service support, consolidation of operation at the launch site, and
automation of ground and flight operations. Reducing launch cost is not a
technical challenge…it is a political challenge. The following chart
shows the breakdown where significant cost reductions can be achieved by privatization
of the space shuttle operations:
Space
Shuttle Extremely Difficult to Upgrade:
Since
1994 NASA has invested over $8 billion in upgrades for the shuttle launch
system. The
space shuttle ground and flight avionic systems were not designed to be
upgraded. The glass
cockpit upgrade is a dismal example of the upgrade problem. This project was
started in 1992, was first flown in April 2000, and was not completed until
2006. The cost soared to over $300 million for an upgrade that provided only a
cosmetic effect and marginal flight safety.
Privatization
solution:
Automation
of the ground and flight control systems permits the introduction of modular
subsystems. A ground and flight control system based on a modular subsystem
design can be repaired or upgraded without interference to the central avionic
control computing system. Modular subsystems were first introduced on the
Boeing 777 civil airliner and are now standard designs on all modern aircraft.
It was the design baseline for the X-33 VentureStar launch vehicle.
Reentry
Thermal Protective System is too
Fragile:
Foam shedding from the external is not the problem that needs
fixing. The entry thermal tiles are too fragile and must be replaced. NASA has
failed to conduct extensive research on thermal reentry systems. However, the
Air Force X-37 space research vehicle program is addressing this critical
issue.
Privatization
solution:
Automation
will allow the introduction of vehicle ground and flight health monitoring systems
to monitor and identify breaches in the thermal protective system, however the
current tile system is unacceptable and must be replaced.
No Adequate Crew Escape System:
The space shuttle must have a crew escape system for launch,
on-orbit, and re-entry phases of flight.
Privatization
solution:
Automation of shuttle flight provides sufficient margins to
permit installation of crew escape pods. THERE
IS NO DOUBT THAT SURVIVABILITY WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE CHALLENGER AND
Commercial
Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods
SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT SAFETY and
Safety Experts Call for
Shuttle Shutdown (Source: Orlando
Sentinel)
Saying NASA is at a critical crossroads, independent safety experts have called
for the agency to stay the course and shut down the shuttle program after nine
remaining missions. Keeping NASA’s shuttle fleet flying beyond 2010 would
endanger astronauts and sap money from efforts to return American astronauts to
the moon by 2020, the group said. “Continuing to fly the shuttle not only
would increase the risk to crews, but also could jeopardize the future
These are the same experst that said they
didn’t do tech analyses when ask to investigate Ares I structural
problem. .Don A. Nelson
Shuttle
reliability remains unrivaled
Robert L. "bob" Crippen | Special
to the sentinel
January
23, 2009
The space industry is approaching a fateful six-day period that
has become an annual time of reflection and rededication, as it honors the
memory of the three great space tragedies in our history: Apollo 1 (Jan. 27,
1967), Challenger (Jan. 28, 1986) and Columbia (Feb. 1, 2003).
These
anniversaries serve as reminders that the price we sometimes pay for extending
our reach beyond our earthly grasp can be high. For that reason, it is
imperative that we base decisions about how to proceed with our nation's agenda
in space on the right arguments.
There is an ongoing discussion among the aerospace and political community
regarding the risks of flying the space shuttle beyond its current retirement
date of 2010. Those who oppose it often cite aging and safety concerns. Too
often, these arguments have been based on somewhat scary probability figures
that, by themselves, are wholly inadequate to determine how much longer the
shuttle should fly.
In weighing the options for our space program, the new administration will need
qualified, independent sources to help define the associated risk, and a common
language for discussing it. These kinds of discussions generally rely on one of
two methods for defining and accepting risk: demonstrated reliability or
predicted risk.
Using predictive models, the generally accepted number based on
Probabilistic Risk Assessment of the shuttle is about a 1 in 77 chance for loss
of a vehicle on any single mission.
However, as former NASA Administrator
Michael Griffin has pointed out, PRA "depends very strongly on underlying
assumptions, which are, in essence, impossible to verify. So, in the end, we
can estimate risk levels but cannot know them accurately."
Furthermore, this approach does not factor in the multitude of safety
enhancements made since
Orbiters returning from space today are among the cleanest in program history.
From improvements to the thermal-protection system, to new wiring in the
orbiter fleet and an enhanced process for building external tanks, the program
never stops striving to improve performance and safety.
After 126
flights, the demonstrated reliability of the space shuttle is 98.4 percent.
Other than the Russian Soyuz (98.2 percent), the demonstrated reliability of
systems currently being considered for human spaceflight is zero, since those
systems have not yet flown.
Ultimately, there is no way to eliminate risk in spaceflight. At best we can
try to understand and manage it to an acceptable level. The risk of flying the
shuttle has been successfully managed in 98.4 percent of the missions. The
continuous efforts to improve the safety and reliability have resulted in a
robust system that is, in many ways, safer each time it flies.
The decision to continue flying the shuttle involves a number of important
considerations. As the new administration considers ways to meet the nation's
goals in space, it should base its policy decisions on objective assessment of
national needs, priorities and available
resources.
The space
shuttle transportation system had completed a remarkable 67 consecutive
missions before having a catastrophic mission. With crew escape pods the
========================================
Privatizing the Space Shuttle
Fleet
- The government enables space
shuttle privatization by the transfer to a US Government corporation and
then at a later date, a sale to the private sector (example: the united
Stated Enrichment Corporation (USEC).
- The government would provide indemnification
and tax exempt status during the period the fleet operated as a US
Government Corporation.
NASA’s decommissioning of the fleet places its value to the
government as “scrap value.” This is unacceptable.
- During the period of
operation as a US Government Corporation the private operator would use existing NASA
facilities as a non-interference operator to the Ares/Orion launch program
if it still exists.
- The private corporation will upgrade
the fleet and construct private launch facilities (Space
- NASA should be tasked to
conduct technology research projects that expand the capability of
the private space launch industry.
========================================
Commercial Space Shuttle
Development Phases
·
Operate
two Orbiters from current facilities during US Government Corporation phase
(assumes Ares program has been cancelled) or operate fleet on a
non-interference arrangement if NASA continues to develop Ares.
·
Third
Orbiter is removed from flight operations and modified to reduce launch cost
and improve safety (Commercial Space Shuttle II). Private corporation
will be permitted to sell bonds and stock to finance modifications and startup
cost.
·
Launch
market demands will determine when remaining two Orbiters will be scheduled for
upgrades.
·
Space Shuttle III will be placed in service when NASA and DARPA second generation
technologies become available.
Shuttle II Development Concept
Space
Shuttle II is a four year development and flight test program. It is based
on existing technology and proven ground and flight control systems. The
goal is to prove that reusable automated space vehicles are the correct
approach for developing the 21st century space transportation
system. Technology development programs for further improvement in safety and
launch cost reduction will be conducted for Space Shuttle III.
· The operational savings are gained
from reductions in support personnel made possible by flight automation and
consolidating operations at KSC. This is a similar approach used to reduce the
Ariane 5 and Evolved Expendable Launch vehicles launch costs. Automated
operation was also the program baseline for the X-33/VentureStar project.
· The shuttle pilot training
facilities will be closed. All flight monitoring will be conducted from the
corporation flight control center(Space
· Automation provides nearly 3,700
pounds weight margin which permits installation of four escape pods.
· This launch vehicle concept is to
be tailored for a private operator. NASA will continue to have responsibility
for flight crew operations as related to payloads.
· A GOVERNMENT AGENCY DOES
NOT HAVE THE “INCENTIVE” TO OPERATE A COST EFFECTIVE LAUNCH SYSTEM.
=================================
Shuttle
II / CEP Development Cost Estimate
Four Years Program
|
|
Cost ~ $ Mil |
|
Escape Pods |
500 |
|
Avionics |
1200 |
|
Ground Support |
800 |
|
|
|
|
Contingency/Fees(40%) |
1000 |
|
Got. Support(15%) |
375 |
|
|
===== |
|
TOTAL |
3875 |
Escape
pods cost of $500
million is for the development and delivery of 12 pods.
Avionics cost of $1.2 billion is for all
remaining Orbiters and includes integrated vehicle health management systems,
automated flight control, and replacing wiring with fiber optics. Avionics
design is to be based on modular subsystems to permit uncomplicated system
upgrades.
Ground
systems cost of
$800 million is for new pre-mission planning support, ground monitoring, and
integrated assembly/launch pad facilities. NO SS II VEHICLE COMMAND
FUNCTIONS WILL BE REQUIRED FROM THE NASA-JSC OR NASA-KSC FACILITIES.
============================================================
Commercial Space Shuttle III
Safety and Performance Upgrade Priority List
Unlike
the Ares launch vehicles there are viable avenues for improving the performance
and safety of the commercial SS II. The following systems are high priority
candidates for the SS III configuration:
· Thermal Protection System -
consideration must be given to TPS improvement. The X-37 flight test for
thermal protection must be reinstated.
· External Tank - investigate
lowering the cost of the tank.
o
Retractable
thermal ground blanket at launch pad.
o
Explore
using the tank for on orbit storage and deep space facilities.
· Solid Rocket Booster Motors
o
Test
large diameter hybrid motors.
o
Investigate
removing thrust vectoring.
o
Consider
additional manufacturer.
· Mechanical and Power
o
Replace
APU and hydraulics. Develop long life high density batteries.
· Non Toxic OMS/RCS
o
Sole
source for OMS/RCS hypergolic propellants unacceptable.
Removing flight operations from NASA permits the agency to conduct
technology !!!
It is feasible that the Space Shuttle III can compete for commercial
payloads and efficiently deliver enough payload mass to low earth orbit for
construction of large space based vehicles. This would preclude development of
a heavy lift launch vehicle.
============================================================
CAUTION- It
is also extremely unlikely that the Delta IV heavy can be delivered as a crew
launch vehicle. It was this over simplification that got NASA in trouble with
the Ares I Orion. The Orion command service modules cost of $375 million was
based on the project Apollo CSM cost using the NASA new start inflation index
to project the mission cost to 2009. Unconfirmed NASA cost estimations for an
Ares I Orion launch operation were $1.75 billion per launch. It can be expected
the Ares I Orion launch cost will significantly exceed those of shuttle
especially when the cost of the cargo delivery is considered.
Only shuttle
provides cargo delivery and return capability. The shuttle launch cost assumes four flights per year. The privatized
commercial space shuttle (CSS) assumes increased flight rates from the
commercial market.
========================================
Conclusions
·
Expanded space exploration and utilization has
been stymied in the
·
Allowing
a contractor to own (or lease) the orbiters and market launch services would
give the contractor vested interest for reducing operations costs.
·
The
United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is a successful example of
transferring government property to the private sector.
·
Privatization
of the space shuttle provides a path of minimum obstacles for the development
of a 21st century competitive space transportation system.
Commercial Space Shuttle and the
Moon
There is
only one valid reason for returning humans to the Moon…SURVIVAL. If mankind is to survive we must have
safe havens other than those on planet Earth. The Moon is the first logical
step in establishing those safe havens. As the knowledge of our universe has
increased so has the realization that planet Earth is vulnerable to threats
from deep space as well as those created on our home planet.
Anthropologists
have traced the extinction of the dinosaurs to asteroids impacting Earth and
even today this occurrence may be looming in our not too distant future as
asteroid Apophis is predicted to make an incredibly close pass by our planet in
2029. Then the asteroid will return
in 2036 with another chance to impact the Earth. Is this mankind’s
timetable to establish permanent human presence on the Moon?
The
commercial Space Shuttle II is the first step in establishing a feasible and
realistic human REUSABLE
space transportation system for colonization of the Moon.
Can we afford to continue on NASA’s Constellation Program
path?
The President and
Congress must take immediate action for space shuttle privatization!
============================================
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
COTS…too many negatives! Neither, the Orbital
Science’s Taurus/Cygnus or SpaceX’s Falcon 9/Dragon heavy lift
launch system exists. The lofty and improbable goals of these companies still
cannot eliminate the need to secure foreign launch services for ISS support.
Neither vehicle solves the reusable issue required to reduce launch costs to
competitive levels. The downturn in the economy makes the task of getting
private funding for these heavy lift vehicles impossible.
NASA’s plan to spend $3.5 billion for twelve
SpaceX vehicles will cost $130 million per flight and eight Orbital Science
vehicles will cost $237 million per flight. The cargo cost per pound will be at
least twice that of the space shuttle’s plus the cost of crew
transportation on the Russian Soyuz vehicle make the COTS operations cost
prohibitive. Crew transportation on COTS vehicle is an unrealistic goal.
Privatization of the space shuttle eliminates the
need for NASA to spend $3.5 billion on launch systems that are inferior to the
space shuttle.
NASA has estimated that
the ISS will require 10 to 20 mt of cargo per year. Launch cost are unavailable
for the Ares I Orion (AO). A
minimum cost was derived by using the Delta IV heavy and the projected 2009
cost of an Apollo command service module. The above chart estimates the launch
cost to supply the crew and cargo requirements using the Ares I Orion / SpaceX
Dragon (AO/SPX), Ares I / Orbital Taurus Cygnus (AO/Orb), Ares I Orion /
Automatic Transfer Vehicle (AO/ATV), current space shuttle, and the CSS. The
cost assumed two Ares I Orion crew transfer missions per year and the minimum
10 mt of cargo. Should the year cargo requirement be 20 mt the COTS cost would
double while the shuttle cost would remain the unchanged. Again only the space
shuttle has cargo return capability.
NOTE:
Unconfirmed NASA sources reported that the Ares I Orion ISS crew rotation vehicle would cost more than $3.5 billion a year which exceed those of the shuttle. Due to the continuing development challenges with the Ares I Orion program, this cost cannot be confirmed or reputed by NASA’s Constellation management. Therefore to obtain a “ballpark” estimate for the ISS transportation cost, the Ariane V / Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and the Delta IV heavy launcher with an Apollo crew module was to determine a “ballpark estimate” of station expected post assembly transportation operations cost.
Evaluation Considerations:
·
NASA will require approximately 10 to 20 Mt of
cargo per year for station to sustain the systems and utilize the internal laboratories
and external platforms.
· ATV assembly and launch cost is $390 million based on the April 17 2009 euro to dollar exchange rate.
· Ariane V launch cost were $147 million with no addition allowance for launch operation cost.
· Delta IV cost of $280 million assumes no additional operations booster cost for launching crew rotation module.
· Using the NASA new start index inflation calculator the Apollo crew command service module cost were used to estimate the module assembly cost to be $355 million.
·
$573 million for the crew command service module
launch, mission and naval crew recovery operations cost based on the Apollo 17
operations cost projected to 2009.
· Two ATV launches with 7.2 Mt cargo capabilities needed to meet the 10 Mt requirement and 3 launches for the 20Mt requirement.
· Two crew rotations launches per year were required for the six man station crew.
ISS Yearly
Transportation Cost Estimate ~ 10Mt
and Two Crew Rotations
1st cargo launch $390 m
2nd cargo launch $390 m
Total cargo $780 m
Crew Rotation Cost per launch
Delta IV $280 m
Crew module $355 m
Flt. Operations $572 m
Total $1.207 b times two launches per year = $2.414 billion
Total cargo $780 m
Total crew $2.414 b
Total $3.194 billion per year for ISS cargo crew transportation
Comments:
· NASA will require only two Ares I per year and therefore the manufacturing cost will be significantly more than the Delta IV heavy cost of $280 million.
· ESA has commitments to launch four ATV at one launch per year. NASA will be required to buy at least one ATV and two ATV’s for the 20 Mt cargo delivery requirement years.
· The Ares I Orion operations cost will not be less than $1 billion per year and with the cargo cost will exceed the space shuttle cost of $1 billion per launch with a four launch per year usage.
· Shuttle operation cost for two ISS mission per year ~ $3.75 billion.
· Lower operations cost can be achieved if the space shuttle is privatized
==============
NASA must have a space
transportation system which is reusable and space based and operated by the
private sector
Lunar
Program: The near term lunar program should continue with the robotic
exploration of the moon. The lunar
exploration must be defined to not only explore but also to identify the
requirements for establishing the moon as a safe haven for human survival. Lunar safe haven is the only valid
reason for establishing a human lunar base. The schedule for that plan
is outline in the above space transportation plan.
The following proposed
Lunar space transportation system (STS) provides the guidelines for the
technology development program.
Note: The lunar excursion
vehicle is space based in Moon orbit. The following technology programs should
be considered:
Objectives and
requirements have been published in the author’s reference
book.
Mars Program: Today’s technology limitations prevent
human exploration of Mars from being considered as a feasible and realistic
goal. However, the Mars STS would follow the same space based development plan
envisioned for the lunar STS. Until technology is available significant
knowledge has and can be achieved by robotic exploration.
NOTE: THESE
OBJECTIVES IDENTIFY ONLY THE DIRECTION THE NEXT NASA ADMINSTRATIVE MUST
ENDORSE. IT WILL REQUIRE SUPPORT FROM THE AEROSPACE COMMUNITY, THE CONGRESS,
AND THE PRESIDENT TO FORMULATE AND INITATE THE STRAGETIC PLAN.
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OBTAIN AUTHOR’S
BOOK
======================================
NASA
Budget Problems
Congressman Sherwood
Boehlert, "There is simply not enough money in
NASA's budget to carry out all the tasks it is undertaking on the current
schedule. That's a fact." NASA MUST CHANGE DIRECTION!
NASA’s Budget
Crisis
Source:
Congressional Budget Office based on the President’s budget for fiscal
year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
·
The CBO projected the need for $7 billion for
the Ares I.
·
Extending ISS past 2016 will cost an
additional $8 to $12 billion for station operations and launch services. NASA 2008 authorization H.R. 6063
requires that the ISS remain viable through at least 2020. This adds $2 billion
annually ISS operation costs from the current 2016 decommissioning date.
·
Foreign launch service cost and capability
uncertain.
·
Credibility: GAO assessed 18
NASA projects with a combined life-cycle cost of more than $50 billion. Of
those, 10 out of 13 projects that had entered the implementation phase
experienced significant cost and/or schedule growth.
·
Gross debt rose from $5.8 trillion in 2001 to an estimated
$12.1 trillion in 2009.
Budget Solutions:
·
Cancel
the Orion crew rotation vehicle and privatize space shuttle.
·
Seek
more support from the ISS partners for operation of the space station and
establish a firm date for decommissioning the station.
·
Justify
the existing budget level by establishing technology program to supplement the
Constellation program.
·
Do
not commit to new program until technology available.
·
Seek
international support for the Earth Observation and Near Earth Object Programs.
United Nation’s support and coordination should be considered.
·
Freeze
all promotions and salary raises until economy crisis is alleviated.
·
Expand
academia research program.
Other Budget Considerations:
·
Encourage
NASA patent auctions to reduce national debt and improve domestic economy.
·
License
access to the Global Positioning System with proceeds going to space technology
development.
=======================
International
Space Station Decision
There are many factors the next NASA administrator and the
President elect must consider in deciding the future of the $120 billion
International Space Station (ISS).
·
First
and foremost is the station worth the $4 billion annual cost for operations
support?
A long duration manned tended station instead of the current
permanently manned operation may
be a cost effective option and still provide productive scientific
investigations.
·
What
fiscal support will be provided by the international partners?
It is feasible for Russian, ESA, and Japanese launch vehicles
to meet the 10 to 20 metric tons ISS cargo requirements. More important what
portion of the crew/cargo budget will they be willing to assume?
·
Will
the ISS be able to operate without the space shuttle from 2010 till 2020?
The ISS was designed for space shuttle support. Station
electrical power is already a critical resource. The solar arrays can only be
replaced by the space shuttle. With the existing problems of the station solar
arrays it is unrealistic to believe that existing electrical power level supply
will be available after 2010. Without the space shuttle only 132 pounds of
experiments can be returned on each Soyuz flight.
It
is extremely doubtful that the ISS can operate until 2012 without shuttle
support.
NOTE:
The Commercial Space Shuttle offers the most feasible and realistic approach
for providing cost effective crew and cargo transportation to the ISS.
=========================
More NASA Problems
NASA is technology
bankrupt. For nearly three decades NASA has failed to institute a technology
development program. Without advancement in technology there will be no
advancements in aeronautics and space exploration. NASA’s policy of
development technology during the program development contributes to excessive
cost and program failures. Technology development must become NASA first
priority. Technology programs must be established in the following disciplines:
·
Propulsion Systems
·
Structural
Material
·
Electrical
Power Systems
·
Avionics
·
Manufacturing
Tooling Systems
·
Also see the author’s book.
In the late 1980’s
NASA established technology teams in
the above disciplines comprised of NASA employees and members of the aerospace
community to identify and prioritize technologies need for future programs. No
funding was ever provided for the technology programs. These technology working
groups must be reestablished and funded or NASA programs will continue to fail.
Propulsion
Systems:
The
existing space transportation system launch and orbital vehicle performance
capability is provided by chemical liquid oxygen/hydrogen (or RP-1 kerosene
fuel) engines and solid rocket or hybrid boosters. These propulsion systems
have reached their maximum performance potential. However significant cost
reductions for this class of engines can be achieved with the development of
reusable engines for launch vehicles and the development of propulsion systems
for space based vehicles. Improved sensors that provide information to decrease
maintenance and flight operations cost are key technology requirements for
these class engines and, therefore must be assigned the highest priority. In
addition space based propulsion systems would require the development of a long
duration propellant storage system.
NOTE:
The space shuttle main engine (SSME) is the only existing reusable engine. That
technology must not be lost.
The long range advance propulsion technology concepts have a
wide range of possibilities. Several propulsion systems for long range
consideration are:
Solar
Propulsion— Incorporating a reflective solar concentrator to heat liquid
hydrogen to a vapor which is expanded through a nozzle to generate thrust.
Sunlight
Sail—An extremely thin and large sheet of material is expanded in space
to capture the force of the sunlight like sailboats capture the wind for their
propulsion force.
Nuclear
Propulsion—Same principal as solar propulsion except nuclear energy is
used to heat the liquid hydrogen.
Anti-matter—Collides
a proton with a positive charge into an antiproton with a negative charge that
produces a tremendous force for propulsion.
Plasma
Rocket—hydrogen gas is heated to extreme temperatures and accelerated by
magnetic fields to provide thrust.
The
long range propulsion technologies will be extremely challenging to develop and
will require extensive laboratory research testing.
Structural
materials—technologies are needed to decrease the structural
weight of space vehicles. Carbon nanotubes materials appear to have tremendous
potential for space structures. They are light weight and stronger than
existing spacecraft materials. The tubes also have the potential to
solve
the storage and leakage problems for cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen. The tubes
can only be produced under laboratory conditions. A top priority must be
assigned to the development and large scale production of this material.
Research
is required for materials to replace the shuttle thermal protective system.
Ceramic materials for engine components also have shown promise.
Electrical
Power Systems—are limited to the capability of batteries, solar
arrays, and nuclear power generators. Extensive research is required in all
these areas. Electro-mechanical actuators research is required to remove
hypergolic generator from flight systems.
Avionics—will
present an extremely difficult management problem for the development of a
space based autonomous vehicle. Foremost in these problems will be costs that
may exceed 50 percent of the vehicle total cost. The integrated health
monitoring and autonomous control system of
reusable
space vehicles also presents formidable technology challenges in the areas of
software and sensors.
Autonomous
navigation systems must be developed and verified. One of the more exciting
avionics technologies being investigated is in the field of nano-electronic
devices. Laboratory demonstrations of accelerometers, gyros, pressure sensors,
thermal actuators, and optical devices
are
resulting in encouraging indications that this technology can significantly
reduce space vehicle weight, improve safety by providing additional layers of
redundancy, and reduce operations costs.
Manufacturing Tooling Systems- Advanced materials for future space programs must
have machines that can process them. The transfer of manufacturing to foreign
countries with low labor cost has diminished this nation capability to made
manufacturating tools. There is an acute need for machines that process
existing and advance materials which allow
NASA’s
Innovative Partnership Program-
This program allows the agency to sell NASA patents that have application in
the commercial market. It is the key
to make NASA a contributor instead of a continuing drain on the nation’s
economy.
For Addition Technology Program Information Obtain
Author’s Book
NASA
in 2004 committed to the Constellation Program which required sending robotic
lunar missions by 2008, completing the space station and retiring the space
shuttle by the year 2010, out source for space station support until the first
shuttle replacement mission in 2014, partially fund the development of two
commercial launch ventures, decommission the space station by 2016, conduct a
lunar human mission as early as 2015, and return to the moon to stay by 2020.
The Constellation space
vehicles were conceived by individuals with no or little background in space
vehicle development. The validation of these vehicles was a rushed 90 days
study compromised by a new Administrator’s known desire to precede with
this “conjectured” transportation system and the President’s
ill advised decision to decommission the space shuttle without first insuring
the development of a replacement vehicle.
The results has been:
·
The Ares I
Orion shuttle replacement vehicle has experience serious development problems
and may never become operational. If the still mounting development problems
are ever solved the vehicle would not be able to provide space station crew
delivery until 2016. This will require purchasing Russian crew transfer launch
service for six years!
·
The Ares V
lunar transportation vehicle is also experiencing costly and time consuming
development problems. NASA’s plan to use shuttle derived flight
components to reduce development costs for the Ares I and V has been a failure.
NASA’s Exploration Systems
Architecture Study (ESAS)
THE CONSTELLATION PROGRAM WILL COST $230 BILLION PLUS
TO DEVELOP A SEVEN LUNAR STAY CAPABILITY…THIS IS PROGRAM MUST BE
REVISED!
Space Forum: “It
is no exaggeration to say that the original ESAS plan now lies in ruins. There
is virtually nothing left of the original claims of low development cost and
high inheritance from Shuttle.”
The Apollo Program spent $165 billion (2005 dollars) through
the first lunar landing. NASA management has estimated in their 2006
Exploration System Architecture Study that the Constellation program through
the first lunar landing would cost only $124 billion. NASA management concluded
that the costs were estimated conservatively because they included $20 billion
for ISS servicing by the Ares I Orion (CEV). In other words the cost of
Constellation up to the first lunar landing would only be $102 billion! NASA
would develop a stand alone crew launch vehicle (which Apollo didn’t
require) and develop the largest cargo launcher ever built for a cost nearly
40% less the Apollo Program. THIS IS WHY
NASA MUST HAVE EFFECTIVE PROGRAM OVERSIGHT.
Warning Signs of
Constellation Program Failure
May 2005 – The space
shuttle replacement program loses 16 months of development time when NASA
Administrator Mike Griffin stopped the original program based on the Air
Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles.
July 2005 – NASA
announces the Ares I launch vehicle configuration will maximize use of space
shuttle components. Predicts Ares I will have “huge cost
advantages” and crewed flight to space station by June 2011.
"We have ways to construct
such vehicles using shuttle solid-rocket motors and external tanks and shuttle
main engines,"
March 2006 – Ares V
first stage SSME engines replaced with lower performance RS-68 engines causes
all cost savings shuttle derived systems to be deleted from Ares V. The lower
performance of the RS-68 engine will eliminate the use of the shuttle external
tank and require a costly redesign of the first stage tanks.
June 2006 – Structural
problems in the Ares five-segment first stage solid rocket motor could not be
resolved by ATK’s engineering analyses. NASA has been forced to schedule
costly flight test(s) to verify the structural integrity of the booster. The
first test has a four segment motor with a dummy fifth segment, which may
not verify structural integrity.
Concerns:
In-flight structural
failure could cause a rapid pitch / yaw rate that could prevent a safe Orion
(crew module) separation.
April 2007 – NASA adds
two year to design phase of Orion and deletes pressurized cargo carrier for
ISS. All cargo to ISS will be by foreign launch systems.
May 2007 –
Constellation management concedes that Ares I Orion human launch prediction in
2015 is only at a 65% confidence level.
July 2008 –
“The cost problems include an $80 million overrun on a motor system. The
Orion spacecraft’ design remains too heavy for the proposed Ares I
rocket. Software development, heat shield testing and other complex work remain
behind schedule or over budget. There are dozen of such serious challenges,
many of which are worsening.”
August 2008 - Given
the projected weight of the Ares V vehicle, mobile launcher and transporter,
the total weight is about 33% higher than the crawlerway has ever
supported…there is a possibility that the crawlerway could fail to
support the load, resulting in severe impacts to the Constellation programme.. Flight
International
October 2008 – NASA cleared to
conclude a $700 million-plus deal with
October 2008 - Currently, Orion is due to launch its debut manned flight in 2015. However, the first crew rotation on the ISS won’t happen until one year later on Orion 4 - in reality a six year gap.
January 2009 – NASA
administrator Mike Griffin resignation becomes effective.
February – Ares V
engine change under review.
March 2009 – NASA
considering ISS Orion crew size reduction o four instead of six.
Next
Administrator’s Management Strategic Plan
Near
Term Objectives Requiring Immediate Attention:
Space Shuttle Privatization
The
shuttle workforce currently consists of approximately 2,000 civil service and
15,000 contractor personnel that includes a large number of engineers and
scientists. There are too many in the shuttle personnel that don’t
actually support flight operation. Privatization allows NASA to redirect these
unutilized resources from shuttle operations to technology research for advance
flight systems. Shuttle privatization keeps space funds from being spent on
foreign launch systems.
Technology
Program
Reestablish
the technology
teams to identify the near term technology priorities. Task and fund
the various NASA centers with development of those technologies. Each
center will seek support from the aerospace industry and academia for
assistance in development of the technology.
Having
technology available can reduce program development cycles from the current
5-10 years to 2-4 years.
NASA
has not exercised due diligence in their responsibility to provide safeguards
for terrestrial and extraterrestrial threats to human survival. The National
Research Council has warned that Earth Observation Program is at risk. The
space observation capability has been diminished as the earth observation
satellite system deteriorates. The Near Earth Object Program has a
congressional mandate to catalogue all asteroids and comets passing near Earth
that have the potential of catastrophic effects. Nearly one thousand have been found,
however the technology to deter these asteroids and comets does not exist. The
increased number of identified asteroids and comets passing near Earth is a warning
sign that must not be ignored. President Obama’s programs may solve the
domestic and international challenges of the nation but the greatest challenge
may come from a terrestrial and extraterrestrial
disaster. The NASA Technology Program is the mechanism to start planning for
this threat to mankind very existence.
Earth Observation Program
This is a
time for unprecedented urgency for earth science research, however there
continues to be cuts in this budget. This must be reversed. The technology
program must identify opportunities to reduce earth science mission cost.
Collaborations with the international partners are required to prevent
duplication of effort of short term and long term opportunities for satellite
missions.
Near Earth
Object Program
NASA must
do more to protect Earth from asteroid impacts. Cataloging 90% of near earth
asteroids by 2020 is an inadequate goal with dire consequences. Earth must have
an early warning system and options must be developed for diverting or
destroying “keyhole” asteroids that will impact Earth. Asteroids
passing in the near earth range should be studied as possible observation bases
for monitoring deep space. International cooperation must be established!
Science
Launch
costs can consume nearly half of a science program budget. Launch cost must
be significantly reduced or science programs will continue to struggle with
funding. Launch cost reduction must be NASA’s top priority. Reusable
space based vehicles will provide a standard capability from which science
payloads can be designed. Expendable deep space vehicle must also be
standardized to prevent science programs failures caused by transportation
system failures and budget overruns.
NASA Management
With the exception of achievements in deep space robotic
missions, NASA’s successful contributions to the nation’s space
endeavors have significantly deteriorated. This can be attributed to NASA
managers who did not define feasible and realistic objectives and were not held
accountable for their mistakes. For example, the billions in cost over runs for
the space station and failure of the X-33 VentureStar has left only the
There is a prevailing belief by NASA management that Congress
will provide the additional budget to “bail out” the project once
it has been approved. This unfortunately has too often been the case.
Furthermore, there exists an extensive void of senior level NASA civil service
employees with executive development project experience. In addition the NASA
administrator does not have an independent evaluation group to evaluate the
merits of proposed endeavors or monitor existing projects. This is
today’s NASA management culture: “Tell them what it takes to get the project approved…don’t
sweat the cost, Congress will bail you out…and no one but the taxpayers
will be held accountable.”
To change this demeaning culture the next NASA administrator
must have the following:
Office of the Chief Engineer
The Administrator must provide this office with the resources
to serve as the agency’s independent evaluator of proposed projects and
monitor of existing projects. The center chief engineer’s office will
serve as the evaluator agent and report to the Headquarter chief engineer and
will have no allegiance to the center director. All evaluations will be public
record.
Use this office as the training ground for future executive
project managers for Senior Executive Service by appointing promising candidates
and rotate them around the various centers to gain insight of program
management and each center’s capability.
Management creditability problems can be attributed to the
lack of extensive experience in project management. Also manager has not been
held accountable for their management incompetence.
The next administrator must re-establish the credibility of
the agency. The peer pressure of internal monitoring by the NASA chief engineer
is the most effective mechanism the Administrator can have.
NASA
Advisory Council
The NASA
Administrator current appoints the members of this “advisory”
council. This appointment policy defeats the objective of providing independent
unbiased consul for the Agency. Council members have been removed for issuing
proclamations unfavorable to the Administrator position. This policy has
contributed to the failure of the Constellation Program and has been
detrimental to the overall performance of the Agency. There must also be an
independent evaluation panel that periodically reviews NASA programs.
The NASA Advisory Council must be
appointed by the President and report to the President and Congress on the Agency programs, policies, plans, financial
controls, and other matters pertinent to the Agency’s responsibilities. The panel members must
be appointed by the executive branch and report to the President and Congress
and not be subservient to the NASA administrator. The Council must also serve as forum where NASA
employees and contractor can voice concern on NASA programs and policies
without fear of management reprisal.
NASA Office
of Inspector General
Since
1990 NASA has had over seventy programs that have exceeded their budget by an
average of 50%. Many of these programs ended up in the salvage dump. How many
of the program managers or contractors were held accountable for these
failures? The answer is none! Accountability doesn’t exist at NASA. The
NASA Inspector General Office has the oversight responsibility; however this
office is plagued by internal dissensions and its technical evaluation
capability is virtually nonexistent. This
office does not have the ability to evaluate the technical feasibility of
NASA’s programs. The Inspector General should seek an outside independent
evaluator on technical issues.
The
President must appoint inspector generals whose background knowledge relates to
their agency…not just government career bureaucrats. To have accountability, there must be responsible oversight.
==============
Reusable Space Vehicles Transportation Plan
The next
NASA administrator must baseline a plan for the development of technology for
reusable and space based transportation system.
China’s Space Shuttle Goal
Ref.: “Shenlong Space Plane
Advances China’s Military Space Potential” by Richard Fisher Jr. , 12-17-2007
Space Based Tug- Space tugs must be a top priority for NASA’s
space transportation. They are a key factor for reducing mission cost and
increasing mission success. Tugs can be supplied by the shuttle and expendable launch
vehicles. ONLY THE SPACE SHUTTLE CAN RETRIEVE TUG PAYLOADS! Tugs
can support near earth, lunar, and deep space missions.
For
proof of concept vehicle development approach obtain: AUTHOR’S BOOK
SSME – The “ONLY” Reusable Rocket Engine
Boeing image
Should the only reusable rocket engine in the world be
abandoned? NASA’s announcement to not use the Space Shuttle Main Engines on
the Ares I and V is another indication that the
Current
Note:
Arianespace announces 2008 results
Evry, April 8, 2009
Following
the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders on Wednesday, April 8, 2009 in
Despite
the global economic crisis Arianespace enjoyed a remarkable year in 2008, in
terms of both number of launches and new launch contracts.
Arianespace confirmed its world leadership, as it
carried out six Ariane 5 launches, orbiting 10 geostationary satellites plus
the Jules Verne ATV to the International Space Station. It won 13 of the 18
launch contracts open to competition during the year.
============
Don A. Nelson is an
aerospace media consultant and writer. He has made numerous appearances on
national and foreign television. His latest interview was for Nova PBS. Mr.
Nelson’s has provided support to congressional offices on NASA issues. He
retired from NASA in January 1999 after 36 years with the Agency. He
participated in the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Projects as a
mission planner and operations technologist. Mr. Nelson was a supporting team
member for the first rendezvous in space, first manned mission to the moon,
first manned lunar landing, and the first flight of the Space Shuttle. During
his last 11 years at NASA, he served as a mission operations evaluator for
proposed advanced space transportation projects. He was a member of the design
team for the space shuttle. His NASA
experiences give him a unique knowledge of NASA’s problems and for
feasible and realistic solutions. Mr. Nelson is a graduate of Southern
Methodist School of Engineering. He is a certified private pilot and holds a
Phase VI Pilot Proficiency Wings award from the Federal Aviation
Administration.
Mr. Nelson is the author of:
“NASA New Millennium Problems and
Solutions”
by Don A. Nelson
Written by a
retired NASA engineer, this easy-to-read book is insider's look at many of the
space program's current problems. Not only does it predict the most recent
shuttle disaster, it provides a detailed understanding of why our nation's
exploration of its 'last frontier' is headed for disaster. With aging shuttles,
no definitive plans for future of the vehicle, and poor management, Nelson's
book is a wake-up call to all Americans to take note and action...or lose the
hope of conquering the stars (Barnes & Noble review).
How to Order:
Available most booksellers
or: www.xlibris.com/NASANewMillenniumProblemsandSolutions
Contact nasaproblems@yahoo.com for a
e-book version.
Now is the time to: ”Speak out…or forever suffer
the consequences of remaining silent!”
Join the
challenge…petition the President and Congress to:
Stop our
jobs from going overseas…privatize the Space Shuttle…support the
NASA technology program
Contact
them at:
http://mygov.governmentguide.com/mygov/dbq/officials/
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