NASA’s Constellation Problem Solution…Cancel the ISS Orion and Privatize the Space Shuttle

Last Update  04/20/2009

Executive Summary

There are continuing warning signs that the Ares I Orion space shuttle replacement vehicle is a failure. However NASA management will begin shutting down the space shuttle May 1st…unless President Obama intervenes (see letter to President). Will the President commit this nation to a position of “begging” the Russian government for access to space station…or will President Obama save the space shuttle…and in doing so…save our space program. It can be expected that the first ISS crew rotation by the Ares I Orion 4 will not occur until after the station scheduled decommissioning in 2016. The development cost has increased by $7 billion with more significant increases predicted. Reports of internal management disconnects are persistent. Flight operations costs can be expected to exceed that of the space shuttle. NASA’s commercial orbital transportation services (COTS) is more conjecture than reality. Foreign launch service to station can be expected to exceed $2 billion during the now six year gap and the launch vehicles would be unable to deliver critical replacement station components. There is a solution…cancel the Orion space station crew rotation vehicle which is designed to service only the space station and privatize the space fleet to provide continuous space station service. Cancellation of the Orion crew rotation vehicle will eliminate the launch gap. NASA is “struggling” with developing the Orion vehicles…one for space station crew rotation and another for the lunar mission. It is the Orion space station crew rotation vehicle problems that is causing the launch gap. Privatization of the shuttle fleet solves these problems and allows NASA the time, resources, and budget to restructure the Constellation Program (CxP) for their primary goal of returning humans to the Moon and beyond. Privatization of the fleet avoids the costly and embarrassing space gap, saves critical space jobs, and insures the operation of the space station. Privatization provides avenues to regain a share in the commercial launch market, crew escape pods, and the foundation for 21st century reusable space based transportation system.

Orion crew rotation vehicle cancellation and Space Shuttle privatization is a win win solution!  If President Obama does his homework he will buy “Made in the USA.” 

Don A. Nelson

Aerospace Consultant

Retired NASA Aerospace Engineer

Contact: nasaproblems@yahoo.com

Nelson’s Bio and Book     Get Involved   COTS     Lunar / Mars Program    

 

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Can this Nation Afford the Ares I Orion Space Station Supply Vehicle?

·        Full operational capability for station crew rotation by Ares I Orion will unlikely be achieved by the ISS decommissioning date of 2016.

·        The Orion command module designed for the station crew rotation is predicted to incur an 18 month schedule slippage and can be expected to have further delays and cost increases as crew size and other critical design issues are still begin investigated.

·        The now six year space station supply launch gap cost can be expected to be over $2 billion for Russian and other foreign launch suppliers. The economic environment makes the availability of these vehicles questionable.

·        Extending the space station operations beyond 2016 will cost an addition $4 billion per year for launch support and station operations.

·        SERIOUS CREW SAFETY ISSUES EXIST FOR THEARES I ORION CREW ROTATION VEHICLE…ESPECIALLY WATER LANDINGS!

Ares/Orion slipping up to 18 months - Shuttle extension gains upper hand

March 27th, 2009 by Chris Bergin    www.nasaspaceflight.com

NASA’s Constellation Program (CxP) will conduct a “Content and Schedule” summit meeting in the next few months, after it was evaluated their current schedules are “broken”. The meeting will aim to protect against a slip that is estimated to be as serious as 18 months, or outright cancellation for Ares I.

Constellation’s schedules have been slipping at an alarming rate over the past few years, with the last PMR (Program Milestone Review) confirming a 12 month slip in the IOC (Initial Operational Capability) to March, 2015. This date relates to Orion 2, with Orion 4 - currently classed as the first crew rotation for the International Space Station (ISS), otherwise known as FOC (Full Operational Capability) - launching one year later in March, 2016. While these dates continue to be the official timeline, internal reviews have found those schedules to be “broken”, with CxP departments across the program reporting they are at “zero percent confidence” for keeping to the March, 2015 (IOC) timeline. The problem isn’t just funding - which has become problematic for CxP over the last few years - but also what is described as “serious disconnects” between related departments, such as Orion, Ground Ops and Ares. CxP attempted to protect the schedule and budgetary pressures by offsetting these additional strains by deleting test items - notably on the Upper Stage. However, this only proved to cause further disconnects throughout the program. Issues with the Ares I Upper Stage engine, J-2X, have also been noted, although no specific information has been made available due to the classified nature of certain vehicle elements. Orion contractor Lockheed Martin were already complaining last year about continued changes to the requirements of vehicle, which is likely to undergo another major change during the upcoming summit meeting, after it was noted the switch from a crew of six to four will be a lead item for discussion. The serious nature of the “broken” schedules have been known for a few months, with an immediate slip of six months added internally to the master schedule, during a period when CxP were evaluating acceleration options. This occurred prior to the latest estimate of a slip of between 12 to 18 months - in total - on top of the current schedule. The priority now is to attempt to find a “magic solution” of bringing Ares/Orion in with a shot of making the March, 2015 IOC date. Avoiding further slips to the right is the goal, as opposed to acceleration of the schedule. The situation with Ares is known in key areas of the Agency, with a “9th Floor” NASA HQ effort already taking place to evaluate the viability of cancelling Ares I.

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Letter to President Obama

April 20, 2009

The Honorable Barack Obama

President of the United States

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20500

 

Dear Mr. President:

 

NASA management has directed the decommissioning of the space shuttle fleet to begin April 30 of this month.  If this directive is allowed to proceed it will commit this nation to a six year space station supply launch gap and require purchasing from $2 to $6 billion of foreign launch services. The uncertainty in the availability of foreign launch services and the incapability of those launch systems to provide timely and critical station replacement components exposes the station to risk of being destroyed.

 

NASA has been unable to resolve the numerous development problems with the Ares I Orion shuttle replacement vehicle and the launch date for full operation crew rotation service to station is now predicted to be no earlier than March 2016…the same year the International Space Station is scheduled to be decommissioned. The Orion crew rotation vehicle is a unique design for station support and must be redesigned for the lunar mission. Safety issues, significant development cost overruns and excessive operation costs, and the failure to meet a full operational date before space station decommissioning justify the cancellation of the Orion crew rotation vehicle.  

 

Space Shuttle is still the only viable vehicle for space station support. However, the fleet is not cost effective or is it safe to operate in the current configuration until station decommissioning in 2016. Shuttle privatization offers solutions to these problems and  provides the opportunity for this nation to regain dominance in the commercial launch market. Shuttle privatization was requested by the 107th Congress and was evaluated by the Shuttle Program Office to have significant benefit to the government.

 

Cancellation of the Orion crew rotation vehicle permits NASA the time and resources to focus on the primary objective of the Constellation Program’s to return human to the Moon and beyond. The Shuttle privatization solution eliminates the station launch gap and the need for foreign launch services, keeps the capability to replace critical station systems and return cargo, lowers operation cost, and contributes to the economic recovery. However, this window of opportunity will close if NASA is permitted to proceed with shuttle decommissioning.

 

Mr. President, if you approve the decommissioning of the space shuttle your administration will condone the mistakes of the previous administration that are devastating our space endeavors. Mr. President you do have another option…cancel the ISS Orion and privatize the “Made in the USA” space shuttle.

Don A. Nelson

Nelson Aerospace Consulting

Retired NASA Engineer

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Commercial Space Shuttle

Arianespace confirmed its world leadership, as it carried out six Ariane 5 launches, orbiting 10 geostationary satellites plus the Jules Verne ATV to the International Space Station. It won 13 of the 18 launch contracts open to competition during the year.

Following the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders on Wednesday, April 8, 2009 in Evry, France, Arianespace announced 2008 sales of 955.7 million euros, with net income of 2.5 million euros.

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NASA must be removed from the space transportation business in order for this nation to regain the commercial launch market. NASA’s will no longer require the costly and wasteful “marching army” for shuttle operations which has consumed 25% of past budgets and the launch cost can be cut in half. Privatization will overcome the internal cultural obstacles that have prevented shuttle flight automation and crew escape pods.

Privatization must be reinstated with the following goals: Establish a government corporation to operate the existing fleet for NASA. The space shuttle government corporation will take one orbiter out of service and upgrade the vehicle for unmanned operations, install crew escape modules, and build a new launch facility. Funding for these upgrades would be provided by the corporation by selling government bonds. When available the remaining orbiters will receive these upgrades and the government corporation sold to the private sector. The then private corporation will provide commercial, civil, and military launch service with these upgrade orbiters. A technology program directed by government agencies (NASA, DARPA and others) will be established to promote the safe and efficient operations for private space systems operators.

There is no doubt that the space shuttle in its current configuration is a costly and unsafe human transportation system. However, even with two tragic failures, the “reusable” space shuttle has proven to be a most reliable and practical concept for space transportation and there are feasible and realistic solutions for making the space shuttle safer and cost effective. As a privatized transportation system, the space shuttle can reduce operations cost by offering commercial launch services.

Over 40 percent of the shuttle cost is for operations compared to 20 percent for the expendable Atlas II. In previously Shuttle accountings another 10 percent was charged for government resources and program management (R&PM). Privatization reduces the shuttle operations cost to slight over 20 percent of the flight cost which frees up skilled employees to work technology research programs. 

Crew safety can be significantly insured with the installation of crew escape pods in the Orbiter.

Prior to the space shuttle Columbia disaster, plans were in progress to privatize the space shuttle operations.

 

 

Note: Privatization will allow continuation of space shuttle service to space station and allows the $200 billion space shuttle investment from becoming a museum exhibit. Privatization saves thousand of jobs and will make the U.S. a competitive provider of launch services for the government and commercial sectors. The U.S. is at a critical junction as the leading space-faring nation. We can go forward with the commercial space shuttle or we can become history. However there are four problems that have prevented the space shuttle from achieving its potential: It’s too expensive to operate, there is no crew escape system, and the re-entry thermal protection system is too fragile. All three of these problems have technical solutions. It is the fourth problem, the political problem that is most challenging.

 

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Commercial Space Shuttle Business Plan

Preface

There is an old axiom that governs all space endeavors… “If you can’t get it into space…you can’t use it in space.” The ability of the United States to “get it into space” is being severely curtailed by the ever increasing cost of launch operations. If the U.S. continues to ignore the launch cost issue it will relinquish its leadership as the world’s predominant space-faring nation. Consider the following:

·       High U.S. labor cost to manufacture and launch the Atlas and Delta Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles have prevented the United Launch Alliance group from successfully competing in the commercial launch market. Obtaining commercial launch business was a key factor for reducing military launch costs.

·       There is compelling evidence that the Ares launch vehicles are burdened with costly development problems and will fail. Failure of the Ares I /Orion space shuttle replacement vehicle will cause immeasurable damage to this Nation’s space endeavors! Even if the development problems can be overcome, the manpower cost required to manufacture and operate the Ares / Orion vehicles will be prohibitive. 

·       The Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) launch vehicles are under funded and unproven. The cargo and crew modules development and operations cost remain more conjecture than reality.

·       NASA plans to purchase launch services from the Russian government for space station support and commercial U.S. satellites are routinely orbited by foreign launch vehicles. The U.S. is now a buyer and not a competitive provider of launch services.

There is a Solution…Privatize the Space Shuttle Fleet!!!

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Feasible and Realistic Goals for the Commercial Space Shuttle

·       Reduce the space shuttle launch cost to near the $200 million level.

·       Support an initial flight rate of seven flights per year and can expand the flight rate to twelve flights per year.

·       Provide launch services for civil and military endeavors.

·       Establish a competitive commercial launch service.

·       Incorporate a crew escape pods system that provides escape avenues for all phases of flight.

·       Establish the foundation for a space based (reusable) transportation system, developed by NASA and commercially operated.

In response to the 107th Congress’s request to investigate privatizing the space shuttle program (SSP), NASA issued the following:

 

CONCEPT OF PRIVATIZATION OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM

//s/Ronald D. Dittemore 9/28/01

Ronald D. Dittemore September 28, 2001

Manager, Space Shuttle Program

Summary

It is believed that utilization of the Space Shuttle for human access to space will continue through at least 2015 and possibly beyond 2020. The longevity and operational aspects of this program demand a different approach to operational management for the future. A different management strategy needs to be employed.

Privatization of the SSP has the potential to provide significant benefits to the Government. However, timing is critical. The continuing erosion of NASA skills and experience threatens the safety of the program. It is critical to take advantage of the existing NASA SSP expertise before further erosion affects the ability to plan and safely implement privatization. Today, the skill and knowledge legacy still remain to formulate the appropriate merger of the NASA SSP and private industry.

Privatization of the space shuttle fleet eliminates the sole reliance on the questionable Ares I /Orion launch system. Allowing the space shuttle infrastructure to be dismantled or gather dust in museums will be a costly mistake.

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The Current Space Shuttle Problems and Privatization Solutions

Too Expensive to Operate:

The current space shuttle’s operation consumes over 20 percent of NASA’s budget. The NASA management structure is too fragmented to effectively direct flight operations. There are too many employees (17,000) at too many centers. There is no incentive to reduce operations cost. Executive order prohibits commercial operations. This results in excessive operation cost.

Privatization solution:

There have been extensive undertakings to reduce the cost of expendable launch vehicles which has resulted in significant reductions in their operations costs. There has NEVER been any determined effort to reduce the cost of space shuttle operations. Competitive launch cost can be achieved by: Removing all civil service support, consolidation of operation at the launch site, and automation of ground and flight operations. Reducing launch cost is not a technical challenge…it is a political challenge. The following chart shows the breakdown where significant cost reductions can be achieved by privatization of the space shuttle operations:

Space Shuttle Extremely Difficult to Upgrade:

Since 1994 NASA has invested over $8 billion in upgrades for the shuttle launch system. The space shuttle ground and flight avionic systems were not designed to be upgraded. The glass cockpit upgrade is a dismal example of the upgrade problem. This project was started in 1992, was first flown in April 2000, and was not completed until 2006. The cost soared to over $300 million for an upgrade that provided only a cosmetic effect and marginal flight safety.

Privatization solution:

Automation of the ground and flight control systems permits the introduction of modular subsystems. A ground and flight control system based on a modular subsystem design can be repaired or upgraded without interference to the central avionic control computing system. Modular subsystems were first introduced on the Boeing 777 civil airliner and are now standard designs on all modern aircraft. It was the design baseline for the X-33 VentureStar launch vehicle.  

Reentry Thermal Protective System is too  Fragile:

Foam shedding from the external is not the problem that needs fixing. The entry thermal tiles are too fragile and must be replaced. NASA has failed to conduct extensive research on thermal reentry systems. However, the Air Force X-37 space research vehicle program is addressing this critical issue.

Privatization solution:

Automation will allow the introduction of vehicle ground and flight health monitoring systems to monitor and identify breaches in the thermal protective system, however the current tile system is unacceptable and must be replaced.

No Adequate Crew Escape System:

The space shuttle must have a crew escape system for launch, on-orbit, and re-entry phases of flight.

Privatization solution:

Automation of shuttle flight provides sufficient margins to permit installation of crew escape pods. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SURVIVABILITY WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE CHALLENGER AND COLUMBIA CREWS IF THEY HAD CREW ESCAPE PODS! Continued operation of the space shuttle without crew escape pods is a failure of due diligence. 

Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods

 

SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT SAFETY and Mission Success COMPARISION

Safety Experts Call for Shuttle Shutdown (Source: Orlando Sentinel)
Saying NASA is at a critical crossroads, independent safety experts have called for the agency to stay the course and shut down the shuttle program after nine remaining missions. Keeping NASA’s shuttle fleet flying beyond 2010 would endanger astronauts and sap money from efforts to return American astronauts to the moon by 2020, the group said. “Continuing to fly the shuttle not only would increase the risk to crews, but also could jeopardize the future U.S. exploration program by squeezing available resources,” the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel said in its latest annual report, released Thursday. The panel was created by Congress after the 1967 Apollo 1 launch pad fire killed three astronauts. (4/17
)

These are the same experst that said they didn’t do tech analyses when ask to investigate Ares I structural problem. .Don A. Nelson

Shuttle reliability remains unrivaled

Robert L. "bob" Crippen | Special to the sentinel

January 23, 2009

The space industry is approaching a fateful six-day period that has become an annual time of reflection and rededication, as it honors the memory of the three great space tragedies in our history: Apollo 1 (Jan. 27, 1967), Challenger (Jan. 28, 1986) and Columbia (Feb. 1, 2003).
These anniversaries serve as reminders that the price we sometimes pay for extending our reach beyond our earthly grasp can be high. For that reason, it is imperative that we base decisions about how to proceed with our nation's agenda in space on the right arguments.
There is an ongoing discussion among the aerospace and political community regarding the risks of flying the space shuttle beyond its current retirement date of 2010. Those who oppose it often cite aging and safety concerns. Too often, these arguments have been based on somewhat scary probability figures that, by themselves, are wholly inadequate to determine how much longer the shuttle should fly.
In weighing the options for our space program, the new administration will need qualified, independent sources to help define the associated risk, and a common language for discussing it. These kinds of discussions generally rely on one of two methods for defining and accepting risk: demonstrated reliability or predicted risk.

Using predictive models, the generally accepted number based on Probabilistic Risk Assessment of the shuttle is about a 1 in 77 chance for loss of a vehicle on any single mission.
However, as former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin has pointed out, PRA "depends very strongly on underlying assumptions, which are, in essence, impossible to verify. So, in the end, we can estimate risk levels but cannot know them accurately."
Furthermore, this approach does not factor in the multitude of safety enhancements made since Columbia, the ongoing improvement in the vehicle, or the performance of the team that maintains and operates it.
Orbiters returning from space today are among the cleanest in program history. From improvements to the thermal-protection system, to new wiring in the orbiter fleet and an enhanced process for building external tanks, the program never stops striving to improve performance and safety.
After 126 flights, the demonstrated reliability of the space shuttle is 98.4 percent. Other than the Russian Soyuz (98.2 percent), the demonstrated reliability of systems currently being considered for human spaceflight is zero, since those systems have not yet flown.
Ultimately, there is no way to eliminate risk in spaceflight. At best we can try to understand and manage it to an acceptable level. The risk of flying the shuttle has been successfully managed in 98.4 percent of the missions. The continuous efforts to improve the safety and reliability have resulted in a robust system that is, in many ways, safer each time it flies.
The decision to continue flying the shuttle involves a number of important considerations. As the new administration considers ways to meet the nation's goals in space, it should base its policy decisions on objective assessment of national needs, priorities and available resources
.

The space shuttle transportation system had completed a remarkable 67 consecutive missions before having a catastrophic mission. With crew escape pods the Columbia space shuttle disaster would have been an accident…not a human disaster.

Russia’s Soyuz had completed 68 consecutive missions before having a catastrophic mission. Two flight crews have been lost, both during entry phase of mission. The Russians plan to replace their Soyuz with a reusable vehicle.

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Privatizing the Space Shuttle Fleet

  • The government enables space shuttle privatization by the transfer to a US Government corporation and then at a later date, a sale to the private sector (example: the united Stated Enrichment Corporation (USEC).
  • The government would provide indemnification and tax exempt status during the period the fleet operated as a US Government Corporation.  NASA’s decommissioning of the fleet places its value to the government as “scrap value.” This is unacceptable.
  • During the period of operation as a US Government Corporation the private operator would use existing NASA facilities as a non-interference operator to the Ares/Orion launch program if it still exists.
  • The private corporation will upgrade the fleet and construct private launch facilities (Space Florida) to improve safety and reduce operation costs.
  • NASA should be tasked to conduct technology research projects that expand the capability of the private space launch industry.

 

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Commercial Space Shuttle Development Phases

·       Operate two Orbiters from current facilities during US Government Corporation phase (assumes Ares program has been cancelled) or operate fleet on a non-interference arrangement if NASA continues to develop Ares.

·       Third Orbiter is removed from flight operations and modified to reduce launch cost and improve safety (Commercial Space Shuttle II). Private corporation will be permitted to sell bonds and stock to finance modifications and startup cost.

·       Launch market demands will determine when remaining two Orbiters will be scheduled for upgrades.

·       Space Shuttle III will be placed in service when NASA and DARPA second generation technologies become available.

Shuttle II Development Concept

Space Shuttle II is a four year development and flight test program. It is based on existing technology and proven ground and flight control systems. The goal is to prove that reusable automated space vehicles are the correct approach for developing the 21st century space transportation system. Technology development programs for further improvement in safety and launch cost reduction will be conducted for Space Shuttle III.

·       The operational savings are gained from reductions in support personnel made possible by flight automation and consolidating operations at KSC. This is a similar approach used to reduce the Ariane 5 and Evolved Expendable Launch vehicles launch costs. Automated operation was also the program baseline for the X-33/VentureStar project.

·       The shuttle pilot training facilities will be closed. All flight monitoring will be conducted from the corporation flight control center(Space Florida). Personnel needed to operate the automated SS II launch system has been estimated to be in the 7,000 range. Estimated saving is approximately $1 billion per year.

·       Automation provides nearly 3,700 pounds weight margin which permits installation of four escape pods.

·       This launch vehicle concept is to be tailored for a private operator. NASA will continue to have responsibility for flight crew operations as related to payloads.

·       A GOVERNMENT AGENCY DOES NOT HAVE THE “INCENTIVE” TO OPERATE A COST EFFECTIVE LAUNCH SYSTEM.

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Shuttle II / CEP Development Cost Estimate
Four Years Program

 

Cost ~ $ Mil

Escape Pods

  500

Avionics

1200

Ground Support

  800

 

 

Contingency/Fees(40%)

1000

Got. Support(15%)

  375

 

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TOTAL

3875

Escape pods cost of $500 million is for the development and delivery of 12 pods.

Avionics cost of $1.2 billion is for all remaining Orbiters and includes integrated vehicle health management systems, automated flight control, and replacing wiring with fiber optics. Avionics design is to be based on modular subsystems to permit uncomplicated system upgrades.

Ground systems cost of $800 million is for new pre-mission planning support, ground monitoring, and integrated assembly/launch pad facilities. NO SS II VEHICLE COMMAND FUNCTIONS WILL BE REQUIRED FROM THE NASA-JSC OR NASA-KSC FACILITIES.

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Commercial Space Shuttle III Safety and Performance Upgrade Priority List

Unlike the Ares launch vehicles there are viable avenues for improving the performance and safety of the commercial SS II. The following systems are high priority candidates for the SS III configuration:

·       Thermal Protection System - consideration must be given to TPS improvement. The X-37 flight test for thermal protection must be reinstated.

·       External Tank - investigate lowering the cost of the tank.

o      Retractable thermal ground blanket at launch pad.

o      Explore using the tank for on orbit storage and deep space facilities.

·       Solid Rocket Booster Motors

o      Test large diameter hybrid motors.

o      Investigate removing thrust vectoring.

o      Consider additional manufacturer.

·       Mechanical and Power

o      Replace APU and hydraulics. Develop long life high density batteries.

·       Non Toxic OMS/RCS

o      Sole source for OMS/RCS hypergolic propellants unacceptable.

Removing flight operations from NASA permits the agency to conduct technology !!!

It is feasible that the Space Shuttle III can compete for commercial payloads and efficiently deliver enough payload mass to low earth orbit for construction of large space based vehicles. This would preclude development of a heavy lift launch vehicle.

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CAUTION- It is also extremely unlikely that the Delta IV heavy can be delivered as a crew launch vehicle. It was this over simplification that got NASA in trouble with the Ares I Orion. The Orion command service modules cost of $375 million was based on the project Apollo CSM cost using the NASA new start inflation index to project the mission cost to 2009. Unconfirmed NASA cost estimations for an Ares I Orion launch operation were $1.75 billion per launch. It can be expected the Ares I Orion launch cost will significantly exceed those of shuttle especially when the cost of the cargo delivery is considered.

Only shuttle provides cargo delivery and return capability. The shuttle launch cost assumes four flights per year. The privatized commercial space shuttle (CSS) assumes increased flight rates from the commercial market.  

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Conclusions

·        Expanded space exploration and utilization has been stymied in the United States by the high labor costs. Automation of the space shuttle provides the avenues to reduce high labor cost and transfer manpower to technology research endeavors.

·        Allowing a contractor to own (or lease) the orbiters and market launch services would give the contractor vested interest for reducing operations costs.

·        The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is a successful example of transferring government property to the private sector.

·        Privatization of the space shuttle provides a path of minimum obstacles for the development of a 21st century competitive space transportation system.

Commercial Space Shuttle and the Moon

There is only one valid reason for returning humans to the Moon…SURVIVAL.  If mankind is to survive we must have safe havens other than those on planet Earth. The Moon is the first logical step in establishing those safe havens. As the knowledge of our universe has increased so has the realization that planet Earth is vulnerable to threats from deep space as well as those created on our home planet.

Anthropologists have traced the extinction of the dinosaurs to asteroids impacting Earth and even today this occurrence may be looming in our not too distant future as asteroid Apophis is predicted to make an incredibly close pass by our planet in 2029.  Then the asteroid will return in 2036 with another chance to impact the Earth. Is this mankind’s timetable to establish permanent human presence on the Moon?

The commercial Space Shuttle II is the first step in establishing a feasible and realistic human REUSABLE space transportation system for colonization of the Moon.

Can we afford to continue on NASA’s Constellation Program path?

The President and Congress must take immediate action for space shuttle privatization!

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Commercial Orbital Transportation Services

COTS…too many negatives! Neither, the Orbital Science’s Taurus/Cygnus or SpaceX’s Falcon 9/Dragon heavy lift launch system exists. The lofty and improbable goals of these companies still cannot eliminate the need to secure foreign launch services for ISS support. Neither vehicle solves the reusable issue required to reduce launch costs to competitive levels. The downturn in the economy makes the task of getting private funding for these heavy lift vehicles impossible.

NASA’s plan to spend $3.5 billion for twelve SpaceX vehicles will cost $130 million per flight and eight Orbital Science vehicles will cost $237 million per flight. The cargo cost per pound will be at least twice that of the space shuttle’s plus the cost of crew transportation on the Russian Soyuz vehicle make the COTS operations cost prohibitive. Crew transportation on COTS vehicle is an unrealistic goal.

Privatization of the space shuttle eliminates the need for NASA to spend $3.5 billion on launch systems that are inferior to the space shuttle.

 

NASA has estimated that the ISS will require 10 to 20 mt of cargo per year. Launch cost are unavailable for the Ares I Orion (AO).  A minimum cost was derived by using the Delta IV heavy and the projected 2009 cost of an Apollo command service module. The above chart estimates the launch cost to supply the crew and cargo requirements using the Ares I Orion / SpaceX Dragon (AO/SPX), Ares I / Orbital Taurus Cygnus (AO/Orb), Ares I Orion / Automatic Transfer Vehicle (AO/ATV), current space shuttle, and the CSS. The cost assumed two Ares I Orion crew transfer missions per year and the minimum 10 mt of cargo. Should the year cargo requirement be 20 mt the COTS cost would double while the shuttle cost would remain the unchanged. Again only the space shuttle has cargo return capability.

NOTE:

Unconfirmed NASA sources reported that the Ares I Orion ISS crew rotation vehicle would cost more than $3.5 billion a year which exceed those of the shuttle. Due to the continuing development challenges with the Ares I Orion program, this cost cannot be confirmed or reputed by NASA’s Constellation management. Therefore to obtain a “ballpark” estimate for the ISS transportation cost, the Ariane V / Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and the Delta IV heavy launcher with an Apollo crew module was to determine a “ballpark estimate” of station expected post assembly transportation operations cost.

 

Evaluation Considerations:

·        NASA will require approximately 10 to 20 Mt of cargo per year for station to sustain the systems and utilize the internal laboratories and external platforms.

·        ATV assembly and launch cost is $390 million based on the April 17 2009 euro to dollar exchange rate.

·        Ariane V launch cost were $147 million with no addition allowance for launch operation cost.

·        Delta IV cost of $280 million assumes no additional operations booster cost for launching crew rotation module.

·        Using the NASA new start index inflation calculator the Apollo crew command service module cost were used to estimate the module assembly cost to be $355 million.

·        $573 million for the crew command service module launch, mission and naval crew recovery operations cost based on the Apollo 17 operations cost projected to 2009. Mission operations for NASA crew launches will require at minimum of 6000 employees for mission planning, crew training, vehicle assembly and checkout, and flight control,

·        Two ATV launches with 7.2 Mt cargo capabilities needed to meet the 10 Mt requirement and 3 launches for the 20Mt requirement.

·        Two crew rotations launches per year were required for the six man station crew.

 

ISS Yearly Transportation Cost Estimate  ~ 10Mt and Two Crew Rotations

 

1st cargo launch       $390 m

2nd cargo launch      $390 m

Total cargo              $780 m

 

Crew Rotation Cost per launch

Delta IV                    $280 m        

Crew module            $355 m

Flt. Operations          $572 m

Total                       $1.207 b    times two launches per year = $2.414 billion

 

Total cargo                $780 m

Total crew              $2.414 b

 

Total                       $3.194 billion per year for ISS cargo crew transportation

 

Comments:

·        NASA will require only two Ares I per year and therefore the manufacturing cost will be significantly more than the Delta IV heavy cost of $280 million.

·        ESA has commitments to launch four ATV at one launch per year. NASA will be required to buy at least one ATV and two ATV’s for the 20 Mt  cargo delivery requirement years.

·        The Ares I Orion operations cost will not be less than $1 billion per year and with the cargo cost will exceed the space shuttle cost of $1 billion per launch with a four launch per year usage. 

·        Shuttle operation cost for two ISS mission per year ~ $3.75 billion.

·        Lower operations cost can be achieved if the space shuttle is privatized

 

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Long Range Objectives

NASA must have a space transportation system which is reusable and space based and operated by the private sector

 

 

Lunar Program: The near term lunar program should continue with the robotic exploration of the moon. The lunar exploration must be defined to not only explore but also to identify the requirements for establishing the moon as a safe haven for human survival. Lunar safe haven is the only valid reason for establishing a human lunar base. The schedule for that plan is outline in the above space transportation plan.

The following proposed Lunar space transportation system (STS) provides the guidelines for the technology development program.

 

Note: The lunar excursion vehicle is space based in Moon orbit. The following technology programs should be considered:

 

 

 

Objectives and requirements have been published in the author’s reference book.

Mars Program: Today’s technology limitations prevent human exploration of Mars from being considered as a feasible and realistic goal. However, the Mars STS would follow the same space based development plan envisioned for the lunar STS. Until technology is available significant knowledge has and can be achieved by robotic exploration.

  

NOTE: THESE OBJECTIVES IDENTIFY ONLY THE DIRECTION THE NEXT NASA ADMINSTRATIVE MUST ENDORSE. IT WILL REQUIRE SUPPORT FROM THE AEROSPACE COMMUNITY, THE CONGRESS, AND THE PRESIDENT TO FORMULATE AND INITATE THE STRAGETIC PLAN.

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OBTAIN AUTHOR’S BOOK   

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NASA Budget Problems

Congressman Sherwood Boehlert, "There is simply not enough money in NASA's budget to carry out all the tasks it is undertaking on the current schedule. That's a fact."   NASA MUST CHANGE DIRECTION!

NASA’s Budget Crisis

 

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on the President’s budget for fiscal year 2009 and data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

·        The CBO projected the need for $7 billion for the Ares I.

·        Extending ISS past 2016 will cost an additional $8 to $12 billion for station operations and launch services. NASA 2008 authorization H.R. 6063 requires that the ISS remain viable through at least 2020. This adds $2 billion annually ISS operation costs from the current 2016 decommissioning date.

·        Foreign launch service cost and capability uncertain.

·        Credibility: GAO assessed 18 NASA projects with a combined life-cycle cost of more than $50 billion. Of those, 10 out of 13 projects that had entered the implementation phase experienced significant cost and/or schedule growth.

·        Gross debt rose from $5.8 trillion in 2001 to an estimated $12.1 trillion in 2009.

      

Budget Solutions:

·        Cancel the Orion crew rotation vehicle and privatize space shuttle.

·        Seek more support from the ISS partners for operation of the space station and establish a firm date for decommissioning the station.

·        Justify the existing budget level by establishing technology program to supplement the Constellation program.

·        Do not commit to new program until technology available.

·        Seek international support for the Earth Observation and Near Earth Object Programs. United Nation’s support and coordination should be considered.  

·        Freeze all promotions and salary raises until economy crisis is alleviated.

·        Expand academia research program.   

Other Budget Considerations:

·        Encourage NASA patent auctions to reduce national debt and improve domestic economy.

·        License access to the Global Positioning System with proceeds going to space technology development. 

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International Space Station Decision

There are many factors the next NASA administrator and the President elect must consider in deciding the future of the $120 billion International Space Station (ISS).

·        First and foremost is the station worth the $4 billion annual cost for operations support?

A long duration manned tended station instead of the current permanently manned operation may be a cost effective option and still provide productive scientific investigations.

·        What fiscal support will be provided by the international partners?

It is feasible for Russian, ESA, and Japanese launch vehicles to meet the 10 to 20 metric tons ISS cargo requirements. More important what portion of the crew/cargo budget will they be willing to assume?

·        Will the ISS be able to operate without the space shuttle from 2010 till 2020?

The ISS was designed for space shuttle support. Station electrical power is already a critical resource. The solar arrays can only be replaced by the space shuttle. With the existing problems of the station solar arrays it is unrealistic to believe that existing electrical power level supply will be available after 2010. Without the space shuttle only 132 pounds of experiments can be returned on each Soyuz flight.

It is extremely doubtful that the ISS can operate until 2012 without shuttle support. 

NOTE: The Commercial Space Shuttle offers the most feasible and realistic approach for providing cost effective crew and cargo transportation to the ISS.

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More NASA Problems

Technology Development

NASA is technology bankrupt. For nearly three decades NASA has failed to institute a technology development program. Without advancement in technology there will be no advancements in aeronautics and space exploration. NASA’s policy of development technology during the program development contributes to excessive cost and program failures. Technology development must become NASA first priority. Technology programs must be established in the following disciplines:

·        Propulsion Systems

·        Structural Material

·        Electrical Power Systems

·        Avionics

·        Manufacturing Tooling Systems

·        Also see the author’s book.

In the late 1980’s NASA established technology teams in the above disciplines comprised of NASA employees and members of the aerospace community to identify and prioritize technologies need for future programs. No funding was ever provided for the technology programs. These technology working groups must be reestablished and funded or NASA programs will continue to fail.

Propulsion Systems:

The existing space transportation system launch and orbital vehicle performance capability is provided by chemical liquid oxygen/hydrogen (or RP-1 kerosene fuel) engines and solid rocket or hybrid boosters. These propulsion systems have reached their maximum performance potential. However significant cost reductions for this class of engines can be achieved with the development of reusable engines for launch vehicles and the development of propulsion systems for space based vehicles. Improved sensors that provide information to decrease maintenance and flight operations cost are key technology requirements for these class engines and, therefore must be assigned the highest priority. In addition space based propulsion systems would require the development of a long duration propellant storage system.

NOTE: The space shuttle main engine (SSME) is the only existing reusable engine. That technology must not be lost.

The long range advance propulsion technology concepts have a wide range of possibilities. Several propulsion systems for long range consideration are:

Solar Propulsion— Incorporating a reflective solar concentrator to heat liquid hydrogen to a vapor which is expanded through a nozzle to generate thrust.

Sunlight Sail—An extremely thin and large sheet of material is expanded in space to capture the force of the sunlight like sailboats capture the wind for their propulsion force.

Nuclear Propulsion—Same principal as solar propulsion except nuclear energy is used to heat the liquid hydrogen.

Anti-matter—Collides a proton with a positive charge into an antiproton with a negative charge that produces a tremendous force for propulsion.

Plasma Rocket—hydrogen gas is heated to extreme temperatures and accelerated by magnetic fields to provide thrust.

The long range propulsion technologies will be extremely challenging to develop and will require extensive laboratory research testing.

Structural materials—technologies are needed to decrease the structural weight of space vehicles. Carbon nanotubes materials appear to have tremendous potential for space structures. They are light weight and stronger than existing spacecraft materials. The tubes also have the potential to

solve the storage and leakage problems for cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen. The tubes can only be produced under laboratory conditions. A top priority must be assigned to the development and large scale production of this material.

Research is required for materials to replace the shuttle thermal protective system. Ceramic materials for engine components also have shown promise.

Electrical Power Systems—are limited to the capability of batteries, solar arrays, and nuclear power generators. Extensive research is required in all these areas. Electro-mechanical actuators research is required to remove hypergolic generator from flight systems. 

Avionics—will present an extremely difficult management problem for the development of a space based autonomous vehicle. Foremost in these problems will be costs that may exceed 50 percent of the vehicle total cost. The integrated health monitoring and autonomous control system of

reusable space vehicles also presents formidable technology challenges in the areas of software and sensors.

Autonomous navigation systems must be developed and verified. One of the more exciting avionics technologies being investigated is in the field of nano-electronic devices. Laboratory demonstrations of accelerometers, gyros, pressure sensors, thermal actuators, and optical devices

are resulting in encouraging indications that this technology can significantly reduce space vehicle weight, improve safety by providing additional layers of redundancy, and reduce operations costs.

Manufacturing Tooling Systems- Advanced materials for future space programs must have machines that can process them. The transfer of manufacturing to foreign countries with low labor cost has diminished this nation capability to made manufacturating tools. There is an acute need for machines that process existing and advance materials which allow U.S. companies to produce products that can compete in the market.

NASA’s Innovative Partnership Program- This program allows the agency to sell NASA patents that have application in the commercial market. It is the key to make NASA a contributor instead of a continuing drain on the nation’s economy.

For Addition Technology Program Information Obtain Author’s Book

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Constellation Program

NASA in 2004 committed to the Constellation Program which required sending robotic lunar missions by 2008, completing the space station and retiring the space shuttle by the year 2010, out source for space station support until the first shuttle replacement mission in 2014, partially fund the development of two commercial launch ventures, decommission the space station by 2016, conduct a lunar human mission as early as 2015, and return to the moon to stay by 2020.

The Constellation space vehicles were conceived by individuals with no or little background in space vehicle development. The validation of these vehicles was a rushed 90 days study compromised by a new Administrator’s known desire to precede with this “conjectured” transportation system and the President’s ill advised decision to decommission the space shuttle without first insuring the development of a replacement vehicle.

The results has been:

·        The Ares I Orion shuttle replacement vehicle has experience serious development problems and may never become operational. If the still mounting development problems are ever solved the vehicle would not be able to provide space station crew delivery until 2016. This will require purchasing Russian crew transfer launch service for six years!

·        The Ares V lunar transportation vehicle is also experiencing costly and time consuming development problems. NASA’s plan to use shuttle derived flight components to reduce development costs for the Ares I and V has been a failure.

NASA’s Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS)

THE CONSTELLATION PROGRAM WILL COST $230 BILLION PLUS TO DEVELOP A SEVEN LUNAR STAY CAPABILITY…THIS IS PROGRAM MUST BE REVISED!

Space Forum: “It is no exaggeration to say that the original ESAS plan now lies in ruins. There is virtually nothing left of the original claims of low development cost and high inheritance from Shuttle.”

The Apollo Program spent $165 billion (2005 dollars) through the first lunar landing. NASA management has estimated in their 2006 Exploration System Architecture Study that the Constellation program through the first lunar landing would cost only $124 billion. NASA management concluded that the costs were estimated conservatively because they included $20 billion for ISS servicing by the Ares I Orion (CEV). In other words the cost of Constellation up to the first lunar landing would only be $102 billion! NASA would develop a stand alone crew launch vehicle (which Apollo didn’t require) and develop the largest cargo launcher ever built for a cost nearly 40% less the Apollo Program. THIS IS WHY NASA MUST HAVE EFFECTIVE PROGRAM OVERSIGHT.  

 

Warning Signs of Constellation Program Failure

May 2005 – The space shuttle replacement program loses 16 months of development time when NASA Administrator Mike Griffin stopped the original program based on the Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles.

 

July 2005 – NASA announces the Ares I launch vehicle configuration will maximize use of space shuttle components. Predicts Ares I will have “huge cost advantages” and crewed flight to space station by June 2011.

"We have ways to construct such vehicles using shuttle solid-rocket motors and external tanks and shuttle main engines," Griffin said of the new boosters Friday. "We think the existing components offer us huge cost advantages as opposed to starting from a clean sheet of paper, and that's what I've proposed doing." Orlando Sentinel. None of the “existing components” worked!

March 2006 – Ares V first stage SSME engines replaced with lower performance RS-68 engines causes all cost savings shuttle derived systems to be deleted from Ares V. The lower performance of the RS-68 engine will eliminate the use of the shuttle external tank and require a costly redesign of the first stage tanks.

 

June 2006 – Structural problems in the Ares five-segment first stage solid rocket motor could not be resolved by ATK’s engineering analyses. NASA has been forced to schedule costly flight test(s) to verify the structural integrity of the booster. The first test has a four segment motor with a dummy fifth segment, which may not verify structural integrity.

Concerns:

In-flight structural failure could cause a rapid pitch / yaw rate that could prevent a safe Orion (crew module) separation.

 

April 2007 – NASA adds two year to design phase of Orion and deletes pressurized cargo carrier for ISS. All cargo to ISS will be by foreign launch systems.

 

May 2007 – Constellation management concedes that Ares I Orion human launch prediction in 2015 is only at a 65% confidence level.

 

July 2008 – “The cost problems include an $80 million overrun on a motor system. The Orion spacecraft’ design remains too heavy for the proposed Ares I rocket. Software development, heat shield testing and other complex work remain behind schedule or over budget. There are dozen of such serious challenges, many of which are worsening.” Florida Today 7-17-2008

 

August 2008 - Given the projected weight of the Ares V vehicle, mobile launcher and transporter, the total weight is about 33% higher than the crawlerway has ever supported…there is a possibility that the crawlerway could fail to support the load, resulting in severe impacts to the Constellation programme.. Flight International

 

October 2008NASA cleared to conclude a $700 million-plus deal with Russia for periodic Soyuz and unmanned Progress re-supply flights to the international space station through 2011. Cost for Russian launch services from 2011 to 2016 could exceed $3 billion.

October 2008 - Currently, Orion is due to launch its debut manned flight in 2015. However, the first crew rotation on the ISS won’t happen until one year later on Orion 4 - in reality a six year gap.

January 2009 – NASA administrator Mike Griffin resignation becomes effective.

February – Ares V engine change under review.

March 2009 – NASA considering ISS Orion crew size reduction o four instead of six.

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Next Administrator’s Management Strategic Plan

Near Term Objectives Requiring Immediate Attention:

Space Shuttle Privatization

The shuttle workforce currently consists of approximately 2,000 civil service and 15,000 contractor personnel that includes a large number of engineers and scientists. There are too many in the shuttle personnel that don’t actually support flight operation. Privatization allows NASA to redirect these unutilized resources from shuttle operations to technology research for advance flight systems. Shuttle privatization keeps space funds from being spent on foreign launch systems.

Technology Program

Reestablish the technology teams to identify the near term technology priorities. Task and fund the various NASA centers with development of those technologies. Each center will seek support from the aerospace industry and academia for assistance in development of the technology.

Having technology available can reduce program development cycles from the current 5-10 years to 2-4 years.

Human Survival Safeguards

NASA has not exercised due diligence in their responsibility to provide safeguards for terrestrial and extraterrestrial threats to human survival. The National Research Council has warned that Earth Observation Program is at risk. The space observation capability has been diminished as the earth observation satellite system deteriorates. The Near Earth Object Program has a congressional mandate to catalogue all asteroids and comets passing near Earth that have the potential of catastrophic effects.  Nearly one thousand have been found, however the technology to deter these asteroids and comets does not exist. The increased number of identified asteroids and comets passing near Earth is a warning sign that must not be ignored. President Obama’s programs may solve the domestic and international challenges of the nation but the greatest challenge may come from a terrestrial and extraterrestrial disaster. The NASA Technology Program is the mechanism to start planning for this threat to mankind very existence. 

Earth Observation Program

This is a time for unprecedented urgency for earth science research, however there continues to be cuts in this budget. This must be reversed. The technology program must identify opportunities to reduce earth science mission cost. Collaborations with the international partners are required to prevent duplication of effort of short term and long term opportunities for satellite missions.

Near Earth Object Program

NASA must do more to protect Earth from asteroid impacts. Cataloging 90% of near earth asteroids by 2020 is an inadequate goal with dire consequences. Earth must have an early warning system and options must be developed for diverting or destroying “keyhole” asteroids that will impact Earth. Asteroids passing in the near earth range should be studied as possible observation bases for monitoring deep space. International cooperation must be established!

Science

Launch costs can consume nearly half of a science program budget. Launch cost must be significantly reduced or science programs will continue to struggle with funding. Launch cost reduction must be NASA’s top priority. Reusable space based vehicles will provide a standard capability from which science payloads can be designed. Expendable deep space vehicle must also be standardized to prevent science programs failures caused by transportation system failures and budget overruns.

NASA Management

With the exception of achievements in deep space robotic missions, NASA’s successful contributions to the nation’s space endeavors have significantly deteriorated. This can be attributed to NASA managers who did not define feasible and realistic objectives and were not held accountable for their mistakes. For example, the billions in cost over runs for the space station and failure of the X-33 VentureStar has left only the U.S. taxpayers accountable.

There is a prevailing belief by NASA management that Congress will provide the additional budget to “bail out” the project once it has been approved. This unfortunately has too often been the case. Furthermore, there exists an extensive void of senior level NASA civil service employees with executive development project experience. In addition the NASA administrator does not have an independent evaluation group to evaluate the merits of proposed endeavors or monitor existing projects. This is today’s NASA management culture: “Tell them what it takes to get the project approved…don’t sweat the cost, Congress will bail you out…and no one but the taxpayers will be held accountable.”

To change this demeaning culture the next NASA administrator must have the following:

Office of the Chief Engineer

The Administrator must provide this office with the resources to serve as the agency’s independent evaluator of proposed projects and monitor of existing projects. The center chief engineer’s office will serve as the evaluator agent and report to the Headquarter chief engineer and will have no allegiance to the center director. All evaluations will be public record.

Use this office as the training ground for future executive project managers for Senior Executive Service by appointing promising candidates and rotate them around the various centers to gain insight of program management and each center’s capability.

Management creditability problems can be attributed to the lack of extensive experience in project management. Also manager has not been held accountable for their management incompetence.

The next administrator must re-establish the credibility of the agency. The peer pressure of internal monitoring by the NASA chief engineer is the most effective mechanism the Administrator can have.

NASA Advisory Council

The NASA Administrator current appoints the members of this “advisory” council. This appointment policy defeats the objective of providing independent unbiased consul for the Agency. Council members have been removed for issuing proclamations unfavorable to the Administrator position. This policy has contributed to the failure of the Constellation Program and has been detrimental to the overall performance of the Agency. There must also be an independent evaluation panel that periodically reviews NASA programs.

The NASA Advisory Council must be appointed by the President and report to the President and Congress on the Agency programs, policies, plans, financial controls, and other matters pertinent to the Agency’s responsibilities. The panel members must be appointed by the executive branch and report to the President and Congress and not be subservient to the NASA administrator. The Council must also serve as forum where NASA employees and contractor can voice concern on NASA programs and policies without fear of management reprisal.

NASA Office of Inspector General

Since 1990 NASA has had over seventy programs that have exceeded their budget by an average of 50%. Many of these programs ended up in the salvage dump. How many of the program managers or contractors were held accountable for these failures? The answer is none! Accountability doesn’t exist at NASA. The NASA Inspector General Office has the oversight responsibility; however this office is plagued by internal dissensions and its technical evaluation capability is virtually nonexistent. This office does not have the ability to evaluate the technical feasibility of NASA’s programs. The Inspector General should seek an outside independent evaluator on technical issues.

The President must appoint inspector generals whose background knowledge relates to their agency…not just government career bureaucrats. To have accountability, there must be responsible oversight.

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Reusable Space Vehicles Transportation Plan

The next NASA administrator must baseline a plan for the development of technology for reusable and space based transportation system. Russia, China, Japan, and India have all recognized that reusable space vehicles will be required for safe and cost effective 21st century space transportation system and are proceeding to that goal. NASA has a reusable launch vehicle in the space shuttle. To discard the space shuttle and its technology will be a devastating blow to this Nation’s space enterprises.

China’s Space Shuttle Goal

Ref.: “Shenlong Space Plane Advances China’s Military Space Potential by Richard Fisher Jr. , 12-17-2007

Space Based Tug- Space tugs must be a top priority for NASA’s space transportation. They are a key factor for reducing mission cost and increasing mission success. Tugs can be supplied by the shuttle and expendable launch vehicles. ONLY THE SPACE SHUTTLE CAN RETRIEVE TUG PAYLOADS! Tugs can support near earth, lunar, and deep space missions.

For proof of concept vehicle development approach obtain:  AUTHOR’S BOOK

SSME – The “ONLY” Reusable Rocket Engine

Boeing image

Should the only reusable rocket engine in the world be abandoned? NASA’s announcement to not use the Space Shuttle Main Engines on the Ares I and V is another indication that the U.S. space transportation program is on the verge of collapse. Lost of the design and manufacturing team of the only proven reusable space launch engine is another dire warning sign.

Current U.S. Expendables Launch Vehicles: The current expendable space transportation vehicles will be required to support the current and near future robotic space exploration endeavors. However the high operations cost of the heavy lift U.S. launch vehicles severely penalizes science and military missions. The high operations cost of these U.S. vehicles has in effect loss the commercial launch market to foreign competition. A privatization of the space shuttle modeled after the highly successful Arianespace Corporation launch operations must be adopted if the U.S. is to continue to be a space faring nation.

 

Note:

Arianespace announces 2008 results

Evry, April 8, 2009

Following the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders on Wednesday, April 8, 2009 in Evry, France, Arianespace announced 2008 sales of 955.7 million euros, with net income of 2.5 million euros.

Despite the global economic crisis Arianespace enjoyed a remarkable year in 2008, in terms of both number of launches and new launch contracts.

Arianespace confirmed its world leadership, as it carried out six Ariane 5 launches, orbiting 10 geostationary satellites plus the Jules Verne ATV to the International Space Station. It won 13 of the 18 launch contracts open to competition during the year.

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Author Biography

Don A. Nelson is an aerospace media consultant and writer. He has made numerous appearances on national and foreign television. His latest interview was for Nova PBS. Mr. Nelson’s has provided support to congressional offices on NASA issues. He retired from NASA in January 1999 after 36 years with the Agency. He participated in the Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Projects as a mission planner and operations technologist. Mr. Nelson was a supporting team member for the first rendezvous in space, first manned mission to the moon, first manned lunar landing, and the first flight of the Space Shuttle. During his last 11 years at NASA, he served as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation projects. He was a member of the design team for the space shuttle. His NASA experiences give him a unique knowledge of NASA’s problems and for feasible and realistic solutions. Mr. Nelson is a graduate of Southern Methodist School of Engineering. He is a certified private pilot and holds a Phase VI Pilot Proficiency Wings award from the Federal Aviation Administration.
Mr. Nelson is the author of:

NASA New Millennium Problems and Solutions

by Don A. Nelson

Written by a retired NASA engineer, this easy-to-read book is insider's look at many of the space program's current problems. Not only does it predict the most recent shuttle disaster, it provides a detailed understanding of why our nation's exploration of its 'last frontier' is headed for disaster. With aging shuttles, no definitive plans for future of the vehicle, and poor management, Nelson's book is a wake-up call to all Americans to take note and action...or lose the hope of conquering the stars (Barnes & Noble review).

How to Order:

Available most booksellers or:       www.xlibris.com/NASANewMillenniumProblemsandSolutions

Contact nasaproblems@yahoo.com for a e-book version.

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Now is the time to: ”Speak out…or forever suffer the consequences of remaining silent!”

Join the challenge…petition the President and Congress to:

Stop our jobs from going overseas…privatize the Space Shuttle…support the NASA technology program

Contact them at:

http://mygov.governmentguide.com/mygov/dbq/officials/

 

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